This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks the...This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.展开更多
The scope of the paper is to empirically assess whether entrepreneurs experiencing difficulties in access-to-credit are vulnerable to some forms of victimization, especially when this refers to crimes more related to ...The scope of the paper is to empirically assess whether entrepreneurs experiencing difficulties in access-to-credit are vulnerable to some forms of victimization, especially when this refers to crimes more related to entrepreneurs＇ activity. The basic idea is that those entrepreneurs might be induced to fund themselves into the informal and criminal credit markets or, if informationally captured by a bank, can be exposed to requests from the financial intermediary that might also have a criminal profile. This has been investigated using an original data set with information collected through a victimization survey administered to entrepreneurs in Campania, the largest region in the South of Italy. The estimation results from a logistic equation are consistent with the hypothesis that, in presence of difficulties in accessing credit, the entrepreneur might incur in a higher risk of victimization.展开更多
文摘This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.
文摘The scope of the paper is to empirically assess whether entrepreneurs experiencing difficulties in access-to-credit are vulnerable to some forms of victimization, especially when this refers to crimes more related to entrepreneurs＇ activity. The basic idea is that those entrepreneurs might be induced to fund themselves into the informal and criminal credit markets or, if informationally captured by a bank, can be exposed to requests from the financial intermediary that might also have a criminal profile. This has been investigated using an original data set with information collected through a victimization survey administered to entrepreneurs in Campania, the largest region in the South of Italy. The estimation results from a logistic equation are consistent with the hypothesis that, in presence of difficulties in accessing credit, the entrepreneur might incur in a higher risk of victimization.
