International political economy has already been shown to be powerful to explain the global trade growth. In this paper we offer a brief survey of international political economy of trade policy. In addition to this, ...International political economy has already been shown to be powerful to explain the global trade growth. In this paper we offer a brief survey of international political economy of trade policy. In addition to this, we also try to address three questions： （1） How does electoral competition affect trade policy？ Suppose two parties compete for the power over trade policy, would the two parties choose the same tariff？. （2） We observe that the US tariffs decline over time, so do the declining U.S. tariffs lead to the fall of the Democratic vote share in the election？ （3） What is the relationship between trade globalization and political liberalization？ Put it another way, how does trade affect democracy？ And conversely, how does democracy affect trade？展开更多
This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China＇s decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials ...This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China＇s decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China＇s central-local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent-seeking. Enhancingfiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in-depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government.展开更多
文摘International political economy has already been shown to be powerful to explain the global trade growth. In this paper we offer a brief survey of international political economy of trade policy. In addition to this, we also try to address three questions： （1） How does electoral competition affect trade policy？ Suppose two parties compete for the power over trade policy, would the two parties choose the same tariff？. （2） We observe that the US tariffs decline over time, so do the declining U.S. tariffs lead to the fall of the Democratic vote share in the election？ （3） What is the relationship between trade globalization and political liberalization？ Put it another way, how does trade affect democracy？ And conversely, how does democracy affect trade？
文摘This paper is an attempt to present an analysis of China＇s decentralization and local governance practices, the dilemmas rooted in the current institution. We argue that the misbehavior of local government officials is endogenous to China＇s central-local structure and that competition among localities has become distorted and constrained by various policy burdens and development mandates imposed from above. The information asymmetry for the enforcement cost of mandates that exists between central and local governments not only leads to difficulties and distortions in local performance evaluations, but also creates opportunities for local bureaucracy expansion and rent-seeking. Enhancingfiscal transfers, or strengthening political restraint, although necessary, would be far from enough to solve the local governance problems. The ultimate solution entails an in-depth deregulation reform on factor mobility and a furthest eradication of policy mandates for the local government.
