The impact of political connections on firm pollution: New evidence based on heterogeneous environmental regulation

Increasing attention has been focused on the extent to which corporate political connections influence the growing pollution due to the rapid growth in the popularity of firm pollution in developing countries.We adopt a static threshold regression model to investigate the effects of heterogeneous environmental regulation on political connections and firm pollution based on the panel data from China’s A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019.The empirical results show a non-linear relationship between the degree of political connection of listed company executives and the level of firm pollution.And the relationship between the two roughly presents a U-shaped relationship under the action of the marketincentive environmental regulation threshold.However,it roughly presents an inverted N-shaped relationship under the action of the command-control environmental regulation threshold.Additionally,the group test results show that the existence of regional and ownership heterogeneity causes certain differences in the environmental behaviour of politically connected enterprises.These findings indicate that diverse environmental regulations are needed to promote sustainable green development and to further expand the theoretical and practical exploration of political connections on firm pollution.

Political Connection, the Nature of Property Rights, and Enterprise M＆A Performance——Empirical Study based on the Panel Data of Listed Companies

Mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are the important methods to quickly acquire external resources, achieve the economies of scale and the economies of scope, improve market share, and expand the scale of enterprise, while M＆A performance is an important index to measure if enterprise M＆A is successful. In this paper, the influence of entrepreneurs＇ political connection on the M＆A driving factors and M＆A efficiency of the enterprises with different property rights are analyzed using 357 mergers and acquisitions of China＇ s 189 listed companies in 2005-2011 as samples based on the distinction between political connection and the nature of enterprise property rights. The results show that the political connection plays a very significant positive influence on the M＆A performances of the central state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, but exerts a very significant negative influence on the local state-owned enterprises; the intensity of entrepreneurs＇ political connection also plays a certain influence on enterprise merger and acquisition, and the central political connection and the local political connection are significantly different in the influence on the enterprise M＆A performance.

The relationship between political connections and the mutual fund performance:Evidence from the US

This paper examines the effect of political connections between mutual fund managers and politicians on the fund performance.Using the publicly available data of individual political donations,we regard the mutual funds as politically connected when their managers make financial contributions to politicians.First,we show that aggregated stock holding changes of politically connected funds predict subsequent abnormal stock returns around the earnings announcement day,implying that the political connection promotes managers’stock picking abilities.Further evidence derived from the sample of entry buys and exit sells shows that politically connected funds outperform politically non-connected funds by 82 basis points annually.Second,we provide evidence that earnings forecast accuracy for the firms whose stocks are held by politically connected funds is improved significantly when time is approaching the announcement date,highlighting the importance of political channels through which information flows between firms and the market are facilitated.

Political connections, media monitoring and long-term loans

We analyze data on Chinese non-state-listed firms and find that it is easier for firms with political connections to obtain long-term loans with extended debt maturities than it is for firms without political connections. Our investigation indicates that this phenomenon is significantly less common with increased media monitoring. Houston et al.(2011) find strong evidence that the state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption in China, but our study shows that, to a certain extent, media monitoring can curb corruption.

Are transactional political connections more valuable to firms than relational political connections?

Political connections are an increasingly important part of firms’strategies to develop relationships with the government and poli-ticians.This study examines the impact of transactional and rela-tional political connections on firm value.The results show that transactionally connected firms are more likely to exhibit greater firm value than their relationally connected and non-connected counterparts.This study further finds evidence of a long-term value-enhancing effect of the transactional approach to political connections.A variety of robustness tests with alternative model specifications continue to show that transactional political con-nections lead to higher firm value.The findings indicate that firms with transactional political connections are provided with better networks with the political regime in power compared with those with relational political connections.These transactionally con-nected firms may enjoy preferential treatment from the govern-ment,in the form of lower taxes,and the access to government loans,subsidies,bailouts,and/or procurement contracts.

The Relation between Abnormal Main Fund Movements and Subsequent Earnings Management： Political Costs and Political Connections

Movement of major fund1 flows has great impact on capital markets, especially in China. This study investigates the relationship between abnormal main fund movements and firm＇s earnings management behavior, specifically, whether the abnormal main fund movements cause firms to keep a low profile for ＂self-protection＂ from being detected by the government. The empirical results of this study suggest that： （1） The mandatory disclosure of the ＂Top-ten circulating stockholders＂ requirement does not only reduce information asymmetry between investors and listed firms, but also strengthens and improves the efficiency of related government regulations in detecting disclosure of false information. This, in turn, increases the risk of being detected for firms with earnings management activities. （2） After abnormal main fund movements, relevant firms significantly reduce the level of earnings management to avoid attention from the public and regulatory agencies. （3） Using political connections as a proxy for the ＂shield effect＂ to mask political cost, we show that the negative relation between abnormal main fund movements and earnings management exists only for the subsample of firms without political connections. This paper provides a new angle for political cost study, and suggests that traditional political cost hypothesis should be further generalized.

Does China's Anti-Corruption Campaign Promote Corporate Innovation?

Vigorous anti-corruption campaigns launched by China since the 18 th CPC National Congress have produced an extensive impact on China's political and economic landscapes. From the micro-perspective of corporate innovation, this paper investigates the effects of anti-corruption efforts on corporate behavior. This paper has found that seeking political connections and promoting innovation are mutually substitutable means of development for firms. Anti-corruption efforts have increased the costs for firms to seek political connections and thus raised the incentives for corporate innovation. After the launch of anti-corruption policies, the level of corporate innovation significantly increased. In particular, R&D spending increased significantly for firms previously with political connections. Anti-corruption efforts have promoted overall corporate innovation. This paper has also found that the effects of anti-corruption efforts on corporate innovation are heterogeneous at the provincial level. For firms previously with political connections in provinces with a high anti-corruption intensity, the level of innovation increased more significantly. Given the controversies concerning the effects of the recent round of anticorruption campaign on economic growth, this paper provides new evidence that anticorruption efforts are favorable to corporate innovation. Considering the endogenous problem, this paper has adopted the policy experiment of anti-corruption efforts after the 18 th CPC National Congress and the difference-in-differences(DID) technique.

Do independent directors play a political role? Evidence from independent directors' death events

We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.

Corporate Donations in China： A Strategic- Political Perspective

This paper explores how the influences corporate donations, based on political identity of top managers upper echelons theory （UET）. The results show that the political identity of the top manager has a significant impact on the donation behavior of a company, especially in areas with poor institutional environments. Corporate donations depend not only on whether the top manager has a political identity but also the type of this identity. Furthermore, the impact differs significantly between companies with different ownership structures. This study enriches our knowledge of corporate philanthropy by demonstrating that corporate donation practices are shaped by a range of contextual factors. Corporate giving behaviors in emerging economies such as China are differently motivated according to the fundamentally different aspects of their institutional settings.

Do modified audit opinions have economic consequences? Empirical evidence based on financial constraints

We present a framework and empirical evidence to explain why,on average,11%of listed firms in China received modified audit opinions(MAOs)between 1992 and 2009.We argue that there are two reasons for this phenomenon:strong earnings management incentives lower firms'financial reporting quality and soft budget constraints weaken the information and governance roles of audit opinions.We find that firms'financial constraints eased after receiving MAOs,which suggests that MAOs have limited economic consequences.Further analysis shows that this phenomenon predominantly exists in government-controlled firms and firms that receive MAOs for the first time.We also find that MAOs have not influenced financial constraints after 2006.Finally,we find that MAOs did not affect borrowing cash flows from banks until 2005,suggesting that MAOs did not start affecting bank financing until that year.We also find that firms receive more related-party financing after receiving MAOs.Our results indicate that a limited effect on bank financing and increased related-party financing reduce the effect of MAOs on financial constraints.

Monetary policy,government control and capital investment:Evidence from China

This study examines how the relationships between local governments and local enterprises moderate the effect of targeted monetary policies through different action-propagating mechanisms. First, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on enterprise investment in areas with different institutional environments. Second, we investigate the impact of monetary policies on stateowned enterprises(SOEs) with different property rights structures. Third, we examine how political connections can influence the action-propagating mechanism of monetary policies. We conclude that in China monetary policies have different effects on SOEs and on private enterprises with or without political connections. Specifically, local government interventions can significantly weaken and distort the effects of monetary policies, such that the intended reduction in investment is noticeably alleviated for SOEs and private enterprises with close links to local governments.

Anti-corruption, marketisation and firm behaviours: evidence from firm innovation in China

China has launched an anti-corruption campaign since theEighteenth CPC National Congress, which has exerted widespreadinfluences on Chinese politics and economy. This paper examinesthe effect of the anti-corruption initiative on firm behaviours fromthe perspective of research and development (R&D) investments. Itshows that pursuing political connections and improving innovation are two mutually exclusive alternatives for firm growth inChina. The anti-corruption campaign raises the cost of seeking forpolitical bond and strengthens the incentive for firm innovation.After anti-corruption policies and regulations were issued, R&Dexpenditure in politically connected firms increases significantly;the anti-corruption initiative has positive effects on firm innovation.Further research shows that the effects vary with different types offirms. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the anti-corruptioninitiative only increases the R&D investments of firms with seniorexecutives who used to serve in the government;while for nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), this campaign has all-aroundpositive effects on their R&D investments. In the meantime, a heterogeneity at the provincial level is observed: R&D investments offirms with political connections increase more significantly in provinces with more intense anti-corruption efforts. Finally, marketisation also has a role to play. For regions with a more developedmarket economy, anti-corruption increases the innovation of firmswith political connections;whereas in regions with a less developed market economy, this effect is insignificant. This paper provides evidence for the opinion that anti-corruption is favourable toeconomic growth in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, ituses data obtained from the anti-corruption policy experimentsince the Eighteenth CPC National Congress and the difference-indifferences (DID) method to further test the hypotheses.

The Performance of Chinese Private Firms in Coping with a Global Financial Crisis： Who Is Best Positioned？

Using organizational flexibility as a research lens, we investigate how private firms, especially SMEs, in China cope with the 2008 financial crisis. Testing data from a large sample of private firms （N=3,459） by difference-indifferences analysis, we find that firms with industrial diversification, geographic expansion and political connections perform better during the crisis than those without. These results are less affected by self-selection problems （as the abrupt crisis provides a natural experiment） and hold up against endogeneity and several other challenges in robustness tests. The findings offer important implications for researchers, business owners, policy makers and future research.

Resignation of officials as independent directors and firm performance

In 2013,the Chinese government implemented Rule No.18,which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms.The surprise implementation of Rule No.18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors(OIDs).The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance.We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory.The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance,as measured by Tobin's 0 and firm leverage.This also confirmed the importance of independent directors'political connection on firm performance,as discovered in prior research.However,this influence varied across OIDs'heterogeneity,external environment and firm ownership.The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.

Women on boards of directors and corporate philanthropic disaster response

In this study we conduct firm-level analysis of the impact of women in the boardroom on corporate philanthropic disaster response(CPDR).We propose that CPDR contains agency costs and that female directors are more likely to restrain the associated agency costs of CPDR.We predict a negative relationship between the ratio of women on boards of directors(WoBs) and philanthropic contribution,which is weaker in firms with political connections and stronger in firms with better-developed institutional environments.Data was collected from the philanthropic responses to the Wenchuan earthquake on May 12,2008 of privately-owned listed Chinese firms.The results support the hypothesized negative relationship,which is found to be weaker in firms with political connections.However,marketization-related factors do not significantly moderate this relationship.These results indicate that CPDR contains agency costs and that female directors do not facilitate the corporate donation process,but rather evaluate the benefits and restrain the associated agency costs.

The Three Links policy and stock returns

This study examines whether the Three Links(3L)policy affected stock returns before,during and after the 2008 Taiwan leadership election.The evidence shows that companies in the industries benefitting from(being damaged by)the 3L policy earned posi-tive(negative)cumulative abnormal returns.Although the polit-ical party connection/affiliation seems to have had an impact as well,it was not persistent.When both factors–the policy effect and the political connection effect–are considered together,we find that the policy effect persisted during the election,while the political connection effect did not.It is obvious that the policy effect is a powerful factor explaining changes of stock returns during the 2008 leadership election in China’s Taiwan.