A New Approach to China's SOE Reform and Governance

Over the past three decades since 1978,reform of China's SOEs has scored remarkable achievements after the three stages of decentralization,institutional innovation and state capital development.However,the reform at the current stage is confronted with complex situations and problems.Internationally,China's state sector is confronted with pressures from elevated national mandates and a stern international environment.Domestically,China's economic development urgently awaits transformation and changes are taking place in a factor-driven development environment familiar to SOEs.In terms of market-based operations,a great gap exists between the current conditions of the SOEs and the requirements of a sophisticated socialist market economic system.Under such circumstances,the state sector is responsible not only for appreciating the value of state assets but also for assuming the new mission of expediting the transformation of China's economic growth pattern,internationalization and the establishment of a sophisticated market economic system.These requirements mark a new milestone for SOE reform and development.Addressing the conflict between the profitability mandate and the public interest mandate is a key priority of SOE reform in the new era.This paper has approached SOE reform by dividing the state sector into three categories:SOEs that serve public policy,SOEs that serve specific functions,and general commercial SOEs,and creating different governance mechanisms for each type of SOEs.

Three decades of SOE reform:no pain,no gain

What lies ahead for China,difficulties or perhaps another three decades of glory? To address this question,a special event was held at Chongqing Technology and Business University:Symposium on Theories on and Reality of China’s 30 Years of Enterprise Reform and Development,annual meeting of the Chinese Institute of Business Administration for 2008. At the foot of a mountain just south of Chongqing,150 delegates in the field of economic research gathered for discussions on pains and gains of the 30 years of reform. Leading economists at the event included Chen Jiagui,vice president of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS),Zhang Guoyou,vice president of Peking University,and Jin Bei,deputy director of CASS’s Institute of Industrial Economics (IIE). The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Chinese Institute of Business Administration,Jiang Yiwei Academic Foundation for Enterprise Reform and Development,Chongqing Technology and Business University,and CASS Management Science Research Institute. The following is a group of articles written by staff reporters of the China Economist (CE).

SOE Reform: from Corporate System to Ownership System

China’s restructuring of state-owned enterpsies has been a major component of the country’s reform and opening, and a driver of its impressive economic growth of the last two decades. An examination of this restructuring is important not only as a contribution to the general economic development literature, but also for China to best understand how its development has played out so far, and thus how it might best be continued.

Challenges faced by SOE reform

State-owned enterprises’(SOE) greater independence from government offices as well as property rights reform have optimized SOEs’ shareholding structure. But the reform has to clear several hurdles before it can be fully realized. In 1998, the central government dismantled ministries that had been the direct administrators of large SOEs. Most functions of those ministries were transferred to industry associations. Only a few considered indispensable were taken over by other government offices. The move has pushed forward the SOE reform to some extent. On the other hand, being State-owned, those enterprises have to find new links with the government.

Revisiting China's SOE Reform Strategy

State-owned enterprise(SOE)reform is often singledout as the least successful component of China’ssuccessful reform history of the past two decades. Thisis supported by the poor performance of the SOE sectorand the financial burden it has imposed on the country’sfiscal and financial systems. Many observers strongly

Analysis on auditing problems in SOEs joint share system reform

At the present stage of the SOEs joint share system reform, the problem of distorted accounting information, the failed financial audit and the ensuing erosion of the state： Owned assets, have severely impeded the process of the SOEs reform. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis on auditing problems in the process of the SOEs reform from managerial points of view, makes the suggestion that we should introduce governmental audit into the auditing supervision of the SOEs reform, and discusses its methods, approaches, contents and procedures in detail. This paper also indicates the possible obstacles of implementing this suggestion.

China's Next Step:to Reform Monopoly Industries

Based on the study of enterprise managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs, this paper points out the new characteristics of managerial corruption in Chinese SOEs:administrative monopoly has become increasingly common, while corruption for personal gains by SOE leaders hits become less and less frequent.This means the reform of SOEs has entered a new stage in which the core problem is how to deal with administrative monopoly.

On the Nature and Direction of State-owned Enterprises Reform in a New Era

State-owned enterprises(SOEs) serve as an important material and political basis for socialism with Chinese characteristics. SOEs must be reformed in accordance with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is the fundamental basis for maintaining the nature and direction of reform for SOEs. Reforms must be built on the fundamental standpoint with people at the center, and aimed at emancipating, developing and protecting productive forces based on the principles of justice and fairness, which is also the direction for Chinese SOEs reform in the new era. Adherence to the public ownership of state-owned assets in the form of value and its market-oriented management in the form of use-value is not only the objective requirement of a production mode adapting to the growth of productive forces, but also the logic of SOEs reform in the new era. Meanwhile, SOEs need to highlight the top-level designs of governmental systems in the reform process, giving e ective play to the leading and guiding roles of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese characteristics for a new era.

国有企业工资溢价与形成机制

本文基于三轮中国企业雇主—雇员匹配数据追踪调查(CMEELS)数据,采用分位数回归和反事实分解方法,对2017—2021年国有企业工资溢价及其形成机制进行探究。研究发现:这段时期国企相对于非国企存在工资溢价,工资溢价主要集中在中高收入层次上,形成国企工资溢价的主要原因是国企和非国企间的劳动力市场分割。进一步分析表明,在高工资水平上,女性和农村户口持有者等群体在非国有企业受到了工资歧视,因此上述群体中存在较大的国企工资溢价。据此本文建议未来应坚持劳动力市场化改革方向,有针对性地打破国企和非国企之间的劳动力市场分割,加强对就业歧视行为的约束,提高中国劳动力市场运行效率。

国企混改、公司治理与企业绩效研究

发展混合所有制经济是深化新时期国企改革的重点。基于公司治理视角,系统分析国企混改对企业绩效的影响机制,以2010—2022年全部沪深上市国有企业数据为样本,采用固定效应模型、中介效应模型及双重差分模型分析引入战略投资者这一混改方式对国有企业公司治理和企业绩效的影响。实证结果表明:国企混改有利于提升企业绩效;公司治理在国企混改对企业绩效的影响中能够起到部分中介传导作用。进一步研究发现,国企混改政策的推行本身对于企业绩效有积极的政策效应;国企混改对企业绩效的影响效果在央企和地方国企、竞争性行业和垄断性行业里均有所不同。因此,政府应发挥引导和监管作用,深化国资国企改革,推动国有企业与民营资本合作共赢,战略投资者也应积极响应国家政策,助力国资民企合作共赢。

China’s internal and external economic imbalances and fiscal reform

China’s ballooning current account surplus has caused a plethora of adverse effects on the healthy development of its economy.Based on an in-depth analysis of the contributory factors to the swelling current account surplus,this paper purports to demonstrate theoretically and empirically that while the chronic savings-consumption imbalance is an important contributor to China’s huge trade surplus,the fundamental underlying contributor is the income structure and savings structure imbalance stemming from the disproportionate increase in retained earnings relative to stagnant wage bills.Corporate retained earnings keep growing rapidly because corporate profit margins are"overstated"and state-owned enterprises"do not pay dividends."Only when these issues are resolved at the institutional level can the savings rate be reduced to an appropriate level with domestic demand boosted to eliminate excess trade surpluses and fundamentally fix internal and external economic imbalances.

国有企业集团内部放权路径研究

深化国有企业改革是全面深化改革的重要组成部分。本文将国有企业集团内部放权路径分为自上而下和自下而上两种,探讨母公司和子公司面临所在地竞争变化时如何放权。本文以行政审批中心设立为准自然实验,基于2005-2018年中国沪深A股国有控股上市公司及子公司数据,采用双重差分模型实证检验母公司所在地竞争程度和子公司所在地竞争程度对国有企业集团内部放权的影响。研究结果显示:母公司所在地区竞争加剧增加了内部放权,但子公司所在地区竞争加剧的影响不显著,即国有企业集团内部放权路径是自上而下的。这种自上而下的放权受到母公司信息处理过载和母公司信息获取成本的影响,当母公司业务繁忙、母公司市场竞争地位高、兼任人为高管和兼任人有集团外部兼任时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权;当母公司与子公司距离远和子公司规模大时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权。本文揭示了国有企业集团内部自上而下的放权路径,表明在国资监管“放管服”过程中,协调内部放权路径可能是打通改革“最后一公里”和激发国有企业活力的有效措施。

混合所有制改革能否促进国有企业数字化转型?

基于国有企业改革视角,以2013—2022年沪深A股国有上市公司为研究对象,实证检验混合所有制改革对国有企业数字化转型的影响。研究发现,混合所有制改革能够显著提升国有企业数字化水平,该结论在经过工具变量两阶段回归、倾向得分匹配、改变变量度量方法和计量估计方法、排除替代性解释影响等稳健性测试后仍然成立。作用机制检验结果表明,混合所有制改革通过治理效应和资源效应推动了国有企业数字化转型。异质性分析显示,对于市场化水平较高地区和政策性负担较大的国有企业,混合所有制改革对数字化转型的正向影响更明显。经济后果考察发现,混合所有制改革通过促进国有企业数字化转型显著提升了其市场价值。

国内改革与国际造法对比视角下国有企业的法律风险与应对

在积极主动对标CPTPP等高标准经贸规则的过程中,我国国有企业国内改革与国际造法之间的差异可能导致的风险亟须得到识别和应对。从国有企业的界定和义务两大方面对比国内改革与国际造法可以发现,中国国有企业面临的法律风险主要表现为第二类商业类国有企业在国际造法中定位不明确和商业类国有企业的部分义务标准过高。该风险以国有企业存在的合理性被认可为基础,以国有企业与政府的关系为核心,集中表现为国有企业商业性的判断,以国有企业非商业性活动的分类为难点。未来,中国参与和接受国际造法时应注意扩大国有企业所能提供的公共服务范围、警惕商业考量条款,并合理利用例外条款。

高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究

建立有效的薪酬契约是国有企业改革的核心问题,而高管拥有的权力可能引发其在薪酬激励方面的自利行为。以2004-2008年的国有上市公司为研究样本,实证发现:国有企业高管的权力越大,不但能获得更高的薪酬水平,还攫取了更多的超额薪酬,并且拉大了高管层与普通员工之间的薪酬差距,表明国企高管的确通过权力的运用扭曲了薪酬激励机制。另外,虽然高管的薪酬业绩敏感性整体上呈现不对称特征,但那些拥有较高权力的同时又建立了政治联系的高管可能基于政治动因的考虑降低了薪酬粘性。进一步的研究显示,政府控制层级的提升和制度环境的改善一定程度上能够抑制国企高管攫取超额薪酬,但并不能有效约束薪酬差距的扩大。本文的研究结果有助于我们理解国有企业高管权力的经济后果,并为当前有关国企薪酬体制改革的政策导向提供了经验启示。

股权结构、制度环境与经营绩效:来自中国城市商业银行的经验证据

文章以我国城市商业银行为研究对象,研究了股权结构和制度环境对经营绩效的影响。研究发现:股权集中度与城市商业银行经营绩效呈负相关关系,股权制衡度与经营绩效正相关;制度环境能够显著降低股权集中度对第2类代理成本的影响,并能在一定程度上弱化城商行的代理成本和经营绩效之间的负向关系;相比非国有城商行,在国有城商行中,股权集中度对代理成本的影响更为显著,且制度环境可以更为有效地制约这种影响。研究结论对国企的混合所有制改革具有一定的借鉴意义。

混合所有制与竞争中立规则——TPP对我国国有企业改革的挑战与启示

跨太平洋伙伴关系协定签署之后,一个涵盖全球经济总量近四成的巨型区域贸易组织正在亚太地区逐步形成。TPP谈判协定的达成不仅会在短期内对世界经济贸易带来巨大影响,而且其构建的新一代国际贸易投资规则更将影响深远。TPP协定中提出的国有企业条款的核心思想来源于"竞争中立"规则。TPP投入运行后,必然会通过贸易创造效应和贸易转移效应增加成员之间的贸易和投资,也会由于贸易转移效应而对TPP非成员国造成一定的负面影响。TPP国有企业条款的适用对象对中国具有很大的挑战性,可能造成准入阶段的投资壁垒,以及对国有企业已有海外投资造成威胁。中国应该以更加开放的姿态认同竞争中立规则的大方向,加快国内改革步伐,与国际规则接轨。

国企改革中国有股份最优比重问题研究

通过深入考察国有企业经营目标及其股权构成,给出了国有企业和私有企业开展古诺竞争的基本模型,然后讨论了国有企业中国有股份比重的变动对均衡社会福利和均衡政府支付的影响,进而得到了一些有益的结论.

产权制度变革与市场机制建设的互补

产权制度变革与市场机制建设不是对立的，而是互补的。单纯的产权制度变革不可能解决经济运行效率低下的弊病，而缺乏适合市场经济发展的产权结构，缺乏具有不同经济利益的市场参与主体，也不会有完善的市场机制。就我国国有企业改革来说，不应该将上述两种改革思路对立起来，要么选择产权制度变革，要么选择市场机制建设，而应看到两者的互补性，根据改革不同阶段和不同领域的现实状况，弄清制约改革进程的关键环节，在统筹兼顾的基础上，确定改革的重点。

分权与会计师事务所选择——来自我国国有上市公司的经验证据

本文基于管理分权的角度,以代理层级作为政府下放决策权的度量,研究金字塔控股结构对于我国国有上市公司会计师事务所需求的影响。研究发现,代理层级越多的国有上市公司越倾向于选择高质量的事务所——国际"四大"(或国内"十大")事务所。研究表明公有制背景下,高质量的审计需求依赖于控股股东——政府监督国有上市公司管理者的需要。本文的研究结论对我国的国企改革也具有重要的意义。