Combining Stated Preference and Revealed Preference Methods for the Valuation of Non-market Goods

In this paper,we introduce the combining stated preference and revealed preference methods which is the state-ofthe-art method for the valuation of non-market goods.Revealed preference methods and stated preference (SP) methods have both been applied by economists in valuing non-market goods;however both methods have inherent weaknesses.In order to exploit the strengths of the various approaches while minimizing their weaknesses,combining the two methods has become an important methodological option.Up to now,a growing number of literatures of studying combing the two types of data have evolved,and researchers developed three types of models to estimate combining revealed preference and stated preference data in academic fields:discrete choice model,continuous choice model and mixed choice model.Combining stated and revealed preference methods have been developed fast especially in the transport study field in which ideas could also be leant for environmental economic studies.

ON THE AXIOMS OF REVEALED PREFERENCE IN FUZZY CONSUMER THEORY

The revealed preference is a central subject in classical consumer theory.Authors likeSamuelson,Arrow,Richter,Sen,Uzawa and others have proposed an axiomatic setting of revealedpreference theory.Consequently revealed preference axioms WARP and SARP and congruence axioms WCA andSCA have been considered.An important theorem of Sen establishes the equivalence between these axioms provided thefamily of budgets includes all non-empty finite sets of bundles.Fuzzy consumer theory(=fuzzy choice functions)is a topic that appears in a lot of papers.Particularly,Banerjee studies in fuzzy context axioms of revealed preference and congruenceextending some results of Arrow and Sen.In this paper we modify the Banerjee definition of a fuzzy choice function(=fuzzy consumer)and we study some fuzzy versions of the axioms of revealed preference and congruence.Banerjeefuzzifies only the range of a consumer;we use a fuzzification of both the domain and the range of aconsumer.The axioms WAFRP,SAFRP,WFCA,SFCA generalize to fuzzy consumer theory thewell-known axioms WARP,SARP,WCA,SCA.Our main result establishes some connections betweenWAFRP,SAFRP,WFCA,SFCA extending a significant part of Sen theorem.Generally,we work in a fuzzy set theory based on a continuous t-norm,but some results areobtained for G(?)del t-norm and others are obtained for Lukasiewicz t-norm.

Disaggregate Traffic Mode Choice Model Based on Combination of Revealed and Stated Preference Data

The conventional traffic demand forecasting methods based on revealed preference （RP） data are not able to predict the modal split. Passengers＇ stated intentions are indispensable for modal split forecasting and evaluation of new traffic modes. This paper analyzed the biases and errors included in stated preference data, put forward the new stochastic utility functions, and proposed an unbiased disaggregate model and its approximate model based on the combination of RP and stated preference （SP） data, with analysis of the parameter estimation algorithm. The model was also used to forecast rail transit passenger volumes to the Beijing Capital International Airport and the shift ratios from current traffic modes to rail transit. Experimental results show that the model can greatly increase forecasting accuracy of the modal split ratio of current traffic modes and can accurately forecast the shift ratios from current modes to the new mode.

Game analysis on constructing the model of an international carbon emissions trading model

Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits,the relevant trading mechanism has been far from perfect.The perfect mechanism for international carbon emissions trading should be a revealing preference game.In other words,only if all players in this game truly show their information and preferences can the Nash outcome be Pareto efficient and fair.China should actively participate in the international carbon emissions trading game;promote efficiency,justice,rationality,and the quality of being manipulation-free in the carbon emissions market;and play a more important role in perfecting the international carbon emissions trading mechanism.