Mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are the important methods to quickly acquire external resources, achieve the economies of scale and the economies of scope, improve market share, and expand the scale of enterprise, w...Mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are the important methods to quickly acquire external resources, achieve the economies of scale and the economies of scope, improve market share, and expand the scale of enterprise, while M＆A performance is an important index to measure if enterprise M＆A is successful. In this paper, the influence of entrepreneurs＇ political connection on the M＆A driving factors and M＆A efficiency of the enterprises with different property rights are analyzed using 357 mergers and acquisitions of China＇ s 189 listed companies in 2005-2011 as samples based on the distinction between political connection and the nature of enterprise property rights. The results show that the political connection plays a very significant positive influence on the M＆A performances of the central state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, but exerts a very significant negative influence on the local state-owned enterprises; the intensity of entrepreneurs＇ political connection also plays a certain influence on enterprise merger and acquisition, and the central political connection and the local political connection are significantly different in the influence on the enterprise M＆A performance.展开更多
By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, ...By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, different succession modes get different efficiency. The result shows that： The decline of company performance will cause the top executive turnover, and that the possibility of top executive turnover in non-state-owned listed companies is higher than that of the state-owned companies. In the routine turnover sample, the performance level of the internal succession is better than that of the external succession. In the non-routine turnover sample, the results are reversed. For further analysis, the main sources of the improvement for performance are items of below-the-line and non-recurring profit and loss, rather than the company＇s operating revenue.展开更多
文摘Mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） are the important methods to quickly acquire external resources, achieve the economies of scale and the economies of scope, improve market share, and expand the scale of enterprise, while M＆A performance is an important index to measure if enterprise M＆A is successful. In this paper, the influence of entrepreneurs＇ political connection on the M＆A driving factors and M＆A efficiency of the enterprises with different property rights are analyzed using 357 mergers and acquisitions of China＇ s 189 listed companies in 2005-2011 as samples based on the distinction between political connection and the nature of enterprise property rights. The results show that the political connection plays a very significant positive influence on the M＆A performances of the central state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, but exerts a very significant negative influence on the local state-owned enterprises; the intensity of entrepreneurs＇ political connection also plays a certain influence on enterprise merger and acquisition, and the central political connection and the local political connection are significantly different in the influence on the enterprise M＆A performance.
文摘By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, different succession modes get different efficiency. The result shows that： The decline of company performance will cause the top executive turnover, and that the possibility of top executive turnover in non-state-owned listed companies is higher than that of the state-owned companies. In the routine turnover sample, the performance level of the internal succession is better than that of the external succession. In the non-routine turnover sample, the results are reversed. For further analysis, the main sources of the improvement for performance are items of below-the-line and non-recurring profit and loss, rather than the company＇s operating revenue.
