The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized an...The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized and dynamic,few nodes in the network may not associate with other nodes.These uncooperative nodes also known as selfish nodes corrupt the performance of the cooperative nodes.Namely,the nodes cause congestion,high delay,security concerns,and resource depletion.This study presents an effective selfish node detection method to address these problems.The Price of Anarchy(PoA)and the Price of Stability(PoS)in Game Theory with the Presence of Nash Equilibrium(NE)are discussed for the Selfish Node Detection.This is a novel experiment to detect selfish nodes in a network using PoA.Moreover,the least response dynamic-based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation(CSRA)game is introduced to improve resource usage among the nodes.The suggested strategy is simulated using the Solar Winds simulator,and the simulation results show that,when compared to earlier methods,the new scheme offers promising performance in terms of delivery rate,delay,and throughput.展开更多
The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper pres...The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit and involves a distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in Li and Morse(2017). The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as the price of anarchy results are also derived.展开更多
We provide an overview of the recently developed general infinitesimal perturbation analysis(IPA)framework for stochastic hybrid systems(SHSs),and establish some conditions under which this framework can be used to ob...We provide an overview of the recently developed general infinitesimal perturbation analysis(IPA)framework for stochastic hybrid systems(SHSs),and establish some conditions under which this framework can be used to obtain unbiased performance gradient estimates in a particularly simple and efficient manner.We also propose a general scheme for systematically deriving an abstraction of a discrete event system(DES)in the form of an SHS.Then,as an application of the general IPA framework,we study a class of stochastic non-cooperative games termed“resource contention games”modeled through stochastic flow models(SFMs),where two or more players(users)compete for the use of a sharable resource.Simulation results are provided for a simple version of such games to illustrate and contrast system-centric and user-centric optimization.展开更多
文摘The introduction of new technologies has increased communication network coverage and the number of associating nodes in dynamic communication networks(DCN).As the network has the characteristics like decentralized and dynamic,few nodes in the network may not associate with other nodes.These uncooperative nodes also known as selfish nodes corrupt the performance of the cooperative nodes.Namely,the nodes cause congestion,high delay,security concerns,and resource depletion.This study presents an effective selfish node detection method to address these problems.The Price of Anarchy(PoA)and the Price of Stability(PoS)in Game Theory with the Presence of Nash Equilibrium(NE)are discussed for the Selfish Node Detection.This is a novel experiment to detect selfish nodes in a network using PoA.Moreover,the least response dynamic-based Capacitated Selfish Resource Allocation(CSRA)game is introduced to improve resource usage among the nodes.The suggested strategy is simulated using the Solar Winds simulator,and the simulation results show that,when compared to earlier methods,the new scheme offers promising performance in terms of delivery rate,delay,and throughput.
基金supported by the National Science Foundation(1607101.00)USAir Force(FA9550-16-1-0290)
文摘The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit and involves a distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in Li and Morse(2017). The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as the price of anarchy results are also derived.
基金This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant EFRI-0735794by AFOSR under Grants FA9550-07-1-0361 and FA9550-09-1-0095+1 种基金by DOE under Grant DE-FG52-06NA27490by ONR under Grant N00014-09-1-1051.
文摘We provide an overview of the recently developed general infinitesimal perturbation analysis(IPA)framework for stochastic hybrid systems(SHSs),and establish some conditions under which this framework can be used to obtain unbiased performance gradient estimates in a particularly simple and efficient manner.We also propose a general scheme for systematically deriving an abstraction of a discrete event system(DES)in the form of an SHS.Then,as an application of the general IPA framework,we study a class of stochastic non-cooperative games termed“resource contention games”modeled through stochastic flow models(SFMs),where two or more players(users)compete for the use of a sharable resource.Simulation results are provided for a simple version of such games to illustrate and contrast system-centric and user-centric optimization.
