Antitrust examination of discriminatory patent licensing fees imposed by companies who own standards-essential patents(SEPs) is a difficult issue in antitrust law enforcement. After studying Huawei's litigation ag...Antitrust examination of discriminatory patent licensing fees imposed by companies who own standards-essential patents(SEPs) is a difficult issue in antitrust law enforcement. After studying Huawei's litigation against IDC and China's anti-monopoly investigation of Qualcomm, this paper creates a vertical oligopolistic game theory model to demonstrate that discriminatory licensing fees imposed by firms with patent monopoly will lead to the collection of high licensing fees from downstream low-cost firms, weaken their competitive advantage, reduce their output and market share, impede their follow-up innovations, and generally harm the social welfare. Therefore, charging high discriminatory licensing fees constitutes an act that harms competition and should be prohibited by antitrust law. Antitrust examination of discriminatory licensing fees should make assessments primarily on the basis of the FRAND principle. Antitrust examination may adopt a triple-structure method to assess the reasonableness of licensing fees, but antitrust authorities should avoid directly prescribing the level of licensing fees and should safeguard the effectiveness of transaction mechanisms based on free negotiations among micro-level entities. Antitrust remedies should follow the principle of "intervening in the price formation mechanism rather than prescribing the level of licensing fees."展开更多
标准必要专利(Standard-Essential Patents,SEPs)的公平、合理、无歧视(Fair,Reasonable and Non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可是当前学术界、实务界共同关注的前沿问题。本文基于8个通信领域标准必要专利典型案件的诉讼判决书,利用多案...标准必要专利(Standard-Essential Patents,SEPs)的公平、合理、无歧视(Fair,Reasonable and Non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可是当前学术界、实务界共同关注的前沿问题。本文基于8个通信领域标准必要专利典型案件的诉讼判决书,利用多案例研究、专利文献计量分析、内容分析等方法,识别了标准必要专利及其统计特征,明晰了FRAND准则的核心内涵,得到FRAND许可定价的影响因素,据此指出标准必要专利的FRAND许可定价应考量"专利贡献价值",并提出了FRAND许可定价路径。研究结论可为政府、法院、企业等利益相关方提供决策参考。展开更多
产业界、司法界和学术界比较关注标准必要专利中的专利劫持问题,对反向劫持问题研究较少。由于合理非歧视(Reasonable And Non-Discrimination,简称"RAND")承诺的模糊性和近年来美国对于禁令救济的谨慎态度,实践中,出现了标...产业界、司法界和学术界比较关注标准必要专利中的专利劫持问题,对反向劫持问题研究较少。由于合理非歧视(Reasonable And Non-Discrimination,简称"RAND")承诺的模糊性和近年来美国对于禁令救济的谨慎态度,实践中,出现了标准实施者在已经使用标准必要专利的情况下,恶意拖延许可谈判或以反垄断举报为要挟,向标准必要专利权人寻求较低许可费率或许可条件的反向劫持现象。反向劫持损害标准必要专利权人利益,影响专利权人投资创新和将专利贡献给标准的积极性。美国法院和反垄断执法机构已经注意到反向劫持的危害性,正试图加以规制,其经验值得我国参考借鉴。展开更多
随着第四次工业革命的兴起,将涌现越来越多的新标准和标准必要专利,这使得标准必要专利公平合理无歧视(fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可的问题变得更为复杂。值得探讨的是,作为标准的接受者而非制定者的主要亚洲经...随着第四次工业革命的兴起,将涌现越来越多的新标准和标准必要专利,这使得标准必要专利公平合理无歧视(fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可的问题变得更为复杂。值得探讨的是,作为标准的接受者而非制定者的主要亚洲经济体的FRAND许可标准有无趋于一致或歧异之处?一些跨国经营、从事专利许可的企业集团对中国竞争法主管机关所作的承诺可否延伸至亚洲之外具有约束力?如何消解不同法律标准之间的冲突?基于以下的原因,主张至少在亚洲地区须确立对标准必要专利的FRAND许可的事前监管机制:已经有巨大的市场失灵、标准必要专利相当于垄断或联合垄断、事实标准超越法律标准、私主体的标准制订组织取代国家职能;并提出专利法和竞争法的改革建议,主张不同法律标准的冲突不应通过一套标准来解决,应经由同理心思考和国家间对各自选择的相互尊重来解决;最后以破除知识产权法与竞争法交叉领域中一些似是而非的论述作结。展开更多
文摘Antitrust examination of discriminatory patent licensing fees imposed by companies who own standards-essential patents(SEPs) is a difficult issue in antitrust law enforcement. After studying Huawei's litigation against IDC and China's anti-monopoly investigation of Qualcomm, this paper creates a vertical oligopolistic game theory model to demonstrate that discriminatory licensing fees imposed by firms with patent monopoly will lead to the collection of high licensing fees from downstream low-cost firms, weaken their competitive advantage, reduce their output and market share, impede their follow-up innovations, and generally harm the social welfare. Therefore, charging high discriminatory licensing fees constitutes an act that harms competition and should be prohibited by antitrust law. Antitrust examination of discriminatory licensing fees should make assessments primarily on the basis of the FRAND principle. Antitrust examination may adopt a triple-structure method to assess the reasonableness of licensing fees, but antitrust authorities should avoid directly prescribing the level of licensing fees and should safeguard the effectiveness of transaction mechanisms based on free negotiations among micro-level entities. Antitrust remedies should follow the principle of "intervening in the price formation mechanism rather than prescribing the level of licensing fees."
文摘标准必要专利(Standard-Essential Patents,SEPs)的公平、合理、无歧视(Fair,Reasonable and Non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可是当前学术界、实务界共同关注的前沿问题。本文基于8个通信领域标准必要专利典型案件的诉讼判决书,利用多案例研究、专利文献计量分析、内容分析等方法,识别了标准必要专利及其统计特征,明晰了FRAND准则的核心内涵,得到FRAND许可定价的影响因素,据此指出标准必要专利的FRAND许可定价应考量"专利贡献价值",并提出了FRAND许可定价路径。研究结论可为政府、法院、企业等利益相关方提供决策参考。
文摘产业界、司法界和学术界比较关注标准必要专利中的专利劫持问题,对反向劫持问题研究较少。由于合理非歧视(Reasonable And Non-Discrimination,简称"RAND")承诺的模糊性和近年来美国对于禁令救济的谨慎态度,实践中,出现了标准实施者在已经使用标准必要专利的情况下,恶意拖延许可谈判或以反垄断举报为要挟,向标准必要专利权人寻求较低许可费率或许可条件的反向劫持现象。反向劫持损害标准必要专利权人利益,影响专利权人投资创新和将专利贡献给标准的积极性。美国法院和反垄断执法机构已经注意到反向劫持的危害性,正试图加以规制,其经验值得我国参考借鉴。
文摘随着第四次工业革命的兴起,将涌现越来越多的新标准和标准必要专利,这使得标准必要专利公平合理无歧视(fair,reasonable and non-discriminatory,FRAND)许可的问题变得更为复杂。值得探讨的是,作为标准的接受者而非制定者的主要亚洲经济体的FRAND许可标准有无趋于一致或歧异之处?一些跨国经营、从事专利许可的企业集团对中国竞争法主管机关所作的承诺可否延伸至亚洲之外具有约束力?如何消解不同法律标准之间的冲突?基于以下的原因,主张至少在亚洲地区须确立对标准必要专利的FRAND许可的事前监管机制:已经有巨大的市场失灵、标准必要专利相当于垄断或联合垄断、事实标准超越法律标准、私主体的标准制订组织取代国家职能;并提出专利法和竞争法的改革建议,主张不同法律标准的冲突不应通过一套标准来解决,应经由同理心思考和国家间对各自选择的相互尊重来解决;最后以破除知识产权法与竞争法交叉领域中一些似是而非的论述作结。
