This article explores the concept of sects as social formations and the process of secularization sects has been undergone in the modern era, implying their exposition to political manipulation by various internal and...This article explores the concept of sects as social formations and the process of secularization sects has been undergone in the modern era, implying their exposition to political manipulation by various internal and external actors. We analyse this subject in the context of the modern Syrian State and, in particular, with reference to the political system established by President Hafez al-Asad in the 70’s. The use of sectarian ties appears as part of the regime patrimonial features, being a political strategy used in order to bind particular society’s groups to the regime. In this sense, sectarianism has nothing to do with religion and it requires to be analysed as a socio-political phenomenon. This kind of analysis permits also to confute the identification between the Asad regime and the Alawite community and to understand the complexity of the relation between the President and the community he originated from.展开更多
This paper aims to analyze the background of the emergence of＂Islamic State＂ and prevailing sectarian strife in the Middle East from the aspect of international relations, considering it as the result of the failure...This paper aims to analyze the background of the emergence of＂Islamic State＂ and prevailing sectarian strife in the Middle East from the aspect of international relations, considering it as the result of the failure and mistakes, accumulated not only since the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War but also from the post-WWI period when the territorial-state system was introduced in this area. This paper emphasizes the importance of the norms and ideas that provide the basis of regional order, and focuses on conflicts between norm-based regional order and interest-based regional alliance. The former has been pursued by the actors that underline supra- or sub-state identity as cores for regional solidarity, while the latter has been introduced by external actors, or established by conservatives to maintain the status quo to react to revolutionary/revisionist movements. The situation became complicated when regional actors faced three different cataclysmic transformations in 1979. Although each incident necessitated a different re-arrangement of their relations, a shorthand patchwork-like formation of alliances was applied, in which the US and Saudi Arabia played key roles. In the post-1979 regime, rivalry became dominant between the interest-based pro-US regional alliances vs. the challengers that justified their own interests with norm-based regional order, manipulating supra-state identity. Once the influence of the US declined after 2011, pro-US state actors found neither interest-based regional alliance nor norm-based regional order supported their own interests. Here, sectarian identity has emerged as a kind of norm to cover their collective interest. Thus sectarianism is the result of necessity for the regional actors to legitimize their interest-based actions and to secure partners for collective action. ＂Islamic State＂ was born in this circumstance, where sectarian identity became an ostensible factor for new regional order in the Middle East in the absence of the US-led regional alliance.展开更多
This paper focuses on the Bahraini regime’s usage of sectarianism as a survival mechanism.The argument herein has adopted a modernist approach,where sectarian identities are not viewed as fixed and as causes of an an...This paper focuses on the Bahraini regime’s usage of sectarianism as a survival mechanism.The argument herein has adopted a modernist approach,where sectarian identities are not viewed as fixed and as causes of an ancient hatred struggle,but are instead viewed as a modern construction that are securitised and desecuritised.It examines how this particular struggle was framed in a sectarian context through the analysis of three pivotal stages of the 2011 uprising and its aftermath.These stages are broken down as follows:(1)the first stage of the uprising,which includes the first month of the uprising and the period prior to the regional military intervention,a period which was characterised by negotiations and dialogue;(2)the period of fragmentation within Bahraini society in which this paper explores the various reasons behind the failed reforms and the failure/ending of dialogue between the regime and the oppositions;and(3)the period of military intervention and the uprising’s aftermath,which reflected a time of securitisation and de-securitisation of the uprising’s space,image and language.These three stages showcase overriding factors such as fear,lack of inclusion of alternatives,divided opposition,and limited regime reform which contributed to the Bahraini regime’s brutal reaction to protesters in 2011 and the Qatar-Gulf crisis which emerged in 2017.The three stages reflect the regime’s pragmatism in dealing with the clashes,and its security narrative adjustment to the regional alliance shifts.The Bahraini regime was able to survive the challenges posed by the uprising in the short-term,but its short-term solutions such as the naturalisation process,would have damaging effects on society in the long-run.展开更多
文摘This article explores the concept of sects as social formations and the process of secularization sects has been undergone in the modern era, implying their exposition to political manipulation by various internal and external actors. We analyse this subject in the context of the modern Syrian State and, in particular, with reference to the political system established by President Hafez al-Asad in the 70’s. The use of sectarian ties appears as part of the regime patrimonial features, being a political strategy used in order to bind particular society’s groups to the regime. In this sense, sectarianism has nothing to do with religion and it requires to be analysed as a socio-political phenomenon. This kind of analysis permits also to confute the identification between the Asad regime and the Alawite community and to understand the complexity of the relation between the President and the community he originated from.
文摘This paper aims to analyze the background of the emergence of＂Islamic State＂ and prevailing sectarian strife in the Middle East from the aspect of international relations, considering it as the result of the failure and mistakes, accumulated not only since the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War but also from the post-WWI period when the territorial-state system was introduced in this area. This paper emphasizes the importance of the norms and ideas that provide the basis of regional order, and focuses on conflicts between norm-based regional order and interest-based regional alliance. The former has been pursued by the actors that underline supra- or sub-state identity as cores for regional solidarity, while the latter has been introduced by external actors, or established by conservatives to maintain the status quo to react to revolutionary/revisionist movements. The situation became complicated when regional actors faced three different cataclysmic transformations in 1979. Although each incident necessitated a different re-arrangement of their relations, a shorthand patchwork-like formation of alliances was applied, in which the US and Saudi Arabia played key roles. In the post-1979 regime, rivalry became dominant between the interest-based pro-US regional alliances vs. the challengers that justified their own interests with norm-based regional order, manipulating supra-state identity. Once the influence of the US declined after 2011, pro-US state actors found neither interest-based regional alliance nor norm-based regional order supported their own interests. Here, sectarian identity has emerged as a kind of norm to cover their collective interest. Thus sectarianism is the result of necessity for the regional actors to legitimize their interest-based actions and to secure partners for collective action. ＂Islamic State＂ was born in this circumstance, where sectarian identity became an ostensible factor for new regional order in the Middle East in the absence of the US-led regional alliance.
文摘This paper focuses on the Bahraini regime’s usage of sectarianism as a survival mechanism.The argument herein has adopted a modernist approach,where sectarian identities are not viewed as fixed and as causes of an ancient hatred struggle,but are instead viewed as a modern construction that are securitised and desecuritised.It examines how this particular struggle was framed in a sectarian context through the analysis of three pivotal stages of the 2011 uprising and its aftermath.These stages are broken down as follows:(1)the first stage of the uprising,which includes the first month of the uprising and the period prior to the regional military intervention,a period which was characterised by negotiations and dialogue;(2)the period of fragmentation within Bahraini society in which this paper explores the various reasons behind the failed reforms and the failure/ending of dialogue between the regime and the oppositions;and(3)the period of military intervention and the uprising’s aftermath,which reflected a time of securitisation and de-securitisation of the uprising’s space,image and language.These three stages showcase overriding factors such as fear,lack of inclusion of alternatives,divided opposition,and limited regime reform which contributed to the Bahraini regime’s brutal reaction to protesters in 2011 and the Qatar-Gulf crisis which emerged in 2017.The three stages reflect the regime’s pragmatism in dealing with the clashes,and its security narrative adjustment to the regional alliance shifts.The Bahraini regime was able to survive the challenges posed by the uprising in the short-term,but its short-term solutions such as the naturalisation process,would have damaging effects on society in the long-run.
