In this paper,we study a model on joint decisions of scheduling and subcontracting, in which jobs(orders) can be either processed by parallel machines at the manufacturer in-house or subcontracted to a subcontractor.T...In this paper,we study a model on joint decisions of scheduling and subcontracting, in which jobs(orders) can be either processed by parallel machines at the manufacturer in-house or subcontracted to a subcontractor.The manufacturer needs to determine which jobs should be produced in-house and which jobs should be subcontracted.Furthermore,it needs to determine a production schedule for jobs to be produced in-house.We discuss five classical scheduling objectives as production costs.For each problem with different objective functions,we give optimality conditions and propose dynamic programming algorithms.展开更多
In recent years, the subcontracting production for foreign trade of the Xi’an Aviation Engine Company (XAEC), a foreign trade production base of China, has achieved rapid development. In 1994, the company’s export e...In recent years, the subcontracting production for foreign trade of the Xi’an Aviation Engine Company (XAEC), a foreign trade production base of China, has achieved rapid development. In 1994, the company’s export earnings from foreign trade made a breakthrough at US$11 million, and it was commended by the State Economic展开更多
We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcon...We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.展开更多
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70731160015)Supported the National Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province(yw06037)
文摘In this paper,we study a model on joint decisions of scheduling and subcontracting, in which jobs(orders) can be either processed by parallel machines at the manufacturer in-house or subcontracted to a subcontractor.The manufacturer needs to determine which jobs should be produced in-house and which jobs should be subcontracted.Furthermore,it needs to determine a production schedule for jobs to be produced in-house.We discuss five classical scheduling objectives as production costs.For each problem with different objective functions,we give optimality conditions and propose dynamic programming algorithms.
文摘In recent years, the subcontracting production for foreign trade of the Xi’an Aviation Engine Company (XAEC), a foreign trade production base of China, has achieved rapid development. In 1994, the company’s export earnings from foreign trade made a breakthrough at US$11 million, and it was commended by the State Economic
基金supported by Leading Talent Program of Guangdong Province(Project No.2016LJ06D703)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.72192805),and the Shenzhen Science and Technology Innovation Commission(Project No.JCYJ20210324115604012)+1 种基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Key Research Grant 71732003)the Summer Fellowship Program of the Fisher College of Business,The Ohio State University.
文摘We study a project management problem where the prime contractor needs to outsource tasks to subcontractors with the required resources.Successful execution of the project requires proper coordination among the subcontractors,as well as contract design by the prime contractor to incentivize the subcontractors.By modeling the subcontractors’coordination problem as a cooperative game,we develop a profit sharing scheme to facilitate the subcontractors’cooperation.We consider two contract designs for the prime contractor:a uniform contract across all subcontractors,and a nonuniform one that customizes incentives for each subcontractor.We propose efficient algorithms to solve the implicit optimization problems for optimal contract parameters.Computational experiments show that the pooling effect of subcontractors’cooperation mitigates the negative impact of poor estimates about the crashing cost and resource availability.We observe three unexpected results through the randomized computation experiments:(i)the subcontractors’profits may decrease if they provide false information;(ii)it is safer for the prime contractor to overestimate subcontractors’crashing costs than underestimate them;and(iii)uniform contracts deliver more project profit for the subcontractors in the coalitions.
