In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint m...In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint mediation proposal while tacitly agreeing to or inciting Japan＇s launching a war. During the war, American diplomats, as wartime protectors of both Japanese and Chinese nationals, frequently went beyond the limits of international law to protect Japanese spies in China. As the only mediator between China and Japan, the United States rejected the joint mediation efforts of European powers and helped reduce international pressure on Japan. At the same time, it unilaterally convinced the Qing government to accept Japan＇s aggressive demands so as to help Japan achieve its war aims. The main reason for the United States＇ bias towards Japan was that it hoped to use Japan to end the tributary relationship between China and Korea in order to further open the door to China while weakening the influence of Britain and Russia in East Asia.展开更多
Memories regarding the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War （1931-1945） and World War il （1939-1945） have always been refreshed in the minds of contemporaries through the retelling of ＂historical war stories＂...Memories regarding the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War （1931-1945） and World War il （1939-1945） have always been refreshed in the minds of contemporaries through the retelling of ＂historical war stories＂ in various forms including books, posters, films and other media presentations. However, these retellings are often criticised by some academics as distortion of historical facts. This is because many of the present generation of readers and audiences were not even born at the time the events happened. Thus, ＂historical facts＂ of this era are, in reality, very vague in people＇s minds and their ＂facts＂ are often simply a construction of frequently retold ＂historical war stories＂ mixed with imagination. This article will argue that even immediately after the end of both wars in 1945, fresh history memory was already distorted, with China being the main victim. Following the end of World War II, there was an extensive publication of books and periodicals about the war. However, through varied interpretations of primary sources and use of visual materials in different ways, various positions were created to suit specific needs for justification of China＇s desire to be part of the camp of world powers after 1945. Similar diverse positions were also used to make political arguments criticising both the Axis and Allied Powers for working toward different political ends.展开更多
Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewe...Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate its alliance with Russia and further encroach on China＇s southwest frontiers; it was therefore happy to see war break out between China and Japan, and took Russia＇s position on stopping Britain from playing a dominant role in mediation between them. As the outcome of the war became clear, exposing Japan＇s ambition to invade China, France turned from its wait-and-see attitude to intervention, taking an active part in the peacemaking activities of Russia, Britain and France and the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany. In so doing, it attempted to safeguard general European interests and consolidate its alliance with Russia, as well as preventing Japan from replacing Europe as the dominant force in China. At the same time, it demanded a quidpro quo from the victim. During negotiation over the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, France put aside its conflicts mediate in disputes between Germany and with its old enemy Germany and endeavored to Russia so as to maintain concerted action under thetriple intervention. It proposed to sacrifice the interests of China to satisfy the wishes of Japan and Russia for a swift resolution of the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula.展开更多
The question of the amount of the First Sino-Japanese War indemnity involves three main elements： Japan＇s military expenditure on the war, China＇s actual payment, and the actual amount Japan received. On all of the...The question of the amount of the First Sino-Japanese War indemnity involves three main elements： Japan＇s military expenditure on the war, China＇s actual payment, and the actual amount Japan received. On all of these issues, there have always been considerable differences between Chinese and Japanese scholars. In this study, we analyze relevant archives and documents and the main scholarly work in both China and Japan and provide a detailed discussion of several scholarly points of views and their basis, and examine the pre- and postwar exchange rates between the yen, the Chinese treasury standard （Kuping） silver tael, and the pound sterling, taking account of the fluctuating value of the yen before and after the war. On this basis, we calculate that Japan＇s actual military spending on the war was no more than 125 million yen, while the actual payments by the Qing government, converted to pounds sterling and then to yen, totaled 358.36 million yen. Japan extorted 233.36 million yen from China, or three times Japan＇s total annual revenue at the time.展开更多
Historical periodization frequently takes wars as turning points--as ruptures that signify the end or beginning of an era. At the same time, front lines have often been taken as boundaries that contain the activities ...Historical periodization frequently takes wars as turning points--as ruptures that signify the end or beginning of an era. At the same time, front lines have often been taken as boundaries that contain the activities of one side or the other. Thus, discontinuity and disjuncture rather than continuity and fluidity have o-en been the points of emphasis among historians who have taken war events as turning points, or who have seen lines of combat as impermeable. A new focus on the Sino-Japanese War period has begun to reveal ways in which that moment served not as an interruption but as a part of longer term processes of change and development that characterized China＇s mid-twentieth century. It also permits us to gain a deeper understanding of the fluidity of human movement and socio-economic interaction that frequently boundaries and to think about similarities various Chinese spaces. The aim of this paper crossed both political and military linkages, and differences between is to consider ways in which the new generation of scholarship on the Sino-Japanese War period offers new ways of thinking about continuity, change, similarity and difference across both temporal and physical boundaries that have served as the parameters for much of the earlier scholarship on the period. To this end, the paper examines recent literature on the Sino-Japanese War period, as well as literature that crosses that period, to examine ways in which this historiography has challenged conventional periodizations and political and geographical delineations展开更多
Before the 1995 World Conference on Women is held in Beijing, I’d like to introduce four women who played active roles in promoting SinoJapanese relationships after World War II. They are Bing Xin and Li Dequan from ...Before the 1995 World Conference on Women is held in Beijing, I’d like to introduce four women who played active roles in promoting SinoJapanese relationships after World War II. They are Bing Xin and Li Dequan from China, and Koya Tomi and Matsuyama Kiko from Japan.展开更多
文摘In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint mediation proposal while tacitly agreeing to or inciting Japan＇s launching a war. During the war, American diplomats, as wartime protectors of both Japanese and Chinese nationals, frequently went beyond the limits of international law to protect Japanese spies in China. As the only mediator between China and Japan, the United States rejected the joint mediation efforts of European powers and helped reduce international pressure on Japan. At the same time, it unilaterally convinced the Qing government to accept Japan＇s aggressive demands so as to help Japan achieve its war aims. The main reason for the United States＇ bias towards Japan was that it hoped to use Japan to end the tributary relationship between China and Korea in order to further open the door to China while weakening the influence of Britain and Russia in East Asia.
文摘Memories regarding the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War （1931-1945） and World War il （1939-1945） have always been refreshed in the minds of contemporaries through the retelling of ＂historical war stories＂ in various forms including books, posters, films and other media presentations. However, these retellings are often criticised by some academics as distortion of historical facts. This is because many of the present generation of readers and audiences were not even born at the time the events happened. Thus, ＂historical facts＂ of this era are, in reality, very vague in people＇s minds and their ＂facts＂ are often simply a construction of frequently retold ＂historical war stories＂ mixed with imagination. This article will argue that even immediately after the end of both wars in 1945, fresh history memory was already distorted, with China being the main victim. Following the end of World War II, there was an extensive publication of books and periodicals about the war. However, through varied interpretations of primary sources and use of visual materials in different ways, various positions were created to suit specific needs for justification of China＇s desire to be part of the camp of world powers after 1945. Similar diverse positions were also used to make political arguments criticising both the Axis and Allied Powers for working toward different political ends.
文摘Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate its alliance with Russia and further encroach on China＇s southwest frontiers; it was therefore happy to see war break out between China and Japan, and took Russia＇s position on stopping Britain from playing a dominant role in mediation between them. As the outcome of the war became clear, exposing Japan＇s ambition to invade China, France turned from its wait-and-see attitude to intervention, taking an active part in the peacemaking activities of Russia, Britain and France and the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany. In so doing, it attempted to safeguard general European interests and consolidate its alliance with Russia, as well as preventing Japan from replacing Europe as the dominant force in China. At the same time, it demanded a quidpro quo from the victim. During negotiation over the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, France put aside its conflicts mediate in disputes between Germany and with its old enemy Germany and endeavored to Russia so as to maintain concerted action under thetriple intervention. It proposed to sacrifice the interests of China to satisfy the wishes of Japan and Russia for a swift resolution of the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula.
文摘The question of the amount of the First Sino-Japanese War indemnity involves three main elements： Japan＇s military expenditure on the war, China＇s actual payment, and the actual amount Japan received. On all of these issues, there have always been considerable differences between Chinese and Japanese scholars. In this study, we analyze relevant archives and documents and the main scholarly work in both China and Japan and provide a detailed discussion of several scholarly points of views and their basis, and examine the pre- and postwar exchange rates between the yen, the Chinese treasury standard （Kuping） silver tael, and the pound sterling, taking account of the fluctuating value of the yen before and after the war. On this basis, we calculate that Japan＇s actual military spending on the war was no more than 125 million yen, while the actual payments by the Qing government, converted to pounds sterling and then to yen, totaled 358.36 million yen. Japan extorted 233.36 million yen from China, or three times Japan＇s total annual revenue at the time.
文摘Historical periodization frequently takes wars as turning points--as ruptures that signify the end or beginning of an era. At the same time, front lines have often been taken as boundaries that contain the activities of one side or the other. Thus, discontinuity and disjuncture rather than continuity and fluidity have o-en been the points of emphasis among historians who have taken war events as turning points, or who have seen lines of combat as impermeable. A new focus on the Sino-Japanese War period has begun to reveal ways in which that moment served not as an interruption but as a part of longer term processes of change and development that characterized China＇s mid-twentieth century. It also permits us to gain a deeper understanding of the fluidity of human movement and socio-economic interaction that frequently boundaries and to think about similarities various Chinese spaces. The aim of this paper crossed both political and military linkages, and differences between is to consider ways in which the new generation of scholarship on the Sino-Japanese War period offers new ways of thinking about continuity, change, similarity and difference across both temporal and physical boundaries that have served as the parameters for much of the earlier scholarship on the period. To this end, the paper examines recent literature on the Sino-Japanese War period, as well as literature that crosses that period, to examine ways in which this historiography has challenged conventional periodizations and political and geographical delineations
文摘Before the 1995 World Conference on Women is held in Beijing, I’d like to introduce four women who played active roles in promoting SinoJapanese relationships after World War II. They are Bing Xin and Li Dequan from China, and Koya Tomi and Matsuyama Kiko from Japan.
