How to Implement the Wholesale Price Contract: Considering Competition between Supply Chains

In this paper,we develop the price competition model of two supply chains,in which each supply chain includes one core manufacturer and one retailer,respectively.The manufacturer in each supply chain sells products to the retailer through a commonly-used wholesale price contract.Each manufacturer has two options to implement the wholesale price contract:playing the Stackelberg game with the retailer and playing the bargaining game with the retailer.Based on the manufacturer's two alternative performing modes in each supply chain,we consider four combined performing modes of two competitive supply chains in the model.By comparing equilibrium results,we find that when both manufacturers choose to bargain with retailers,the sales volume increases and the sales price decreases.Moreover,the manufacturers'mode option is affected by bargaining power,product quality level,and the cost of improving product quality.Specifically,when both bargaining power and the cost of improving product quality are relatively small,both manufacturers choose to play Stackelberg game with retailers.When manufacturers'bargaining power is sufficiently large,regardless of the cost of improving product quality,both manufacturers choose to bargain with retailers.Surprisingly,when the manufacturer chooses to bargain the wholesale price with the retailer,higher product quality is not always beneficial to the retailer because the retailer may have to share part of the cost of the manufacturer.

Research on Multichannel Supply Chain Pricing Under Different Dominance

In a multichannel supply chain comprising of dual-channel retailers with both physical and online channels as well as single-channel e-tailers with online channels,a multichannel demand model for e-commerce is constructed based on customer channel preferences,and a Stackerberg game model with price competition dominated by dual-channel retailers and single-channel e-tailers as well as a Bertrand game model with equal rights are established to analyze the impact of different channel rights structures on the price,demand,and profit of the two retailers.The results show that the single-channel e-tailer under the dual-channel retailer-dominated game has the highest profit,and the dual-channel retailer xmder the single-channel e-tailer-dominated game has the highest profit;thus,both retailers should accept the other's dominant channel rights for profit maximization.

CAPACITY COMMITMENT AND PRICING FOR SUBSTITUTABLE PRODUCTS UNDER COMPETITION

Capacity acquisition and pricing decisions are a company＇s long-term strategic decisions. However, demand uncertainty and substitutability of multiple products cause the difficulty to solve capacity and pricing decision problems. In this paper, we address a multiple product pricing and multiple resource capacity acquisition problem with demand.uncertainties and competition. The company needs to determine capacity commitment for each resource and product prices before demands are realized so that the total profit is maximized. If the demand exceeds the committed capacity, extra amounts can be purchased from the spot market. Variable unit production costs, capacity acquisition and maintenance costs are considered. We first analyze a single company basic problem and find the optimal solutions on prices and capacity. Based on the single company model, we address the two-product, two-firm capacity commitment and pricing problem considering across product and across company price competition factors. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium on price and capacity commitment are proved, and then we extended the results to the multiple product, multiple company case.

Development of the generic drug industry in the US after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984

The key events in the development of the US generic drug industry after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 are systematically reviewed,including the process of approval for generic drugs,bioequivalence issues including“switchability”,bioequivalence for complicated dosage forms,patent extension,generic drug safety,generic substitution and low-cost generics.The backlog in generic review,generic drug user fees,and“quality by design”for generic drugs is also discussed.The evolution of the US generic drug industry after the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 has afforded several lessons of great benefit to other countries wishing to establish or re-establish a domestic generic drug industry.

Nodal, zonal, or uniform electricity pricing： how to deal withnetwork congestion

In this paper, the main contributions to congestion management and electricity pricing, i.e., nodal, zonal, and uniform electricity pricing, are surveyed. The key electricity market concepts are structured and a formal model framework is proposed for electricity transportation, production, and consumption in the context of limited transmission networks and competitive, welfare maximizing electricity markets. In addition, the main results of existing short-run and long-run congestion management studies are explicitly summarized. In particular, the important interconnection between short-run network management approaches and optimal long-run investments in both generation facilities and network lines are highlighted.