According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, primary users （PUs） who own the spectrum resource have the right to lease part of spectrum to secondary users （SUs） in exchange for appropriate profit. In...According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, primary users （PUs） who own the spectrum resource have the right to lease part of spectrum to secondary users （SUs） in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, we propose a pricing-based spectrum leasing framework between one PU and multiple SUs. In this scenario, the PU attempts to maximize its utility by setting the price of spectrum. Then, the selected SUs have the right to decide their power levels to help PU s transmission, aiming to obtain corresponding access time. The spectrum leasing problem can be cast into a stackelberg game, where the PU plays the seller-level game and the selected SUs play the buyer-level game. Through analysis based on the backward induction, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the stackelberg game with certain constraints. Numerical results show that the proposed pricing-based spectrum leasing framework is effective, and the performance of both PU and SUs is improved, compared to the traditional mechanism without cooperation.展开更多
According to the property rights model of cognitive radio,primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit.In this paper,an ...According to the property rights model of cognitive radio,primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit.In this paper,an implementation of this framework is investigated,where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation （relaying）.A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation.Based on the demand of secondary nodes,the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service （QoS） by setting the price of spectrum.Taking the price asked by primary link,the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission.The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer （Stackelberg） games.Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.展开更多
基金supported by National Basic Research Program of China(973 Program)(No. 2010CB731800)Key Project of National Nature Science Foundation of China(No. 60934003),National Nature Science Foundation of China(Nos. 61104033, 61172095,61203104)Nature Science Foundation of Hebei Province(Nos. F2011203226, F2012203109, F2012203126)
文摘According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, primary users （PUs） who own the spectrum resource have the right to lease part of spectrum to secondary users （SUs） in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, we propose a pricing-based spectrum leasing framework between one PU and multiple SUs. In this scenario, the PU attempts to maximize its utility by setting the price of spectrum. Then, the selected SUs have the right to decide their power levels to help PU s transmission, aiming to obtain corresponding access time. The spectrum leasing problem can be cast into a stackelberg game, where the PU plays the seller-level game and the selected SUs play the buyer-level game. Through analysis based on the backward induction, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the stackelberg game with certain constraints. Numerical results show that the proposed pricing-based spectrum leasing framework is effective, and the performance of both PU and SUs is improved, compared to the traditional mechanism without cooperation.
基金supported by the National Basic Research Program of China (2009CB320401)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60772108)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (BUPT2009RC0111)
文摘According to the property rights model of cognitive radio,primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit.In this paper,an implementation of this framework is investigated,where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation （relaying）.A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation.Based on the demand of secondary nodes,the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service （QoS） by setting the price of spectrum.Taking the price asked by primary link,the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission.The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer （Stackelberg） games.Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.
