Performance analysis and comparison of PoW,PoS and DAG based blockchains

In the blockchain,the consensus mechanism plays a key role in maintaining the security and legitimation of contents recorded in the blocks.Various blockchain consensus mechanisms have been proposed.However,there is no technical analysis and comparison as a guideline to determine which type of consensus mechanism should be adopted in a specific scenario/application.To this end,this work investigates three mainstream consensus mechanisms in the blockchain,namely,Proof of Work(PoW),Proof of Stake(PoS),and Direct Acyclic Graph(DAG),and identifies their performances in terms of the average time to generate a new block,the confirmation delay,the Transaction Per Second(TPS)and the confirmation failure probability.The results show that the consensus process is affected by both network resource(computation power/coin age,buffer size)and network load conditions.In addition,it shows that PoW and PoS are more sensitive to the change of network resource while DAG is more sensitive to network load conditions.

Performance analysis of blockchain for civil aviation business data based on M/G/1 queuing theory

An Ethereum blockchain based on proof of stake ( PoS) consensus mechanism is used to achieve the data sharing within the civil aviation service platform for both airport group management and passengers. Considering the Gas consumption of Ethereum, the dynamic batch-service capacity constraint by the Block Gas Limit and the priority mechanism depending on the different Gas Price of transactions, M/ G/1 queuing theory with batch-service is used to construct the service model of transactions confirmation process in the proposed blockchain system, where the effects of transactions arrival rate, block capacity, service rate and number of nodes on the average confirmation time of transactions with different priority are analyzed, and eventually a performance analysis model of blockchain for civil aviation business data is proposed. The simulation results prove the usability and accuracy of the model, which can provide both theoretical basis for data sharing of civil aviation using Ethereum blockchain and the further optimization of transactions confirmation time.

Dividend or No Dividend in Delegated Blockchain Governance:A Game Theoretic Analysis

Delegated blockchain governance is the frontier of blockchain design issues that is to improve the scalability of blockchain networks.Delegated proof of stake(DPoS)blockchains such as EOS must select a few super nodes for transaction verification.In particular,the blockchain community has debated recently on whether dividend should be allowed when electing super nodes,which might be considered as unethical or unfair,leading to an open research topic and a new research gap that has theoretical value for both academia and industry.In this paper,we build a theoretical framework to study how dividend affects user decisions and welfare in a DPoS blockchain.Based on game theory,we propose a three-player Hotelling model with two policies to study the behaviors of voters and candidates.We first use a static game analysis to show that the benefits of dividend for voters and for candidates vary with the size of reward and there exists an interval,in which the zero dividend policy would be good for the welfare of both candidates and voters.Then,we use an evolutionary game analysis to examine the process dynamics of super node selection,we find that the campaign strategy of candidates has to do with the size of platform reward given to the candidates by the blockchain platform.Especially in the asymmetric case,we find that higher level of platform reward turns to benefit candidates with large number of votes even more.Our findings are instrumental for designing dividend policies in DPoS blockchains and can stimulate more potential research in blockchain governance.