The Budget Execution Quality of Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Hong Kong

This paper proposes to use the related party transactions’(RPT)budget completion ratio(BCR)as indicator of RPT’s execution quality.This paper studies BCR by defining budget ceiling through RPTs announcement and comparing the amount disclosed in annual report as budget execution result.Through statistical analysis of 285 RPT announcements,we classify RPT’s BCR into four benchmark grades.This paper sums up the BCR of RPT from the samples,and deduces moral obligation and moral judgement curve(OJ curve)in terms of BCR.OJ curve is the real dynamic equilibrium after the struggle agency problems.From our statistical results,we verified that Weitzman’s ratchet effect exists in the budget formulation of RPTs,and it is a solid proof of Weitzman’s ratchet effect applied to real business scenarios.The empirical results show ratchet effect exists in BCR of RPTs before and after the change from GEM board listing to main board listing in Hong Kong(Transfer).This paper also finds that it is significant to find the estimated actual amount in the coming year through the budget completion ratio(BCR)of RPT from last year.This paper is a pioneer to examine the execution quality of RPT by the means of(i)Weitzman’s Truth Inducing Model,(ii)BCR,and(iii)SGR as well as(iv)estimated actual amount.

Usefulness and Effectiveness of Related Party Transactions （RPTs） Disclosure： Empirical Evidence From Italy

Related party transactions （RPTs） can be used by corporate insiders （e.g., managers, controlling shareholders） to expropriate corporate outsiders （e.g., minority shareholders）. We argue that effective disclosure of RPTs can eliminate or at least reduce expropriation phenomena by letting corporate outsiders assess the fairness of the transactions and identify the underlying conflicts of interest. We consider a sample of large RPTs carried out by listed corporations in Italy, a country that has been affected by significant corporate scandals in recent years. In particular, we analyse the content of several compulsory informative documents, required by CONSOB （the Italian Securities and Exchange Commission）, concerning large RPTs. The focus of our content analysis is on the ＂warnings＂ sections of these documents that should convey clear and comprehensive information on potential risks and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results show that, while the ＂warnings＂ sections of the studied documents generally contain all the information required by existing rules, the depth of the information provided is often unlikely to be sufficient to communicate the implications of the RPTs. Thus, readers may not find the disclosed information adequate to evaluate the fairness of the transactions. Moreover, visual representations are rarely used in the informative documents. The use of such representations could allow companies to convey the structures and features of complex RPTs in a simpler and more direct way.

Ownership Concentration and the Value Effect of Related Party Transactions （RPTs）

This paper investigates 218 related party transactions （RPTs） in Israel, an economy characterized by a high percentage of closely-held finns and identifies a non-linear inverted U connection between the value effect of RPT and the level of finn ownership concentration. This non-linear connection is similar to the worldwide documented quadratic （inverted U） relation between ownership concentration and a finn＇s Tobin＇s Q. The relation becomes even statistically stronger, when measuring ownership concentration using a strategic power approach, in an attempt to identify the source of this puzzling connection.

Post-issuance related party transaction： Evidence of tunneling

The distortion of corporate financing in China stock markets is not only reflected as the significant increase of leverage after rights offering, but also the large amount of post-issuance related party transactions between the parent SOEs and their subsidiaries. This paper examines the three channels, including accounts receivables, direct loan and loan guarantee. Empirical findings suggest that high frequency of these transactions after rights offering, and the amount of transactions increase as ownership concentration increases, which support the argument of tunneling.

Product market competition,ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions

Previous studies have shown that product market competition has an important effect on corporate strategies and internal governance mechanisms. Using a sample of China's listed firms from 2004 to 2009, we explore the relationship between product market competition and normal related party transactions and find a significant positive relationship. In addition, we investigate the substitutive effect of product market competition and the cash flow rights owned by ultimate controlling shareholders on the extent of normal related party transactions. In particular, our results suggest a positive relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholders' cash flow rights and normal related party transactions that is strongest in noncompetitive industries and weakens as product market competition increases.

Related party transactions and firm value: The moderating role of corporate social responsibility reporting

This study investigates the influence of related party transactions(RPTs)on firm value.Further,it examines whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility(CSR)reporting reflects its corporate values and ethical concerns,therefore mitigating the value-destroying effects of RPTs.Based on 274 observations from publicly listed firms in Indonesia,our results show that RPTs(i.e.,related party sales)are negatively related to firm value.Further,we find that in the presence of better CSR reporting,the relationship between RPTs and firm value becomes more positive.This is in line with the view that CSR reporting,which reflects firms’ethical concerns,may serve as a mechanism against managers’opportunism.However,we find that related party payables have a positive relationship with firm value.Further investigation reveals that,although certain RPTs show a short-term,value-enhancing effect,these transactions seem to result in subsequent tunneling activities,suggesting managerial opportunism in the long term.

Analysis and Countermeasures on EquityConcentration

This paper starts from the concept and distribution of Tunneling. The main reason of Tunneling is the concentration of Equity andthe incompletion of legal protection for small and medium-sized investors. Tunneling not only infringes small and medium-sizedshareholders＇ interest, but also violates company＇s benefit, and further damages the interest of creditors. Tunneling proceeds invariety of ways, one of them is Related Party Transaction, which severely erodes company＇s benefit. The suggestedcountermeasure for Tunneling is adjusting the property structure, completing the legislation and improving the independentdirector system.

基于SAP系统的集团内部模拟市场结算

集团公司下级多家子公司,为主机公司配套部件,结算原则如何制定,是主机公司面临的重要问题,也是主机公司成本管控的重要环节,通过SAP系统标准成本法与线下作业成本法的结合,实现模拟市场结算,是一种可行高效的结算方法,新产品可以快速定价,批量产品又可以随原材料市场波动而调整价格,主机公司随时进行下级采购件的成本监控。模拟市场结算,有利于提高子公司的成本管理能力与盈利能力,让子公司进入市场竞争,拓展发展空间。

诉讼威慑与公司治理优化——基于康美药业集体诉讼的事件研究证据

股东的权利,从享有公司收益、参与重大决策,到提起诉讼要求损害赔偿,被广泛认为是一个经济体中有效配置资本的重要影响因素。康美药业案作为中国第一起实质性集体诉讼,其判决结果深刻影响了资本市场主体的行为。采用事件研究法,以2018—2022年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了2021年11月12日康美药业证券虚假陈述集体诉讼案一审判决所带来的强化股东保护的公司治理效应。结果发现,盈余管理程度高、被交易所问询多以及存在关联交易的企业,在康美药业案一审判决前后的市场反应更差。此外,相较于其他重要事件日,一审判决对潜在违规企业的威慑更为明显,且威慑效应具有持续性,公司更倾向于守法经营,带来公司治理的优化。为保障中小股东的合法权益,建议政府进一步降低集体诉讼门槛和维权成本,为投资者提供便捷有效的诉讼维权渠道;上市公司增强财务信息质量和透明度,守法经营,依法披露,提升内部治理水平。

大数据税收征管有助于抑制关联交易吗?--来自“金税三期”工程的准自然实验证据

近年来,上市公司的关联交易不断增长,严重损害了中小股东的利益。文章以“金税三期”工程作为准自然实验,探究大数据税收征管对公司关联交易的治理作用及其影响机制。基于2011—2018年我国非金融上市公司发生的商品与劳务类关联交易数据,通过构造多期双重差分模型,文章研究发现以“金税三期”工程为代表的大数据税收征管模式显著降低了企业的关联交易水平。异质性分析发现,当公司内部治理水平较低,外部市场制度不完善时,“金税三期”工程对关联交易的治理作用更为显著。关于机制的研究显示,大数据税收征管通过征税效应、治理效应和信息效应降低委托代理成本、提高会计稳健性和提升会计信息透明度,从而减少企业关联交易水平。文章的研究不仅从理论上丰富了大数据税收征管的经济效应,而且对我国在数字经济时代深化监管方式改革提供了政策启示。

控制股东忠实义务的完善:基于特拉华州公司法的比较考察

控制股东的忠实义务有助于抑制控制股东的不当行为,保护公司、其他股东的合法权益。我国公司法对控制股东关联交易的法律规制与忠实义务功能相同,在一定程度上可替代忠实义务,但在义务主体、义务适用场合、义务内容与审查等方面仍有进一步完善的空间。美国特拉华州控制股东忠实义务可被概述为控制董事会、主导公司决策的股东在利益冲突交易中负有公平交易的义务。在对忠实义务的审查中,特拉华州法院将公司治理程序与司法审查有机结合,兼顾了自由与公平两种价值,是其最值得批判性借鉴之处。设置妥当的关联交易治理程序,构建兼顾自由与公平的司法审查方式,亦是我国控制股东忠实义务法律制度完善的核心命题。

监管机构随机现场检查能有效遏制关联交易吗?

证券监管是维护资本市场健康有序发展的重要手段。从证监机构预防性监管的视角出发,检验了证监机构随机现场检查的治理效应。研究发现,随机现场检查能够通过提高内部控制质量与公司治理水平,抑制关联交易。这种抑制作用主要体现在利益流出型、涉及担保抵押、股权交易和提供或接受劳务的关联交易事项中。当企业面临的外部治理更强,也即由十大会计师事务所审计、面临更多媒体报道时,这种抑制作用更为显著。论文的研究结论为监管机构深入创新监管方式提供了经验证据。

大数据赋能下关联方交易审计的应用路径优化问题

加强审计信息化建设和审计技术方法创新,增强大数据审计能力,充分运用现代信息技术开展审计,有助于提高审计质量和效率。大数据赋能关联方交易审计,有助于自动识别关联方关系、挖掘交易异常,能够为审计人员提供准确、全面的审计线索。目前,大数据赋能关联方交易审计的过程中,存在基础设施与资源不足、数据管理和安全风险、技术融合与人才短缺等问题。基于此,文章提出通过强化基础设施与数据资源建设、构建数据管理与安全法律体系、加强技术融合与人才队伍建设等具体措施,以深化新兴技术在审计全流程的应用,持续提升审计工作质效。

关联交易、管理层权力与公司违规——兼论审计监督的治理作用

本文以2005~2014年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了关联交易、管理层权力以及二者交互作用对公司违规的影响,并探索了审计监督作为外部公司治理机制在其中扮演的重要角色。研究发现:上市公司关联交易水平越高、管理层权力越大,越有可能发生公司违规;管理层权力加剧了关联交易与公司违规的正相关关系,这意味着权力膨胀的管理层可能利用关联交易从事机会主义行为;高质量审计师(主要是国内"四大"而非国际"四大")可以发挥公司治理作用,显著降低了管理层利用关联交易从事机会主义行为所带来的公司违规风险。进一步地研究发现,随着关联交易资金流方向、公司违规类型的不同,关联交易、管理层权力以及高质量审计师对于公司违规的影响也有所差异。

内部控制与关联交易：基于效率促进观和掏空观分析

本文利用中国上市公司的关联交易和内部控制数据,采用混合回归方法,发现内部控制缺陷和关联交易正相关:存在内部控制缺陷的公司,其关联交易的金额、次数和比例更高。将关联交易分类为效率促进类的正常关联交易、掏空类异常关联交易,发现公司内部控制缺陷对异常关联交易的影响要比正常关联交易的影响更大。还采用具有准自然实验性质的双重差分方法,利用上市公司内部控制缺陷整改事件研究了内部控制缺陷整改前后上市公司关联交易的差异,研究发现:存在内部控制缺陷的公司整改后,异常关联交易显著减少而正常关联交易不受该整改行为的影响。研究表明,良好的内部控制制度能够抑制异常关联交易的发生,能够授权效率促进类正常关联交易的实施。

地区市场化进程、市场分割与公司关联交易行为

文章以我国制造类行业上市公司为研究样本,考察转轨经济环境下不同地区间市场化发育水平对企业交易方式的影响。研究发现,与资金占用型关联交易显著不同,购销关联交易能显著提高公司绩效;产品和要素市场越不发达、市场化水平越低的地区企业购销类关联交易越多。结论证明,在市场发育不完善制度环境下,关联购销成为企业降低交易成本的有效交易方式,这支持了关联交易具有效率观的思想。文章结论对于理解转轨经济环境下企业特殊交易行为具有重要意义。

上市公司关联交易对审计质量的影响研究

以2015—2019年度部分A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,考察上市公司关联交易对审计质量的影响。实证研究发现:上市公司机会主义型关联交易的发生金额与审计质量之间呈显著正相关关系,而决策有用型关联交易的金额与审计质量之间无明显关系。基于此提出了建议,即在上市公司层面对外进一步加强企业的信息披露、对内不断优化完善内部治理结构,在证监会层面加强对市场的监管处罚力度,在会计师事务所层面加强审计人员尤其是注册会计师的职业道德教育。这为上市公司进行关联交易行为选择的经济后果和事务所规避审计风险、提高审计质量提供经验证据,更好地适应时代发展和市场需求,推动我国社会主义市场经济健康发展。

中国企业集团关联交易:掏空支持还是相互保险

已有文献对于企业集团核心经济功能存在巨大争论,综合考虑掏空和支持互动机制有可能克服单一的掏空或支持视角研究的局限。本文实证考察了我国企业集团内部掏空和支持的时机选择、工具差异和经济后果,结果表明:当上市公司面临退市风险时,控股股东同时提供融资类和非融资类关联交易支持,而当控股股东陷入财务困境时,上市公司仅提供融资类关联交易支持,非对称存在的掏空支持互动机制构成集团内部成员间的相互保险。本文再利用证监会关联交易监管政策变动外生冲击开展的自然实验研究提供了补充证据,其政策含义在于监管当局应考虑制定关联交易的相机监管政策。

“瞒天过海”:企业避税与大股东掏空

本文在控股股东与中小股东的委托代理框架下,检验了控股股东是否会将避税作为开展复杂关联交易的理由,从而掩盖其掏空意图。以2008-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,本文发现避税活动能够增加公司财务和业务的复杂性,为公司控制人的利益侵占提供掩盖。在采用公司实际税率作为避税活动的工具变量以控制潜在内生性问题的情况下,本文结论依旧稳健。进一步,本文发现避税活动与掏空行为的关系在治理环境较差的公司中更加显著。具体而言,当公司机构投资者持股比例较低,或者较少受到分析师关注时,避税与控股股东掏空行为的关系更显著。后续证据发现,避税活动较为激进的公司进行了更频繁的关联交易,公司也更加不透明。最后,本文从公司现金持有价值角度探究了普通投资者对公司避税活动和掏空行为的反应,发现出于对避税活动掩盖下的控股股东掏空行为的担忧,仅在掏空威胁较低的公司中,普通投资者愿意为公司避税活动节省的现金赋予更高的价值。

关联购销、价格管制及价值相关性研究——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

关于关联交易对企业的影响有两种对立的观点：正面观和负面观。文章通过分析关联交易会计管制政策出台前后（1998-2003年）上市公司关联销售比率和利润率指标的变化发现，会计管制通过规定关联交易价格上限能限制企业管理当局利用关联交易进行盈余管理的活动，但这种限制作用是有限的。实证研究表明关联购销业务的增加导致市场负面反应，从而支持了关联交易的负面观。文章还发现股票市场对关联购销业务的反应经历了一个过程。在2001年会计管制政策出台前，股市对于关联购销总量变动没有反应；管制政策出台后，利润率操纵受到抑制，关联购销业务对股价的负面影响得到明显体现。