ISIS and Sectarianism as a Result of a Meltdown of the Regional Orders in the Middle East

This paper aims to analyze the background of the emergence of＂Islamic State＂ and prevailing sectarian strife in the Middle East from the aspect of international relations, considering it as the result of the failure and mistakes, accumulated not only since the Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War but also from the post-WWI period when the territorial-state system was introduced in this area. This paper emphasizes the importance of the norms and ideas that provide the basis of regional order, and focuses on conflicts between norm-based regional order and interest-based regional alliance. The former has been pursued by the actors that underline supra- or sub-state identity as cores for regional solidarity, while the latter has been introduced by external actors, or established by conservatives to maintain the status quo to react to revolutionary/revisionist movements. The situation became complicated when regional actors faced three different cataclysmic transformations in 1979. Although each incident necessitated a different re-arrangement of their relations, a shorthand patchwork-like formation of alliances was applied, in which the US and Saudi Arabia played key roles. In the post-1979 regime, rivalry became dominant between the interest-based pro-US regional alliances vs. the challengers that justified their own interests with norm-based regional order, manipulating supra-state identity. Once the influence of the US declined after 2011, pro-US state actors found neither interest-based regional alliance nor norm-based regional order supported their own interests. Here, sectarian identity has emerged as a kind of norm to cover their collective interest. Thus sectarianism is the result of necessity for the regional actors to legitimize their interest-based actions and to secure partners for collective action. ＂Islamic State＂ was born in this circumstance, where sectarian identity became an ostensible factor for new regional order in the Middle East in the absence of the US-led regional alliance.

The Bahraini Uprising of 2011 and the Regime’s Securitisation of Sectarianism as a Survival Mechanism

This paper focuses on the Bahraini regime’s usage of sectarianism as a survival mechanism.The argument herein has adopted a modernist approach,where sectarian identities are not viewed as fixed and as causes of an ancient hatred struggle,but are instead viewed as a modern construction that are securitised and desecuritised.It examines how this particular struggle was framed in a sectarian context through the analysis of three pivotal stages of the 2011 uprising and its aftermath.These stages are broken down as follows:(1)the first stage of the uprising,which includes the first month of the uprising and the period prior to the regional military intervention,a period which was characterised by negotiations and dialogue;(2)the period of fragmentation within Bahraini society in which this paper explores the various reasons behind the failed reforms and the failure/ending of dialogue between the regime and the oppositions;and(3)the period of military intervention and the uprising’s aftermath,which reflected a time of securitisation and de-securitisation of the uprising’s space,image and language.These three stages showcase overriding factors such as fear,lack of inclusion of alternatives,divided opposition,and limited regime reform which contributed to the Bahraini regime’s brutal reaction to protesters in 2011 and the Qatar-Gulf crisis which emerged in 2017.The three stages reflect the regime’s pragmatism in dealing with the clashes,and its security narrative adjustment to the regional alliance shifts.The Bahraini regime was able to survive the challenges posed by the uprising in the short-term,but its short-term solutions such as the naturalisation process,would have damaging effects on society in the long-run.

The Use of Sectarian Ties Inside Syrian Modern Political System

This article explores the concept of sects as social formations and the process of secularization sects has been undergone in the modern era, implying their exposition to political manipulation by various internal and external actors. We analyse this subject in the context of the modern Syrian State and, in particular, with reference to the political system established by President Hafez al-Asad in the 70’s. The use of sectarian ties appears as part of the regime patrimonial features, being a political strategy used in order to bind particular society’s groups to the regime. In this sense, sectarianism has nothing to do with religion and it requires to be analysed as a socio-political phenomenon. This kind of analysis permits also to confute the identification between the Asad regime and the Alawite community and to understand the complexity of the relation between the President and the community he originated from.

Al-Maliki Tribal Policy and the Emergence of the New Shaykhs in Iraq

The state collapse in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 resulted in a vacuum of state institution.This helped the emergence and increase of sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni,which led to civil war in 2006-2007.In order to end the violence and to alienate Al-Qaeda,the US authorities and Iraqi government began supporting tribal leaders during the civil war.In 2008,the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki created tribal council called(Majālis al-Asnād)to utilize the tribal groups mainly belong to Shia sect.This article tries to explain the emergence of new social strata called New Shaykhs in Iraqi society,as a result of Maliki’s tribal policy.It is due to the failed state situation in Iraq since 2003 which helped non-state actors to be more and more active,such as new tribal leaders.This paper focus on the political manipulation of tribal societies which is different after 2003,compared to traditional policy in Iraq which have used and mobilized the tribal societies.

Daraa and the Altered Trajectory of the Syrian Crisis

Daraa City is widely known as the birthplace of the Syrian uprising.The uprising,which was initially motivated by high-minded ideas and opposition to the arbitrary violence of an authoritarian state,rapidly degenerated into a civil war orientated by external agendas and priorities.In this paper,I want to situate Daraa governorate at the centre of this development,with the intention of highlighting how the course of events in this small part of Syria had vital implications for the development of the Syrian Civil War.In seeking to develop an analysis of the interplay of internal dynamics and external influences,i seek to‘reconcile’the‘micro’and‘macro’dimensions of civil war,and also draw on contributions to the peacebuilding literature,and this enables me to reconceptualise the relationship between‘internal’and‘external’drivers of conflict.

Shi’i-Sunni Differences and the Emergence of the Ottoman-Iranian Border

Struggles for domination over the borderlands dividing Iran and the post-Ottoman states of Turkey and Iraq have a long history. Starting in early sixteenth century this borderland became the scene of wars of domination between the Sunni Ottoman and Shia Safavid states. This article suggests that the first fifty years of the destructive confrontations between these two states are of outmost importance for scholars and the general public trying to understand the dynamics of sectarianism that still informs the modern-day tensions in the Middle East. Moreover,this period is the foundational period of the formation of the Ottoman-Safavid frontier, a process that lasted for almost four hundred years. This article argues that sectarian and territorial boundary drawing went hand in hand and these processes should be studied together.

The Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf: The Contours of Iran’s GCC Policy

Common perceptions of recent tensions between Iran and the GCC states are couched in terms of a longstanding and historically rooted Shia-Sunni conflict between two major regional powers:Iran and Saudi Arabia.This paper argues that this perspective is simplistic since it ignores the major political drivers of the conflict at regional and international levels.From the perspective of the Regional Security Complex(RSC),the Persian Gulf region has been a typical security sub-complex since the 1970s.After the Iran-Iraq war,Iran adopted a d
etente policy towards the GCC states taking advantage of a domestic consensus to improve relations with her neighbouring states.The drive gained momentum after the arrival in office of President Hassan Rouhani in 2013.However,his GCC policy has faced multiple challenges.The GCC countries have increasingly been suspicious and critical of Iran’s growing strength and regional influence.The intensification of the proxy games with Saudi Arabia have increased the insecurity of GCC states.Internationally too,the USA’s tough stance under President Trump and the return of the economic sanctions regime against Iran has raised regional temperatures,making it even harder for Iran and the GCC to improve their relations.We argue that to understand the proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia in particular,a more nuanced approach is needed that goes beyond religious strife and rivalry.