The Frontiers and Future Landscape of Research and Education on Value Rationality in Contemporary China

The importance of conducting in-depth research and education on value rationality in the new era is increasingly recognized.Therefore,it is essential to systematically grasp the themes,frontiers,and trends of research in this field,organizing the knowledge system to provide references for future studies.This necessitates clarifying the research achievements of scholars from different disciplines and institutions.Using the CiteSpace visualization analysis method,we can analyze,summarize,and synthesize research networks,hotspots,and knowledge structures,thereby forming a direction for advancing research.Through literature review methods and knowledge graph software analysis,it is believed that value rationality and instrumental rationality represent the rational attitudes individuals adopt when contemplating issues and putting them into practice.They are merely methods and should not be subjected to excessive value judgments.The relationship between value rationality and instrumental rationality is a focal point of societal concern,involving complex interdisciplinary issues with significant theoretical value and practical implications.In the future,the academic community needs to strengthen research collaboration,enhance the expansion of value rationality in various social practice fields,and conduct empirical studies to build consensus for the construction of Chinese society.

MATRIX ALGORITHMS AND ERROR FORMULA FOR BIVARIATE THIELE-TYPE RECTANGULAR MATRIX VALUED RATIONAL INTERPOLATION

A new method for the construction of bivariate matrix valued rational interpolants (BGIRI) on a rectangular grid is presented in [6]. The rational interpolants are of Thiele-type continued fraction form with scalar denominator. The generalized inverse introduced by [3]is gen-eralized to rectangular matrix case in this paper. An exact error formula for interpolation is ob-tained, which is an extension in matrix form of bivariate scalar and vector valued rational interpola-tion discussed by Siemaszko[l2] and by Gu Chuangqing [7] respectively. By defining row and col-umn-transformation in the sense of the partial inverted differences for matrices, two type matrix algorithms are established to construct corresponding two different BGIRI, which hold for the vec-tor case and the scalar case.

On the Coalitional Rationality and the Inverse Problem for Shapley Value and the Semivalues

In cooperative game theory, a central problem is to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition to the players who agreed to cooperate and form the grand coalition. Such allocations are obtained by means of values, having some fairness properties, expressed in most cases by groups of axioms. In an earlier work, we solved what we called the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, in which the main result was offering an explicit formula providing the set of all games with an a priori given Semivalue, associated with a given weight vector. However, in this set there is an infinite set of games for which the Semivalues are not coalitional rational, perhaps not efficient, so that these are not fair practical solutions of the above fundamental problem. Among the Semivalues, coalitional rational solutions for the Shapley Value and the Banzhaf Value have been given in two more recent works. In the present paper, based upon a general potential basis, relative to Semivalues, for a given game and a given Semivalue, we solve the connected problem: in the Inverse Set, find out a game with the same Semivalue, which is also coalitional rational. Several examples will illustrate the corresponding numerical technique.

Werner-Type Matrix Valued Rational Interpolation and Its Recurrence Algorithms

In this paper, a practical Werner-type continued fraction method for solving matrix valued rational interpolation problem is provided by using a generalized inverse of matrices. In order to reduce the continued fraction form to rational function form of the interpolants, an efficient forward recurrence algorithm is obtained.

Generalized Inverse Vector Valued Osculatory Rational Interpolation and Its Error Formula

In this paper, osculatory rational functions of Thiele-type introduced by Salzer (1962) are extended to the case of vector valued quantities using tile t'ormalism of Graves-Moms (1983). In the computation of the osculatory continued h.actions, the three term recurrence relation is avoided and a new coefficient algorithm is introduced, which is the characteristic of recursive operation. Some examples are given to illustrate its effectiveness. A sutficient condition for cxistence is established. Some interpolating properties including uniqueness are discussed. In the end, all exact interpolating error formula is obtained.

PROBLEMS AND METHODS IN MATRIX VALUED RATIONAL INTERPOLATION

A variety of matrix rational interpolation problems include the partial realizationproblem for matrix power series and the minimal rational interpolation problem for generalmatrix functions.Several problems in circuit theory and digital filter design can also be re-duced to the solution of matrix rational interpolation problems[1—4].By means of thereachability and the observability indices of defined pairs of matrices,Antoulas,Ball,Kang and Willems solved the minimal matrix rational interpolation problem in[1].On

On the Coalitional Rationality of the Shapley Value and Other Efficient Values of Cooperative TU Games

In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In the present paper, for a given vector, which is the Shapley Value of a game, but it is not coalitional rational, that is it does not belong to the Core of the game, we would like to find out a new game with the Shapley Value equal to the a priori given vector and for which this vector is also in the Core of the game. In other words, in the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, we want to find out a new game, for which the Shapley Value is coalitional rational. The results show how such a game may be obtained, and some examples are illustrating the technique. Moreover, it is shown that beside the original game, there are always other games for which the given vector is not in the Core. The similar problem is solved for the Least Square Values.

Analysis on Value Rationality of Traditional Farm Tools in the Taomin Area

This paper introduces the types of traditional farm tools,and analyzes the value rationality of these traditional farm tools:on the one hand,these farm tools have witnessed the farming culture,and they are also a manifestation of local culture in the Taomin area,representing the cultural characteristics and civilization progress of this area.

The value rationality and tool rationality of Health Priority

Health Priority is increasingly becoming a human need and an international consensus.In addition to the basic value judgment and direction-leading function,Health Priority also has a clear,practical meaning and distinct tool attributes.The text adheres to the organic unity of regularity and purpose,follows the modern medical model and the philosophy of system theory,combines the characteristic facts,and discusses the value rationality and tool rationality of Health Priority based on the whole process management,and tries to refine the Health Priority governance model with Chinese characteristics,so as to provide a reference for global health governance.

THE NOTE ON MATRIX-VALUED RATIONAL INTERPOLATION

In [3], a kind of matrix-valued rational interpolants (MRIs) in the form of Rn(x) = M(x)/D(x) with the divisibility condition D(x) | ‖M(x)‖2, was defined, and the characterization theorem and uniqueness theorem for MRIs were proved. However this divisibility condition is found not necessary in some cases. In this paper, we remove this restricted condition, define the generalized matrix-valued rational interpolants (GMRIs) and establish the characterization theorem and uniqueness theorem for GMRIs. One can see that the characterization theorem and uniqueness theorem for MRIs are the special cases of those for GMRIs. Moreover, by defining a kind of inner product,we succeed in unifying the Samelson inverses for a vector and a matrix.

“价值中立(Value free)”接受史简析

价值中立是一个见仁见智有价值的话题。本文从历史社会学的角度 ,对它的接受史进行了考察 ,认为批判“价值中立”是由于“现在”,解释“过去”是为了更好地把握“现在”。尽管“价值中立”具有局部的合理性 。

Cartesian product over interval valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets

The intuitionistic fuzzy set(IFS) based on fuzzy theory,which is of high efficiency to solve the fuzzy problem, has been introduced by Atanassov. Subsequently, he pushed the research one step further from the IFS to the interval valued intuitionistic fuzzy set(IVIFS). On the basis of fuzzy set(FS), the IFS is a generalization concept. And the IFS is generalized to the IVIFS.In this paper, the definition of the sixth Cartesian product over IVIFSs is first introduced and its some properties are explored.We prove some equalities based on the operation and the relation over IVIFSs. Finally, we present one geometric interpretation and a numerical example of the sixth Cartesian product over IVIFSs.

Analysis on the Effective Management and Enterprise Value Based on Employee and Customer Value

Value is the internal driving force for any corporate to obtain profits. The key issue of making profit lies on whether the corporate can truly appreciate the needs and combination of stakeholders＇ value, and establish a successful management of value exchange system. This paper starts with the theories of the employee and customer value measurement and management, followed by the value exchange system of employee-customer-organization. Therefore, it explains the status and role of employee-customer-organization in terms of value exchange. This work concludes that customers＇ satisfaction is determined by employees＇ satisfaction, and on that basis, customers would provide the promoted value to the organization.

VALUE DISTRIBUTION OF MEROMORPHIC SOLUTIONS OF CERTAIN NON-LINEAR DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS

In this article, we consider the non-linear difference equation(f(z + 1)f(z)-1)(f(z)f(z-1)-1) =P(z, f(z))/Q(z, f(z)),where P(z, f(z)) and Q(z, f(z)) are relatively prime polynomials in f(z) with rational coefficients. For the above equation, the order of growth, the exponents of convergence of zeros and poles of its transcendental meromorphic solution f(z), and the exponents of convergence of poles of difference △f(z) and divided difference △f(z)/f(z)are estimated. Furthermore, we study the forms of rational solutions of the above equation.

Two Dual Expansions for Generalized Bivariate Thiele-Type Matrix Valued Interpolating Continued Fractions

A new method for the construction of bivariate matrix valued rational interpolants on a rectangulargrid is introduced. The rational interpolants are expressed in the continued fraction form with scalardenominator. Tile matrix quotients are based oil the generalized inverse for a matrix, Which is found to beeffective in continued fraction interpolation. In this paper, tWo dual expansions for bivariate matrix valuedThiele-type interpolating continued fractions are presented, then, tWo dual rational interpolants are definedout of them.

Egalitarian Allocations and the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value

In a cooperative transferable utilities game, the allocation of the win of the grand coalition is an Egalitarian Allocation, if this win is divided into equal parts among all players. The Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value of a game is a set of games in which the Shapley Value is the same as the initial one. In the Inverse Set, we determined a family of games for which the Shapley Value is also a coalitional rational value. The Egalitarian Allocation of the game is efficient, so that in the set called the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, the allocation is the same as the initial one, but may not be coalitional rational. In this paper, we shall find out in the same family of the Inverse Set, a subfamily of games with the Egalitarian Allocation is also a coalitional rational value. We show some relationship between the two sets of games, where our values are coalitional rational. Finally, we shall discuss the possibility that our procedure may be used for solving a very similar problem for other efficient values. Numerical examples show the procedure to get solutions for the efficient values.

工具理性与价值理性融合:一个数字乡村建设的解释框架

数字乡村是乡村振兴的战略方向,也是实现乡村治理现代化的重要内容。在数字乡村建设中,工具理性和价值理性是同时存在的,相互融合并且各有分工,价值理性引领工具理性,而工具理性又为价值理性提供更好的实现方法。工具理性和价值理性对数字乡村建设的影响,主要体现在作为工具理性的数字技术对乡村经济产业、社会生活、治理方式变革的推动,以及作为价值理性的数字乡村建设目标对政策整体协同推进的引导。当工具理性和价值理性失衡时,则会出现参与主体困境、技术工具困境、治理效果困境等问题。由此,必须在理念层面、主体层面、技术层面、制度层面发力,促进工具理性与价值理性融合,推动数字乡村发展。

从工具理性到价值理性:智慧社区共同体的多维建构

智慧社区共同体建构是数字技术赋能社区治理综合效能提升的关键,是推动社区治理现代化转型的必由之路。从工具理性过渡至价值理性,为智慧社区共同体建构提供了新的研究视角。本研究从和谐社区建设、协调沟通机制、多元协同参与、数字技术赋能等方面剖析智慧社区共同体构建的内在机理,基于智慧社区共同体建构面临的人文理性缺乏、“碎片化”分治、多元参与不够、数字赋能有限等现实困境,提出从重塑人民至上理念的智慧社区共同体、夯实智慧社区共同体建构的信任合作基础、创新智慧社区共同体的多元共治机制、数字赋能智慧社区共同体的创新服务能力等多维度建构智慧社区共同体,进而全面推进社区治理现代化进程。

Three-Dimensional Generalized Inverse Matrix Rational Interpolation

In this paper, a three dimensional matrix valued rational interpolant (TGMRI) is first constructed by making use of the generalized inverse of matrices. The interpolants are of the Thiele type branched continued fraction form, with matrix numerator and scalar denominator. Some properties of TGMRI are given. An efficient recursive algorithm is proposed. The results in the paper can be extend to n variable.

On the Coalitional Rationality and the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution

In earlier works we introduced the Inverse Problem, relative to the Shapley Value, then relative to Semivalues. In the explicit representation of the Inverse Set, the solution set of the Inverse Problem, we built a family of games, called the almost null family, in which we determined more recently a game where the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Allocations are colalitional rational. The Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is another value for cooperative transferable utilities games (TU games), showing how to allocate fairly the win of the grand coalition, in case that this has been formed. In the present paper, we solve the similar problem for this new value: given a nonnegative vector representing the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution of a TU game, find out a game in which the Egalitarian Nonseparable Contribution is kept the same, but it is colalitional rational. The new game will belong to the family of almost null games in the Inverse Set, relative to the Shapley Value, and it is proved that the threshold of coalitional rationality will be higher than the one for the Shapley Value. The needed previous results are shown in the introduction, the second section is devoted to the main results, while in the last section are discussed remarks and connected problems. Some numerical examples are illustrating the procedure of finding the new game.