This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks the...This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.展开更多
This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines...This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines the decision-making process of bank loans and the information needs, and analyzes the scientificity and rationality of the existing interpretations. Based on the reasons of ＂small bank advantage＂, it discusses some issues to which banks and enterprises should pay attention in the relationship lending.展开更多
文摘This paper analyzes the loan exit on relationship lending in China. We define the relationship lending and analyze the value that both banks and borrowers will obtain in relationship lending, as well as some risks they will face, and then analyze the behaviors of loans exit with game theory. Our results suggest that, in general, relationship lending is helpful for the commercial banks and the enterprises to communicate information and enhance financing efficiency, while in the loan exit gaming, only when the decision of loan exit is made authentic promised by the banks, can the relationship lending effectively exert their positive function, and maintain the health cooperation between borrowers and lenders.
文摘This paper focuses on relationship lending and the hypothesis of the small bank advantage. It integrates the knowledge of organization management theory, management theory and information economics theory. It combines the decision-making process of bank loans and the information needs, and analyzes the scientificity and rationality of the existing interpretations. Based on the reasons of ＂small bank advantage＂, it discusses some issues to which banks and enterprises should pay attention in the relationship lending.
