Discreet investors exert greater influence on cooperation in the public goods game

This paper studies the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a public goods game model with heterogeneous investment strategies in square lattices.In the proposed model,players are divided into defectors,cooperators and discreet investors.Among these,defectors do not participate in investing,discreet investors make heterogeneous investments based on the investment behavior and cooperation value of their neighbors,and cooperators invest equally in each neighbor.In real life,heterogeneous investment is often accompanied by time or economic costs.The discreet investors in this paper pay a certain price to obtain their neighbors'investment behavior and cooperation value,which quantifies the time and economic costs of the heterogeneous investment process.The results of Monte Carlo simulation experiments in this study show that discreet investors can effectively resist the invasion of the defectors,form a stable cooperative group and expand the cooperative advantage in evolution.However,when discreet investors pay too high a price,they lose their strategic advantage.The results in this paper help us understand the role of heterogeneous investment in promoting and maintaining human social cooperation.

Strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game

The key advantage of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. How to improve the proportion of cooperators is one of the key issues of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm operations. This work proposes a strategy dominance mechanism of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm within the framework of public goods game. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous collaboration in unmanned swarm;and an aspiration-driven multiplayer evolutionary game model is established based on the requirement. Then the average abundance function and strategy dominance condition of the model are constructed by theoretical derivation. Furthermore, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via simulation,and the influences of the multiplication factor r, aspiration levelα, threshold m and other parameters on the strategy dominance conditions were simulated for both linear and threshold public goods games(PGGs) to determine the strategy dominance characteristics;Finally, deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

Discussion on the Supply of Child-friendly City Construction Based on the Attributes of Public Goods

Child friendliness is the need for a good life in the new era.The problems related to the construction of child-friendly cities were discussed from the perspective of the supply of public goods.Through literature research and summary,the basic concepts,construction factors,sources of supply goods,structure of the main supplies,and supply behavior of public goods supply in child-friendly cities were sorted out.Some effective suggestions were proposed,such as improving the resource conversion and integration ability of the main suppliers,establishing an effective incentive system,optimizing the structure of the main suppliers,improving multi-party collaborative efficiency,ensuring benefits for all parties,raising child-friendly awareness,innovating funding sources for projects,ensuring adequate funding supply,building urban supply system in accordance with local conditions,and ensuring the supply of public goods.

Globalization Under the Spells of Breakdowns in Supply Chains, Regime Change, Regime Formation, and Alliance Restructuring: How Much Is Left for Public Goods?

In a paper conceived about five years ago(“Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?”)roughly a dozen factors were linked to explain important causal paths from globalization to the potential output of public goods.The Russian invasion of Ukraine,the corona epidemic,and the increased hegemonic rivalry between China and the U.S.interrupted or even destroyed many of the linkages between globalization and potential public good production.About five important detrimental paths involved in the meantime.In the present article we aim at linking what is left from the previous level of globalization or emerging to form a new and simplified causal model for likely linkages between truncated or(re-)emerging globalization,and the deadly needed output of public goods.These linkages refer to rules of climate control,go to trade linkages and arbitrary tariffs and trade interventions.Regime change,regime formation,and alliance restructuring address aspects of domestic rule and international stability.Selectorate theory,regime type,and exit options for political elites provide key explanatory factors in explaining globalization and public goods productions,or their decay.Where possible we use some data and transformation experiences corroborating our arguments.In other instances need for further empirical macro research will become clear.

Application of the Industry-University-Research Education Model of“Works,Products,and Public Goods”in Design Majors Practical Courses in Colleges and Universities

One of the goals and requirements of China’s educational modernization includes prioritizing,guiding,and promoting the social service capabilities of universities.The teaching of practical courses in design majors in colleges and universities has long been plagued by problems such as being“out of touch with the market and social needs”and“ignoring the cultivation of creativity.”It fails to meet the goals and requirements of educational modernization.This article takes the“Fundamentals of Styling and Comprehensive Expression”course offered by the School of Design of Guangxi Normal University as an entry point to study the industry-university-research education method that combines“social service”with the teaching of design professional practical courses.It also attempts to improve“works,products,and public goods”through the establishment of the theoretical model of“product”and the analysis of practical application paths is carried out to solve the problems existing in the traditional teaching of the design major,enhance the social service capabilities of the design major,promote talent employment and industry and social development,and carry out teaching reform attempts.

Problems and Countermeasures of Bike-Sharing System in China Based on the theory of Public Goods

Under the new normal of China’s economic development,bike-sharing,a new product of the“Internet+”era,opens the door to a novel lifestyle for the society,and is in the stage of rapid development.Nevertheless,with the explosive growth of the number of bicycles,some new problems gradually come out,such as disorderly parking,serious damage and waste of resources,which in turn restrict its further development.Based on the theory of public goods,this article studies the quasi-public goods attributes and problems of bike-sharing,as well as provides feasible measures for its long-term development,so as to realize the co-governance and sharing among enterprises,consumers and government.

Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

Punishment in optional public goods games

In this work, the optional public goods games with punishment are studied. By adopting the approximate best response dynamics, a micro model is given to explain the evolutionary process. Simultaneously, the magnitude of rationality is also considered. Under the condition of bounded rationality which provides a light to interpret phenomena in human society, the model leads to two types of equilibriums. One is the equilibrium without punishers and the other is the equilibrium including only punishers and cooperators. In addition, the effects of rationality on equilibriums are briefly investigated.

Fitness of others'evaluation effect promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game

Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.

Incentive Mechanism Design for Public Goods Provision:Price Cap Regulation and Optimal Regulation

This paper studies the mechanism design that induces firms to provide public goods under two regulatory means： price cap regulation and optimal regulation, respectively. We first outline two models of monopoly regulation with unobservable marginal costs and effort, which can be regard as an optimal problem with dual restrictions. By solving this problem, we get the two optimal regulatory mechanisms to induce the provision of public goods. Further, by comparative statics, the conclusion is drawn that the welfare loss as sociated with price cap regulation, with respective to optimal regulation, increases more with increase of the expense of public goods.

Study on Problems and Countermeasures of Rural Public Goods Supplying System

In current China, the main problem existing in the rural public goods supplying system is the unbalanced condition of public goods supply, and the chief reason for which is unitary system of supply main body. Thus the leading countermeasure for comer of public goods supply is to reform the present unitary rural public goods supplying system, to strengthen functional transfer of rural grass-roots directive organization, to adopt diversified mode and provide public goods on the base of overall planning of urban and rural areas and to implement unitary and diversified supplying strategy. In this way, supplying efficiency of the rural public goods will be improved.

EVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC GOODS GAMES BASED ON HISTORICAL PAYOFFS

We investigate the evolution of cooperation in public goods game based on individuals' historical payoffs. In particular, the fitness of individuals are characterized by two types of payoffs, which are obtained by acting as cooperators and defectors, respectively. Both of payoffs are the linear combination of the current payoffs and the cumulative historical payoffs. The results show that cooperation is enhanced by an increasing memory effect with a wide range of related factors. To explain this phenomenon, we plot some representative snapshots of the population and scrutinize the mean fitness of cooperators and defectors along the boundary. It is found that increasing memory effect induces a positive feedback mechanism for cooperators to expand their districts. Defectors can just survive through forming narrower clusters to exploit cooperators more widely. The threshold values for cooperators and defectors vanishing under the influence of noise are also investigated.

Research on Supervision of Country Public Goods Supply Based on Public Choice Theory

To increase the provision of rural public goods is a major task of Chinese new rural construction, while it can not do without the necessary supervision. This paper described the relationship between public choice theory and the provision of rural public goods and it was a basis for in-depth study of the government＇s subject behavior from the perspective of public choice, and led to the necessity of regulation of rural public goods provision in rural areas, then it presented a strengthen monitoring of the rationalization proposals.

Demand of Rural Public Goods in Western Ethnic Minority Areas

In the context of Development of the West Regions and the construction of new countryside,on the basis of defining the concept of public goods,this article analyzes the status quo and layers of demand of rural public goods in western ethnic minority areas:the demand of rural public goods in ethnic minority areas shows "pyramid" structure,that is,the most basic layer is production-based rural public goods,followed by life-based rural public goods and democratic-management-based rural public goods.Finally the countermeasures for achieving effective demand of rural public goods are put forward as follows:adhere to customers(farmers)-oriented principle;innovate upon the rural residents' demand expression mechanism of public goods in ethnic minority areas;achieve diversification of supply subject of rural public goods in ethnic minority areas.

Study on the Influence of Farmer Social Capital on Cooperative Supply Willingness of Agricultural Disaster Reduction Public Goods——Based on the Investigation on 515 Farmers

Based on social capital theory,related factors of three dimensions( structure dimension,cognition dimension and relation dimension) of farmer social capital are taken as independent variables,and famer's willingness to cooperatively supply agricultural disaster reduction public goods is taken as dependent variable. Taking 515 farmers in 27 villages of Hubei Province as investigation objects,the influence of farmer social capital on cooperative supply willingness of agricultural disaster reduction public goods is explored by Logistic regression model. Research results show that social solidarity,common value concept,social trust and reciprocal content have positive impact on farmer's willingness of cooperative supply,while annual household income,number of agricultural disaster reduction public goods and social network have negative impact on farmer's willingness of cooperative supply.

Study on Farmers' Satisfaction with the Supply of Public Goods for Disaster Reduction in Agriculture——Based on the Survey Data of Farmers in Two Counties and One District of Hubei Province

According to actual features of public goods for disaster reduction in agriculture,an evaluation indicator system of farmers' satisfaction with the supply of public goods for disaster reduction in agriculture composed of five first-grade indicators containing 18 second-grade indicators was established firstly,and then a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation model of farmers' satisfaction was set up. Finally,farmers' satisfaction with the supply of public goods for disaster reduction in agriculture in two counties and one district of Hubei Province was evaluated by the model. The results show that farmers are satisfied with the supply of public goods for disaster reduction in agriculture on the whole,but farmers' satisfaction with openness about funds for disaster reduction,supply structure of public goods,work attitude and work efficiency is at a general level. Some suggestions about the four aspects were proposed,such as improving supervisory mechanisms to increase funding transparency,making information channels unblocked to improve the supply efficiency of public goods for disaster reduction,and improving the quality of government workers to increase their work efficiency.

Creating Inclusive Global Value Chains under the BRI from the Perspective of Public Goods Supply and Demand

Supply and demand of public goods provide a brand-new theoretical framework for research on the creation of inclusive global value chains(GVCs)under the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).The supply of international public goods is an important positive variable for creating global value chains under the BRI,in which China and other developing countries involved,as well as their small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs),are microscopic entities.When the BRI’s supply of instrumental,institutional,and conceptual international public goods is in equilibrium with the demand of GVC entities for public goods,the BRI creates necessary conditions for the extension of GVCs.GVCs created under the BRI are of great value in promoting inclusiveness,fair income distribution,balanced regional development,and the restructuring of international economic governance.Under the current GVC system,some developed countries have been wary about the BRI and even developed misgivings and biases.Nevertheless,developed countries may play an active role in bridging gaps in the BRI’s development and complement their respective strengths with developing countries for win-win cooperation.

“COST OF GROWTH”:REGIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND CHINA'S NEIGHBORHOOD DIPLOMACY

China is a growing power.It is an important integral part for realizing the Two Centenary Goals and the Chinese Dream to be upgraded from a regional power to a world power. To this end,the neighborhood is of primary importance and the neighborhood diplomacy consists of an impor-

Globalization and Public Goods:Too Big to Tackle?

The massive Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 will have unforeseeable effects on the themes addressed here,from international regime change to infra-structural re-orientation to value changes.Here we concentrate on the positive cycle of effects globalization has brought about before the new war in Europe,mainly economic growth and(some)pressures for democratic development,as well as the negative cycle that originates in(relative)economic decline,elite dissent,even failed states and regime change,often in the direction of counter-democracy.The causal links between 13 independent and intervening variables and public goods as the dependent variable are specified in this explanatory sketch.There is need for broadening the view in explaining causal paths between globalization factors and the production of public goods.In doing that we focus in particular on variables like elite dissent,immigration,and new minorities,all three weakening the capacities of states to respond.Further we state that all four:ecological challenges,economic and social inequality and polarization,regime change,and international terrorism can be viewed as to their joint effects on the production of public goods.Selectorate theory is crucial.It explains political regimes on the base of the size of the selectorate with large(s)electorates producing public goods,as in democracies,and small ones only private ones,as in sultanist regimes and dictatorships.