Quantum hacking of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution using Trojan-horse attack

We present a Trojan-horse attack on the practical two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. Our attack mainly focuses on the imperfection of the practical system that the modulator has a redundancy of modulation pulsewidth, which leaves a loophole for the eavesdropper inserting a Trojan-horse pulse. Utilizing the unique characteristics of two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution that Alice only takes modulation operation on the received mode without any measurement, this attack allows the eavesdropper to render all of the final keys shared between the legitimate parties insecure without being detected. After analyzing the feasibility of the attack, the corresponding countermeasures are put forward.

Navigating the Quantum Threat Landscape: Addressing Classical Cybersecurity Challenges

This research paper analyzes the urgent topic of quantum cybersecurity and the current federal quantum-cyber landscape. Quantum-safe implementations within existing and future Internet of Things infrastructure are discussed, along with quantum vulnerabilities in public key infrastructure and symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Other relevant non-encryption-specific areas within cybersecurity are similarly raised. The evolution and expansion of cyberwarfare as well as new developments in cyber defense beyond post-quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution are subsequently explored, with an emphasis on public and private sector awareness and vigilance in maintaining strong security posture.

Controlling a sine wave gating single-photon detector by exploiting its filtering loophole

GHz single-photon detector （SPD） is a crucial part in the practical high speed quantum key distribution （QKD） system. However, any imperfections in a practical QKD system may be exploited by an eavesdropper （Eve） to collect information about the key without being discovered. The sine wave gating SPD （SG-SPD） based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode, one kind of practical high speed SPD, may also contain loopholes. In this paper, we study the principle and characteristic of the SG-SPD and find out the filtering loophole of the SG-SPD for the first time. What is more, the proof-of-principle experiment shows that Eve could blind and control Bob＇s SG-SPD by exploiting this loophole. We believe that giving enough attention to this loophole can improve the practical security of the existing QKD system. GHz single-photon detector （SPD） is a crucial part in the practical high speed quantum key distribution （QKD） system. However, any imperfections in a practical QKD system may be exploited by an eavesdropper （Eve） to collect information about the key without being discovered. The sine wave gating SPD （SG-SPD） based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode, one kind of practical high speed SPD, may also contain loopholes. In this paper, we study the principle and characteristic of the SG-SPD and find out the filtering loophole of the SG-SPD for the first time. What is more, the proof-of-principle experiment shows that Eve could blind and control Bob＇s SG-SPD by exploiting this loophole. We believe that giving enough attention to this loophole can improve the practical security of the existing QKD system.

Security analysis on some experimental quantum key distribution systems with imperfect optical and electrical devices

In general, quantum key distribution （QKD） has been proved unconditionally secure for perfect devices due to quantum uncertainty principle, quantum noneloning theorem and quantum nondividing principle which means that a quantum cannot be divided further. However, the practical optical and electrical devices used in the system are imperfect, which can be exploited by the eavesdropper to partially or totally spy the secret key between the legitimate parties. In this article, we first briefly review the recent work on quantum hacking on some experimental QKD systems with respect to imperfect devices carried out internationally, then we will present our recent hacking works in details, including passive faraday mirror attack, partially random phase attack, wavelength-selected photon-number-splitting attack, frequency shift attack, and single-photon-detector attack. Those quantum attack reminds people to improve the security existed in practical QKD systems due to imperfect devices by simply adding countermeasure or adopting a totally different protocol such as measurement-device independent protocol to avoid quantum hacking on the imperfection of measurement devices [Lo, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 2012, 108： 130503].