Competition Game Analysis Between Public Enterprises

Municipal public utilities reform is an important part of the economic system structural reform of cities. In this paper a kind of market competition mechanism for commercial municipal public enterprises is proposed; a price competition model of municipal public enterprises with similar products is founded; its static and dynamic game analysis is offered and a comparison between them is made. The results show that,for the business type of municipal public enterprise market competition mechanism can be introduced to mobilize the enterprise activity to raise the end of efficiency; the government may control the market price through the economic measures of regulating the amount of subsidy;that enterprises enter the market and select the price simultaneously is more advantageous than entering the market one after another in general, information among the municipal enterprises is symmetrical (the equilibrium is lower); "following enterprises" gets "second mover advantage";to raise the difference of the same product will increase the profit of enterprise.

Voluntary Disclosure and the Type of Product Market Competition： Capacity vs. Price

This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. The author proposes that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure： capacity competition and price competition. Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more information to attain financial market valuation-related benefits, while price competition drives them to disclose less to protect long-term product market advantages. The author finds that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above the finn＇s external financing needs documented in the previous literature. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than those in price competition. Further analysis shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction benchmark firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than the benchmark firms.

Mixed Market Competition in a Quality Differentiated Duopoly Model An Approach to Banking Sector

This paper attempts to develop a theoretical framework to investigate the competitive implications of quality choices of financial institutions whereby they charge prices to consumers based on their willingness to pay for the service qualities in the mixed market scenario under vertical product differentiation model. Initially, it analyzes benchmark equilibrium solutions of monopoly and duopoly to establish the degree of quality differentiation between two private banks in an uncover market configuration. Further, it estimates the quality differentiation between private and public banks, and examines the interaction between two market structures keeping public bank as both leader and follower, and then measures the social welfare from different prospectives. The explicit operation of two stages Nash equilibrium game forecasted that public banks＇ monopoly seems to be still better than a private banking, and it is socially optimal. The outcome demonstrates a significant importance of vertical quality differentiation for policy implication in banking industry and provides an insight on the reasons of particular co-existence of public and private banking services in the specified location. In this context, it is concluded that the presence of public banks in banking industries is a crucial condition for obtaining the higher range of social welfare.

Research on Multichannel Supply Chain Pricing Under Different Dominance

In a multichannel supply chain comprising of dual-channel retailers with both physical and online channels as well as single-channel e-tailers with online channels,a multichannel demand model for e-commerce is constructed based on customer channel preferences,and a Stackerberg game model with price competition dominated by dual-channel retailers and single-channel e-tailers as well as a Bertrand game model with equal rights are established to analyze the impact of different channel rights structures on the price,demand,and profit of the two retailers.The results show that the single-channel e-tailer under the dual-channel retailer-dominated game has the highest profit,and the dual-channel retailer xmder the single-channel e-tailer-dominated game has the highest profit;thus,both retailers should accept the other's dominant channel rights for profit maximization.

CAPACITY COMMITMENT AND PRICING FOR SUBSTITUTABLE PRODUCTS UNDER COMPETITION

Capacity acquisition and pricing decisions are a company＇s long-term strategic decisions. However, demand uncertainty and substitutability of multiple products cause the difficulty to solve capacity and pricing decision problems. In this paper, we address a multiple product pricing and multiple resource capacity acquisition problem with demand.uncertainties and competition. The company needs to determine capacity commitment for each resource and product prices before demands are realized so that the total profit is maximized. If the demand exceeds the committed capacity, extra amounts can be purchased from the spot market. Variable unit production costs, capacity acquisition and maintenance costs are considered. We first analyze a single company basic problem and find the optimal solutions on prices and capacity. Based on the single company model, we address the two-product, two-firm capacity commitment and pricing problem considering across product and across company price competition factors. The existence and uniqueness of equilibrium on price and capacity commitment are proved, and then we extended the results to the multiple product, multiple company case.

How to Implement the Wholesale Price Contract: Considering Competition between Supply Chains

In this paper,we develop the price competition model of two supply chains,in which each supply chain includes one core manufacturer and one retailer,respectively.The manufacturer in each supply chain sells products to the retailer through a commonly-used wholesale price contract.Each manufacturer has two options to implement the wholesale price contract:playing the Stackelberg game with the retailer and playing the bargaining game with the retailer.Based on the manufacturer's two alternative performing modes in each supply chain,we consider four combined performing modes of two competitive supply chains in the model.By comparing equilibrium results,we find that when both manufacturers choose to bargain with retailers,the sales volume increases and the sales price decreases.Moreover,the manufacturers'mode option is affected by bargaining power,product quality level,and the cost of improving product quality.Specifically,when both bargaining power and the cost of improving product quality are relatively small,both manufacturers choose to play Stackelberg game with retailers.When manufacturers'bargaining power is sufficiently large,regardless of the cost of improving product quality,both manufacturers choose to bargain with retailers.Surprisingly,when the manufacturer chooses to bargain the wholesale price with the retailer,higher product quality is not always beneficial to the retailer because the retailer may have to share part of the cost of the manufacturer.

Development of the generic drug industry in the US after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984

The key events in the development of the US generic drug industry after the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 are systematically reviewed,including the process of approval for generic drugs,bioequivalence issues including“switchability”,bioequivalence for complicated dosage forms,patent extension,generic drug safety,generic substitution and low-cost generics.The backlog in generic review,generic drug user fees,and“quality by design”for generic drugs is also discussed.The evolution of the US generic drug industry after the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 has afforded several lessons of great benefit to other countries wishing to establish or re-establish a domestic generic drug industry.