A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results in...A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results indicate that the provider should forsake RRPs and purely rely on customers'organic word-of-mouth communication under certain conditions.In particular,when the innovativeness of the referred product is extremely high,the provider should forsake RRPs completely,even though few customers will make organic referrals for the product.When the innovativeness is on other levels,the provider should make optimal RRPs decision depending on both the sender's persuasion effectiveness and the tie-strength between the two customers.Moreover,the optimal rewards increase with the innovativeness of the referred product when the provider opts to use RRPs.These results seem contrary to the existing empirical finding to some extent,and it is due to the high referral cost for making a successful referral for the high innovative offerings.展开更多
In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharin...In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharing bonus is worked out and the impact of social relationships among customers is discussed. The results show that the higher the bonus,the more efforts the inductor is willing to make to persuade the inductee into buying. In addition,the firms should take the social relationship into consideration when setting the optimal sharing bonus. If the social relationship is weak,there is no need to adopt the SRP. Otherwise,there are two ways to reward the inductors. Also,the stronger the social relationship,the fewer the sharing bonuses that should be offered to the inductors,and the higher the expected profits. As a result,it is reasonable for the firms to implement SRPs on the social media where users are familiar with each other.展开更多
This paper deals with the continuous time Markov decision programming (briefly CTMDP) withunbounded reward rate.The economic criterion is the long-run average reward. To the models withcountable state space,and compac...This paper deals with the continuous time Markov decision programming (briefly CTMDP) withunbounded reward rate.The economic criterion is the long-run average reward. To the models withcountable state space,and compact metric action sets,we present a set of sufficient conditions to ensurethe existence of the stationary optimal policies.展开更多
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)。
文摘A nested Stackelberg game among a provider of a product,a sender(existing customer),and a receiver(new customer)is developed to explore the optimal referral reward programs(RRPs)for innovative offerings.The results indicate that the provider should forsake RRPs and purely rely on customers'organic word-of-mouth communication under certain conditions.In particular,when the innovativeness of the referred product is extremely high,the provider should forsake RRPs completely,even though few customers will make organic referrals for the product.When the innovativeness is on other levels,the provider should make optimal RRPs decision depending on both the sender's persuasion effectiveness and the tie-strength between the two customers.Moreover,the optimal rewards increase with the innovativeness of the referred product when the provider opts to use RRPs.These results seem contrary to the existing empirical finding to some extent,and it is due to the high referral cost for making a successful referral for the high innovative offerings.
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province(No.KYLX15_0193)
文摘In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharing bonus is worked out and the impact of social relationships among customers is discussed. The results show that the higher the bonus,the more efforts the inductor is willing to make to persuade the inductee into buying. In addition,the firms should take the social relationship into consideration when setting the optimal sharing bonus. If the social relationship is weak,there is no need to adopt the SRP. Otherwise,there are two ways to reward the inductors. Also,the stronger the social relationship,the fewer the sharing bonuses that should be offered to the inductors,and the higher the expected profits. As a result,it is reasonable for the firms to implement SRPs on the social media where users are familiar with each other.
基金This paper was prepared with the support of the National Youth Science Foundation
文摘This paper deals with the continuous time Markov decision programming (briefly CTMDP) withunbounded reward rate.The economic criterion is the long-run average reward. To the models withcountable state space,and compact metric action sets,we present a set of sufficient conditions to ensurethe existence of the stationary optimal policies.
