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Does Wittgenstein Actually Undermine the Foundation of Artificial Intelligence?
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作者 XU Yingjin 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》 2016年第1期3-20,共18页
Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis, namely, that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which c... Wittgenstein is widely viewed as a potential critic of a key philosophical assumption of the Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) thesis, namely, that it is in principle possible to build a programmed machine which can achieve real intelligence. Smart Shanker has provided the most systematic reconstruction of the Wittgensteinian argument against AI, building on Wittgenstein's own statements, the "rule-following" feature of language-games, and the putative alliance between AI and psychologism. This article will attempt to refute this reconstruction and its constituent arguments, thereby paving the way for a new and amicable rather than agonistic conception of the Wittgensteinian position on AI. 展开更多
关键词 Strong Artificial Intelligence (AI) rule-following psychologism algorithm
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