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A Tree Formulation for Signaling Games with Noise
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作者 Xeni Dassiou Dionysius Glycopantis 《Natural Science》 2014年第13期1128-1139,共12页
The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. ... The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis. 展开更多
关键词 Signals and NON-COOPERATIVE Signaling Games Noise States of Nature A Machine Imperfect Information Sets ACTIONS Language CONVENTION NASH EQUILIBRIUM BELIEFS Updating Perfect Bayesian EQUILIBRIUM Fixed Point Self-Fulfilling Prophesies Rational Expectations EQUILIBRIUM
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