期刊文献+
共找到1篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
1
作者 方祥圣 朱平 +2 位作者 刘润然 刘恩钰 魏贵义 《Chinese Physics B》 SCIE EI CAS CSCD 2012年第10期555-562,共8页
In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player... In this study,we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model with a 2-stage strategy updating rule,and focus on the cooperation behavior of the system.In the first stage,i.e.,the pre-learning stage,a focal player decides whether to update his strategy according to the pre-learning factor β and the payoff difference between himself and the average of his neighbors.If the player makes up his mind to update,he enters into the second stage,i.e.,the learning stage,and adopts a strategy of a randomly selected neighbor according to the standard Fermi updating rule.The simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on the pre-learning factor.Generally,the cooperation frequency decreases as the pre-learning factor increases;but a high cooperation level can be obtained in the intermediate region of- 3〈 β 〈-1.We then give some explanations via studying the co-action of pre-learning and learning.Our results may sharpen the understanding of the influence of the strategy updating rule on evolutionary games. 展开更多
关键词 evolutionary game theory strategy updating social cooperation prisoner's dilemma game
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部