Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs.A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized ta...Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs.A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized targeting is the existence of elite capture.China has recently implemented a nationwide decentralized poverty targeting program,the targeted poverty alleviation(TPA)policy,to achieve the national goal of eliminating absolute poverty by the end of 2020.As the largest decentralized poverty targeting program in the world,TPA's successful implementation was believed to be threatened by elite capture in some earlier reports.Since 2015,a targeting correction mechanism,called"follow-up checks"policy,has been introduced.With the"follow-up checks"policy,the elites and other ineligible households who receive benefits under TPA were removed from the program.This paper investigates the elite capture phenomenon in TPA using village census data from a poverty-stricken county in 2017-two years after implementing the"follow-up checks"policy.We find no evidence of elite capture in TPA.The elites are unlikely to become beneficiaries or receive more benefits than non-elites.Our results contradict earlier findings that reported elite capture in TPA.We argue that the reason is the accountability emphasized by the central government in the"follow-up checks"policy.Our findings imply that having proper accountability is critical for improving targeting performance by global antipoverty initiatives.展开更多
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs （HRVP） has obtained far-reaching powers to formulate, coordinate and implement EU external policies, traditionally a prerogative of the state. ...Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs （HRVP） has obtained far-reaching powers to formulate, coordinate and implement EU external policies, traditionally a prerogative of the state. In the exercise of this delegated powers, the HRVP is assisted by a dedicated administrative body, the European External Action Service （EEAS）. Formal decision-making over the EU＇s common foreign and security policy lies with the Council, while the European Neighborhood and Trade policies, as well as international cooperation remain competences of the EU-Commission. Concomitantly, the EEAS is situated within several, partly overlapping and conflicting accountability relationships. The ensuing question is： To what extent, how and by whom can the HRVP and the EEAS be held politically to account？ With data from official documents, 50 semi-structured interviews and a survey among 184 EU foreign policy-makers, the article maps and assesses of the multi-level actor/forum relationships of the EU＇s foreign policy machinery.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71661147001 and 71603228)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(2018M630687 and 2018T110607)the Zhejiang University-IFPRI Center for International Development Studies。
文摘Decentralized methods for targeting poverty are widely adopted in developing countries to improve the performance of various poverty alleviation programs.A common challenge for implementing successful decentralized targeting is the existence of elite capture.China has recently implemented a nationwide decentralized poverty targeting program,the targeted poverty alleviation(TPA)policy,to achieve the national goal of eliminating absolute poverty by the end of 2020.As the largest decentralized poverty targeting program in the world,TPA's successful implementation was believed to be threatened by elite capture in some earlier reports.Since 2015,a targeting correction mechanism,called"follow-up checks"policy,has been introduced.With the"follow-up checks"policy,the elites and other ineligible households who receive benefits under TPA were removed from the program.This paper investigates the elite capture phenomenon in TPA using village census data from a poverty-stricken county in 2017-two years after implementing the"follow-up checks"policy.We find no evidence of elite capture in TPA.The elites are unlikely to become beneficiaries or receive more benefits than non-elites.Our results contradict earlier findings that reported elite capture in TPA.We argue that the reason is the accountability emphasized by the central government in the"follow-up checks"policy.Our findings imply that having proper accountability is critical for improving targeting performance by global antipoverty initiatives.
文摘Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs （HRVP） has obtained far-reaching powers to formulate, coordinate and implement EU external policies, traditionally a prerogative of the state. In the exercise of this delegated powers, the HRVP is assisted by a dedicated administrative body, the European External Action Service （EEAS）. Formal decision-making over the EU＇s common foreign and security policy lies with the Council, while the European Neighborhood and Trade policies, as well as international cooperation remain competences of the EU-Commission. Concomitantly, the EEAS is situated within several, partly overlapping and conflicting accountability relationships. The ensuing question is： To what extent, how and by whom can the HRVP and the EEAS be held politically to account？ With data from official documents, 50 semi-structured interviews and a survey among 184 EU foreign policy-makers, the article maps and assesses of the multi-level actor/forum relationships of the EU＇s foreign policy machinery.
