Research on Children’s Game Activity Design Strategies Based on Embodied Cognition Theory

Edutainment,in the kindergarten education stage,emphasizes the game as the basic activity and combines the content of education with the form of the game,thus it also forms the educational method of gamification teaching.Through investigation and analysis,it is found that the current kindergarten game activity design has the problem of improper combination of educational content and game form.The current kindergarten game activity design has problems such as stereotypes,children’s lack of active learning opportunities in activities,teachers’insufficient theoretical understanding,inappropriate teacher guidance methods,and so on.Embodied cognition theory attaches importance to the important role of the body in the development of cognition,provides new guidance for classroom teaching,and opens up a new path for classroom teaching reform.Based on the perspective of embodied cognition theory,the concept of body and mind integration should be adhered to in kindergarten teaching with games as the basic activity,experiential teaching situation should be created,children’s subjective experience should be respected,and games and interactions should be designed to promote children’s physical and mental participation,thus laying a foundation for the realization of children’s individual freedom,autonomy,and all-round development.Therefore,this paper aims at the existing problems in the current kindergarten gamification teaching and discusses the design strategy of children’s game activities based on embodied cognition theory.

Energy-Efficient Clustering Using Optimization with Locust Game Theory

Wireless sensor networks(WSNs)are made up of several sensors located in a specific area and powered by a finite amount of energy to gather environmental data.WSNs use sensor nodes(SNs)to collect and transmit data.However,the power supplied by the sensor network is restricted.Thus,SNs must store energy as often as to extend the lifespan of the network.In the proposed study,effective clustering and longer network lifetimes are achieved using mul-ti-swarm optimization(MSO)and game theory based on locust search(LS-II).In this research,MSO is used to improve the optimum routing,while the LS-II approach is employed to specify the number of cluster heads(CHs)and select the best ones.After the CHs are identified,the other sensor components are allo-cated to the closest CHs to them.A game theory-based energy-efficient clustering approach is applied to WSNs.Here each SN is considered a player in the game.The SN can implement beneficial methods for itself depending on the length of the idle listening time in the active phase and then determine to choose whether or not to rest.The proposed multi-swarm with energy-efficient game theory on locust search(MSGE-LS)efficiently selects CHs,minimizes energy consumption,and improves the lifetime of networks.The findings of this study indicate that the proposed MSGE-LS is an effective method because its result proves that it increases the number of clusters,average energy consumption,lifespan extension,reduction in average packet loss,and end-to-end delay.

关于Banach空间值L^1S-games与随机变量阵列完全收敛性的几个注记

设B是一实可分的Banach空间,具有Radon-Nikodyn性质(RNP).{Xn,n≥1}是L1B中的序列,其子序列{Xs,s∈S}是一L1极限鞅.证明了{Xn,n≥1}是L1S-game的充分必要条件是{Xn,n≥1}在条件liminfnE‖XSn‖<∞下或条件∫{τ<∞}‖XSτ‖dP<∞,τ∈下依概率收敛,其中是由{Fn,n∈N}的停时组成的集合,Sn=inf{s∈S:n≤s},n∈N.这个结论推广与改进了Luu的相关结果.而行独立的B值随机变量阵列完全收敛性的两个结果则改进与推广了T.C.Hu等人的相应结果.

Enigma of Exam-oriented Education in China:A comparison on Sino-U.S.Educational Concepts in Higher Education

College English teaching in China has long been criticized for its orientation to examination that consequently brings about negative learning attitude and ineffective learning achievement.Chinese educationists have brought forward several ap proaches to solve this problem but little has been changed due to the cultural influences.This paper analyzes the roots of examoriented education system in China in perspective of culture by comparing the Sino-U.S.cultural elements in depth in tradition al culture,learning and teaching motivation,teacher-student relationship and learners'engagement in class.This paper finally poses two suggestions on how to change the current situation gradually:(1) Focus on the washback of evaluation system on edu cational concepts.(2) Transform the product-evaluation to process-evaluation gradually by standardizing the current evaluation approaches,especially the standards of process-evaluation.

Zero-determinant strategy:An underway revolution in game theory

Repeated games describe situations where players interact with each other in a dynamic pattern and make decisions ac- cording to outcomes of previous stage games. Very recently, Press and Dyson have revealed a new class of zero-determinant （ZD） strategies for the repeated games, which can enforce a fixed linear relationship between expected payoffs of two play- ers, indicating that a smart player can control her unwitting co-player＇s payoff in a unilateral way [Proc. Acad. Natl. Sci. USA 109, 10409 （2012）]. The theory of ZD strategies provides a novel viewpoint to depict interactions among players, and fundamentally changes the research paradigm of game theory. In this brief survey, we first introduce the mathematical framework of ZD strategies, and review the properties and constrains of two specifications of ZD strategies, called pinning strategies and extortion strategies. Then we review some representative research progresses, including robustness analysis, cooperative ZD strategy analysis, and evolutionary stability analysis. Finally, we discuss some significant extensions to ZD strategies, including the multi-player ZD strategies, and ZD strategies under noise. Challenges in related research fields are also listed.

THE OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR PROMOTING THE COOPERATION IN EVOLUTION GAME GENERATED BY PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Natural selection opposes the evolution of cooperation unless specific mechanisms are at work in Prisoner＇s Dilemma. By taking advantage of the modern control theory, the controller design is discussed and the optimal control is designed for promoting cooperation based on the recent advances in mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Two con- trol strategies are proposed： compensation control strategy for the cooperator when playing against a defector and reward control strategy for cooperator when playing against a coop- erator. The feasibility and effectiveness of these control strategies for promoting cooperation in different stages are analyzed. The reward for cooperation can＇t prevent defection from being evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）. On the other hand, compensation for the coopera- tor can＇t prevent defection from emerging and sustaining. By considering the effect and the cost, an optimal control scheme with constraint on the admissible control set is put forward. By analyzing the special nonlinear system of replicator dynamics, the exact analytic solution of the optimal control scheme is obtained based on the maximum principle. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated by examples.

Modeling and Analysis of Single Machine Scheduling Based on Noncooperative Game Theory

Considering the independent optimization requirement for each demander of modernmanufacture, we explore the application of noncooperative game in production scheduling research,and model scheduling problem as competition of machine resources among a group of selfish jobs.Each job has its own performance objective. For the single machine, multi-jobs and non-preemptivescheduling problem, a noncooperative game model is established. Based on the model, many prob-lems about Nash equilibrium solution, such as the existence, quantity, properties of solution space,performance of solution and algorithm are discussed. The results are tested by numerical example.

关于Schmidt's game的一个注记

Schmidt的(α,β)-game是由Schmidt所引入的研究分形集的一个非常有力的工具。在Schmidt's game意义下winning的集合具有满的Hausdorff维数,且具有可数交稳定性。已有的结论表明,存在(α,β)-winning的集合S,当α减小时不再是winning的。本文将通过数的展式构造(α,β)-winning的分形集S,证明当β增大时,此时S不再是(α,β)-winning的。

Fulbright Program: A Bright Facet of Sino-U.S. People-to-People Exchange

In the history of Chinese-American people-to-people exchange,the implementation of the China-U.S.Fulbright Program is surely a bright facet which should not be ignored.This program has been cultivating talents in the fields of social sciences and humanities for the two countries,promoting Sino-U.S.communications in the domains of education,academia and culture,and propelling the diffusion and advance of both Chinese and American cultures.The Fulbright Program in China still has certain limitations waiting to be improved,and one obvious problem is its coverage in China.To solve this problem,more Chinese higher education institutions should be included in the China-U.S.Fulbright Program,and the result would be the generation of immeasurable value for the prosperity of Sino-American people-to-people exchange and therefore the construction of the new model of major country relations between China and the United States.

Justifying the Choice and Use of a Game and a Song in My Lesson

Games and songs can bring a lot of pleasure to children. They are useful tools in children's language learning. As English teachers, we should know how to make full use of them to stimulate children's interest and promote their learning. In this essay, I will take one primary English lesson as an example to demonstrate my point. First I am going to talk about the advantages of using a game and a song, and then analyze the teaching or learning context and the activities in the lesson. At last I am going to focus on how and why to use the game and the song in the classroom. In a word, I am going to justify my choice and use of a game and a song in a revision lesson.

Integrating the environmental factor into the strategy updating rule to promote cooperation in evolutionary games

Many previous studies have shown that the environment plays an important role for social individuals. In this paper, we integrate the environmental factor, which is defined as the average payoff of all a player＇s neighbours, with the standard Fermi updating rule by introducing a tunable parameter, w. It is found that the level of cooperation increases remarkably, and that the cooperators can better resist the invasion of defection with an increase in w. This interesting phenomenon is then explained from a microscopic view. In addition, the universality of this mechanism is also proved with the help of the small-world network and the random regular graph. This work may be helpful in understanding cooperation behaviour in species from unicellular organisms up to human beings.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner＇s dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games.

Adaptive co-evolution of strategies and network leading to optimal cooperation level in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

We study evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks. During the co-evolution process, interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability p or update their strategies with probability 1 - p depending on their payoffs. Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy. Interestingly, the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of p via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics. Finally, the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation. Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals＇ behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.

Bush' s China Policy and the Future of Sino-U.S.Relations

The past two years have witnessed great fluctuations ininternational oil prices,and diplomatic efforts,both above andunder the table,by major powers around this issue.The currenttension in the war-threatened Iraq has added more uncertainties to thefuture world oil situation.Will the world oil supply and demand change?What impact would this exert on big powers’ oil strategy choices,geopolitics as well as world economy?What should China do in such asituation?To find the answers to these questions,at the invitation of theeditor of the Contemporary International Relations,seven experts fromChina Institute of Contemporary International Relations gathered to have adiscussion in early February this year.Naturally,they have differentviews over many issues.Still,we hope our readers would find theirdiscussion interesting.Following is the list of participants.

Cooperation influenced by the correlation degree of two-layered complex networks in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games

An evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game is investigated on two-layered complex networks respectively representing interaction and learning networks in one and two dimensions. A parameter q is introduced to denote the correlation degree between the two-layered networks. Using Monte Carlo simulations we studied the effects of the correlation degree on cooperative behaviour and found that the cooperator density nontrivially changes with q for different payoff parameter values depending on the detailed strategy updating and network dimension. An explanation for the obtained results is provided.

China's WTO Entry Helps Sino-US Ties

China applied for restoration of its status as the GATT founding member in1986. The country has made great endeavor in reducing customs duties, removing non-tariff barriers, enhancing protection of intellectual property rights andservice trades, launching reform of the foreign trade regime, eliminating trade bar-riers and improving environment for foreign investment. Over the past 14 years,China has taken part in 26 relevant multilateral meetings and hundreds of bilateralnegotiations.

Frugality and overspending:sources of Sino-U.S.economic imbalances

Savings rates are the biggest difference in the economic structures of China and the United States,the two most important countries in today’s global economy.China has the highest savings rate of any major country,while the United States,at the other end of the spectrum, has the lowest.This paper discusses the origin of this contrast and its far-reaching implications for two-way economic and trade ties.

New Sino-US Strategic Gambling and China’s Strategy

Since confidence is fading and anxiety is increasing in the US,America’s China policy has become more radical. In the short term, the US has the upper hand and China is in a relatively passive position. In the medium-and long-term, there will be more balance between them. This current strategic gambling between China and the US will be the major issue of international politics in the first half of the 21 st century and the most prominent external challenge China faces. China needs to make strategic adjustments but the gamble may be worthwhile in correcting imbalance in the international order and in the co-evolution of the two countries.

Effect of Strategy-Homogeneity on the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in a Square Lattice

We investigate the effect of strategy-homogeneity on the prisoner’s dilemma game in a square lattice. Strategy-homogeneity means that the population contains at least one connected group in which individuals maintain the same strategy at each iteration and may update according to updating rule at next iteration. The simulation results show that the introduction of strategy-homogeneity increases the cooperation in the evolutionary stable state. For any value of temptation to defect, the density of cooperators in equilibrium state increases firstly and then decreases as the level of strategy-homogeneity increases constantly, and there exists an appropriate level of strategy-homogeneity, maximizing the density of cooperators. The results may be favorable for comprehending cooperative behaviors in societies composed of connected groups with coherent strategy.