From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the ...From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the regional distribution in our country,except for Beijing,Shanghai,Tianjin and Hainan,the debt risk mainly concentrates in the western region.In a further step,it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”which contains none-accordance of debt power(such as debt financing power),confusion of debt responsibility(such as debt management responsibility)and distortion of debt interests(such as the private benefit and the public interests).If we want to correct this problem,the keynote is to prevent the local government’s debt to be used by the purpose of reaching the private interests.Actually,it should play a role that the local debt financing takes to the“faithful”service for the social interests.For realizing this purpose,it should keep eyes on the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”,which is the most important factor as for setting up the control system of debt risk about our local governments.Particularly,it includes the following aspects.First of all,it should find the right time to empower the local government with the debt power.Secondly,on the basis of both positive and negative sides,it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in the local government,in order to solve the problems such as new debt,invalid debt and overdue debt expansion.Thirdly,it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.展开更多
The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explai...The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explain how the Qing Court decentralized or centralized its power.These approaches fail to consider how local officials in fact reacted to central command.This research is an attempt to apply the social science method to a classical historical study.I firstly examine the various political decisions of governors when they were faced with a series of big events during the Boxer Uprising(1900–1901).After arranging them using strict criteria,I will conduct spatial and structural analysis on their diversity,and furthermore explore the internal and external influencing factors.Statistics indicate that governors of coastal provinces and of the provinces along the Yangtze River were more likely to express their opinions to the Qing court,while the North and Northeastern provinces tended to obey the central orders.Regional differences mainly have a positive correlation with provincial structural factors,such as revenue and relations with foreign powers.The correlations are also determined by personal political experience and resources of governors.展开更多
文摘From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the regional distribution in our country,except for Beijing,Shanghai,Tianjin and Hainan,the debt risk mainly concentrates in the western region.In a further step,it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”which contains none-accordance of debt power(such as debt financing power),confusion of debt responsibility(such as debt management responsibility)and distortion of debt interests(such as the private benefit and the public interests).If we want to correct this problem,the keynote is to prevent the local government’s debt to be used by the purpose of reaching the private interests.Actually,it should play a role that the local debt financing takes to the“faithful”service for the social interests.For realizing this purpose,it should keep eyes on the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”,which is the most important factor as for setting up the control system of debt risk about our local governments.Particularly,it includes the following aspects.First of all,it should find the right time to empower the local government with the debt power.Secondly,on the basis of both positive and negative sides,it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in the local government,in order to solve the problems such as new debt,invalid debt and overdue debt expansion.Thirdly,it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.
基金support of the China Scholarship Council and advises and helps from Professor James Tong in University of California,Los Angeles(Grant no.201406010081).
文摘The central–local government relationship has always been an important topic for political research of the Late Qing period.Former researchers focused mainly on political systems,finding historical archives to explain how the Qing Court decentralized or centralized its power.These approaches fail to consider how local officials in fact reacted to central command.This research is an attempt to apply the social science method to a classical historical study.I firstly examine the various political decisions of governors when they were faced with a series of big events during the Boxer Uprising(1900–1901).After arranging them using strict criteria,I will conduct spatial and structural analysis on their diversity,and furthermore explore the internal and external influencing factors.Statistics indicate that governors of coastal provinces and of the provinces along the Yangtze River were more likely to express their opinions to the Qing court,while the North and Northeastern provinces tended to obey the central orders.Regional differences mainly have a positive correlation with provincial structural factors,such as revenue and relations with foreign powers.The correlations are also determined by personal political experience and resources of governors.
