The principle of the best interests of the child,as a criterion for substantive review,is conceptually ambiguous and uncertain in its application.To mitigate this dilemma in the application of the principle of the bes...The principle of the best interests of the child,as a criterion for substantive review,is conceptually ambiguous and uncertain in its application.To mitigate this dilemma in the application of the principle of the best interests of the child,the European Court of Human Rights(ECHR)has made a procedural transition in the interpretation and application of this principle,shifting from conducting specific proportionality analysis or interests balancing in cases related to children to examining whether States Parties have applied the principle of the best interests of the child in their judicial procedures.Moreover,ECHR has developed three procedural review schemes:holistic reviews,key factors-based reviews and factor list-based reviews.Compared with substantive reviews,procedural reviews adhere to the ECHR doctrine of margin of appreciation,restrict the free discretion of the court,give play to the effect of procedural autonomy,and pursue the value of subjective procedural justice,which has its own unique theoretical value and practical significance,and provides a feasible reference for China to interpret and apply the principle of the best interests of the child.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
文摘The principle of the best interests of the child,as a criterion for substantive review,is conceptually ambiguous and uncertain in its application.To mitigate this dilemma in the application of the principle of the best interests of the child,the European Court of Human Rights(ECHR)has made a procedural transition in the interpretation and application of this principle,shifting from conducting specific proportionality analysis or interests balancing in cases related to children to examining whether States Parties have applied the principle of the best interests of the child in their judicial procedures.Moreover,ECHR has developed three procedural review schemes:holistic reviews,key factors-based reviews and factor list-based reviews.Compared with substantive reviews,procedural reviews adhere to the ECHR doctrine of margin of appreciation,restrict the free discretion of the court,give play to the effect of procedural autonomy,and pursue the value of subjective procedural justice,which has its own unique theoretical value and practical significance,and provides a feasible reference for China to interpret and apply the principle of the best interests of the child.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
