Buying work safety services from intermediaries is a new and important approach to improve the work safety in small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).The existing literature addresses the significance and effectivene...Buying work safety services from intermediaries is a new and important approach to improve the work safety in small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).The existing literature addresses the significance and effectiveness of the service model but it ignores the dynamic game relationship between relevant stakeholders when SMEs choose to purchase the services under bounded rationality.Therefore,this study aims to analyse this dynamic game relationship based on evolutionary game theory.Furthermore,dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model are applied to determine the impact of major factors for three stakeholders(SMEs,governments,and safety service agents),examine stability strategies,and identify modes of equilibrium under different subsidy strategies.The results of simulation are as follows.First,the results explain that how the major factors(service price,the quality of service,government subsidy,etc.)affect the system dynamic force of buying work safety services.Second,when the subsidy strategy is static payment,the selection of the stakeholders fluctuates and is not optimal.Third,when the subsidy strategy is a dynamic payment,the evolutionary game process converges to a stable state,which indicates that an evolutionarily stable strategy exists under the dynamic subsidy strategy.Moreover,the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the different initial values.The results of this study offer a certain reference for the government to guide the implementation of the purchase of work safety or other services in SMEs.展开更多
基金The authors gratefully acknowledge the funding support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72074099,71874072 and 72004081the MOE(Ministry of Education in China)Project of Humanities and Social Sciences under Grant No.19YJAZH059+2 种基金the Social Science Fund of Jiangsu Province under Grant No.20GLB009the Soft Science Project of Zhenjiang City under Grant No.RK2020013the Scientific Research Project Funds of Jiangsu University under Grant No.18C335.
文摘Buying work safety services from intermediaries is a new and important approach to improve the work safety in small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).The existing literature addresses the significance and effectiveness of the service model but it ignores the dynamic game relationship between relevant stakeholders when SMEs choose to purchase the services under bounded rationality.Therefore,this study aims to analyse this dynamic game relationship based on evolutionary game theory.Furthermore,dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model are applied to determine the impact of major factors for three stakeholders(SMEs,governments,and safety service agents),examine stability strategies,and identify modes of equilibrium under different subsidy strategies.The results of simulation are as follows.First,the results explain that how the major factors(service price,the quality of service,government subsidy,etc.)affect the system dynamic force of buying work safety services.Second,when the subsidy strategy is static payment,the selection of the stakeholders fluctuates and is not optimal.Third,when the subsidy strategy is a dynamic payment,the evolutionary game process converges to a stable state,which indicates that an evolutionarily stable strategy exists under the dynamic subsidy strategy.Moreover,the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the different initial values.The results of this study offer a certain reference for the government to guide the implementation of the purchase of work safety or other services in SMEs.
