Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges:a multi‑leader–follower game approach

This study is designed to solve supply chain inefficiencies caused by some members’financial problems,such as capital shortages and financing restrictions in a stochastic environment.To this end,we have established a supply chain finance framework by designing two novel coordinating contracts based on trade credit financing for different problem settings.These contracts are modeled in the form of multi-leader Stackelberg games that address horizontal and vertical competition in a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and a financially constrained manufacturer.However,previous studies in the trade credit literature have addressed only simple vertical competition,that is,seller-buyer competition.To solve the proposed models,two algorithms were developed by combining population-based metaheuristics,the Nash-domination concept,and the Nikaido-Isoda function.The results demonstrate that the proposed supply chain finance framework can eliminate supply chain inefficiencies and make a large profit for suppliers,as well as the financially constrained manufacturer.Furthermore,the results of the contracts’analysis showed that if the manufacturer is required to settle its payments to suppliers before the end of the period,the trade credit contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because of a lack of incentive for suppliers.However,if the manufacturer is allowed to extend its payments to the end of the period,the proposed trade credit financing contract can coordinate the supply chain.Finally,the sensitivity analysis results indicate that the worse the financial status of the manufacturer,the more bargaining power suppliers have in determining the contract parameters for more profit.

Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions,but manufacturers’insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies.To alleviate capital constraints,manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments.This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts.Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode,we come to the following conclusions:(1)Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain,manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas.(2)When financing independently,a decentralized decision-making mode(MD)is the best choice for manufacturers.(3)In cooperative financing,when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode(SD)in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit,the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved.(4)When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model(SC)in cooperative financing,they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction.If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range,the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement,indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.

A joint inventory–finance model for coordinating a capital‑constrained supply chain with financing limitations

Faced with economic recession,firms struggle to find ways to stay competitive and maintain market share.Effective coordination of the supply chain can solve this problem,but this may fail if existing capital constraints and financial flows are ignored.This study addresses the challenge by exploiting coordination through joint decision-making on the physical and financial flows of a capital-constrained supply chain.We also consider the capital-constrained member’s financing limitations that lead to lost sales.Two scenarios based on non-coordinated and coordinated structures are modeled in the form of bi-objective optimization problems that simultaneously optimize system costs and service levels.The models are solved using the -constraint method.The results indicate that the non-coordinated model cannot satisfy more than about 50%of the demand due to capital shortage and financing limitations,while the coordinated model can satisfy all of the demand via internal financing.Furthermore,the proposed coordination scheme leads to cost reduction for the members and the total system.To motivate all members to accept the proposed coordination scheme,a cost-sharing mechanism is applied to the coordination procedure.Finally,a sensitivity analysis concerning financial parameters is provided for validating the coordination model.

Smart contract-enabled consortium blockchains for the control of supply chain information distortion

Conflicts between supply chain members emerge because individual strategic actions may not be jointly optimal.Efforts to forecast consumer demand represent a source of conflict.The coordination of forecasts requires a powerful incentive alignment approach.This work proposes a smart contract equipped consortium blockchain system that creates an incentive structure that makes coordination with respect to forecasts economically appealing.Distortions of demand information due to uncoordinated forecasting are captured by a bullwhip measure that factors both forecast error and variance.Cooperation under the system is shown to help minimize this bullwhip measure,thus generating new outcomes for the participants that allow for a higher reward.Under a fixed payout structure,the system achieves credibility of continued cooperation,thus promoting an optimally coordinated equilibrium between the retailer and supplier.Blockchain technology represents a novel information system and consensus formation mechanism that can intermediate the behavior of a supply chain network.

Coordination of a Socially Responsible Supply Chain with Cause Marketing Campaigns

This paper explores the coordination problem of a socially responsible supply chain,in which the supplier contributes corporate social responsibility by donating a specific amount of money to a cause marketing and the retailer cares for consumer surplus in addition to its own profit.We consider two donation formats:absolute amount donation and percentage of profit donation.For each donation format,the optimal solutions for the centralized and decentralized decisions are derived,and the effects of system parameters on the optimal decisions and other outcome variables are investigated.Moreover,a two-part tariff contract and a quantity discount plus cost sharing contract are proposed to coordinate the socially responsible supply chain.This study may provide theoretical support and operational procedures for supply chain managers to integrate corporate social responsibility into business routines.

多主导多随从电信增值业务供应链协调研究(英文)

In order to study supply chain of the telecom value-added service,a multi-leaders and multi-followers Stackelberg game model with multiple telecom operators and multiple service providers whose income is composed of information fee division and advertisement was constructed.Then a demonstration was simulated,and the results were compared with the situation of service providers' income only from information fee division.The simulated and compared results indicate that,the enterprises in the supply chain have the nature of pursuing the maximum profits in capital markets;meanwhile,first-mover advantages and some enterprise can get more profits with the information asymmetry.

Coordinating an Extended Warranty Supply Chain under Increasing,Constant and Decreasing Product Failure Rates

A product typically exhibits three different failure rates across its lifetime:increasing,decreasing,or constant.This paper studies how the characteristics of failure rate impact the supply chain coordination for an extended warranty program involving a manufacturer and a retailer.A two-stage Stackelberg game is utilized to model the interaction between these two players.Two extended warranty channel structures are compared depending on whether the manufacturer or the retailer offers the warranty service.The analysis shows that the failure rate trend during the warranty period has different effects on the coordination of the service supply chain.When a product has an increasing or constant failure rate,the optimal length of extended warranty offered by the retailer is longer than that of the manufacturer,while the optimal length is shorter for a product with a decreasing failure rate.If a product during the warranty coverage has an increasing or constant failure rate,a longer extended warranty period will motivate customers to buy the product without the warranty,whereas more customers will buy both the product and the warranty if the product experiences a decreasing failure rate.It is concluded that,if the manufacturer and the retailer incur the same warranty service cost,the total profit in the supply chain is higher when the manufacturer offers the extended warranty.From the game participants'perspective,the one which sells the extended warranty will obtain more profit.

The optimal strategies in the supply chain with stochastic demand sensitivity to carbon emission

With the increasing awareness of low-carbon environmental protection,consumers prefer to purchase low-carbon products.In this paper,a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in classic single-period model with emission-sensitive stochastic demand is investigated.Firstly,optimal results for the decentralized and centralized decisions in the basic model are presented respectively.It manifests the effect of double marginalization which shows not only a lower order quantity but also higher unit carbon emission.Then,we are going to discuss the introduction of a buyback and cost-sharing contract,and two main carbon emission regulations in the decentralized model.Finally,compared with the basic model,numerical examples are studied on the optimal solutions to the total profit for the supply chain,order quantity,and unit/total carbon emission as the demand sensitivity to carbon emission/green investment coefficient/demand variance varies respectively before reaching several significant conclusions.

Coronavirus Dynamics:The Undulating Playing Field

The goal of the paper is to conduct an exploratory review and analyses of the dynamics of the pandemic focusing on two themes:pandemic morbidity and vulnerable populations.Method:Review of literature,anecdotal evidence,and reports on the morbidity of COVID-19;including scope of its devastating effects in selected countries.Findings:The devastating effects of the coronavirus are felt across different vulnerable populations.These include the elderly,front line workers,marginalized communities,visible minorities,and more.Inadequate and sometimes conflicting remarks by“experts”have only contributed in exacerbating the confusion in the general population.However,compassion and empathy from different communities have had positive effects on mitigating some of the health outcomes like mental health and other health-related effects of the pandemic.Institutional support needs to be strengthened,especially with regard to individual risks and supply chain coordination:personal protection equipment(PPE),masks,swabs,reagents,etc.The challenge in Africa is especially daunting,because of limited and inadequate financial resources and infrastructure,as confirmed by the health budget allocations as a percentage of their respective GDP(gross domestic product).Discussion:The effects of the COVID-19 are producing unprecedented and catastrophic outcomes in many countries.These have been exacerbated by the level of unpreparedness and inadequate degrees of prevention and intervention strategies.With a few exceptions,the common and current intervention approach is driven by many unknowns including compilation of relevant reliable and compelling data sets.Vulnerable communities continue to suffer most:a situation that is highlighted in this essay as one attempt to remind institutions of their duty to provide appropriate support,including compassion and empathy to these populations.The repercussions of no or inadequate action are numerous,significant,and mind-boggling with unpredictable future outcomes and possible dire consequences.The continuous carnage caused by COVID-19 is a wake-up call reminding all stakeholders(public and private institutions)that once again the inequality infiltrating vulnerable populations needs to be effectively addressed with emphasis on affordability,improved quality of life,and an inclusive long-term strategic plan.Ubiquitous and inadequate supply chain coordination mechanisms have been a major deterrent towards mitigating the effects of this coronavirus pandemic.

Evolutionary approaches for supply chain optimisation Part I:single and two-component supply chains

Purpose–The purpose of this paper and its companion(Part II:multi-silo supply chains)is to investigate methods to tackle complexities,constraints(including time-varying constraints)and other challenges.In tis part,the paper aims to devote attention to single silo and two-silo supply chains.It also aims to discuss three models.The first model is based on the winebottling real-world system and exposes complexities of a single operational component of the supply chain.The second model extends it to two components:production and distribution.The last system is a real-world implementation of the two-component supply chain.Design/methodology/approach–Evolutionary approach is proposed for a single component problem.The two-component experimental supply chain is addressed by the algorithm based on cooperative coevolution.The final problem of steel sheet production is tackled with the evolutionary algorithm.Findings–The proposed systems produce solutions better than solutions proposed by human experts and in a much shorter time.Originality/value–The paper discusses various algorithms to provide the decision support for the real-world problems.The proposed systems are in the production use.

Evolutionary approaches for supply chain optimisation.Part II:multi-silo supply chains

Purpose–The purpose of this paper and its companion(Part I:single and two-component supply chains)is to investigate methods to tackle complexities,constraints(including time-varying constraints)and other challenges.In this part,attention is devoted to multi-silo supply chain and the relationships between the components.The first part of the paper aims to consider two types of experimental supply chains:with one-to-many and many-to-one relationships.The second half of the paper aims to present two approaches on optimising the material flow in the real-world supply chain network.Design/methodology/approach–Cooperative coevolutionary and classical sequential approaches are taken to address the experimental multi-silo supply chains.Due to the nature and the complexity of the supply chain presented in the second half of the paper,evolutionary algorithm was not sufficient to tackle the problem.A fuzzy-evolutionary algorithm is proposed to address the problem.Findings–The proposed systems produce solutions better than solutions proposed by human experts and in much shorter time.Originality/value–The paper discusses various algorithms to provide the decision support for the real-world problems.The system proposed for the real-world supply chain is in the process of integration to the production environment.

Fairness-Embedded Governmental Coordination by Dominated Retailer in Heterogeneous Circumstance

Market demand is positively affected by the investments in marketing and quality improvement. In a retailer dominated supply chain, the manufacturer takes charge of product quality improvement and the retailer focuses on marketing. The investments on cooperative marketing and product quality improvement in supply chains are known to be heterogeneous investment, where the manufacturer(he) is fairness sensitive and the retailer(she) is fairness insensitive. Due to the manufacturer's conservative investment resulting from this sensitivity of fairness, the retailer shares a proportion of the manufacturer's investment to increase his investment. It is found that the manufacturer's fairness negatively affects his investment and the manufacturer sometimes tends to be a ‘free rider' under decentralized decision patterns, which lead to a poor supply chain performance. This study also proves that both the manufacturer and the retailer are motivated to cooperate under centralized patterns,where the retailer's objective is additional expected profit and the manufacturer's objective is enlarging his utility.Based on the comparison of equilibrium solutions in decentralized and centralized patterns, this study suggests the range of cost-sharing proportion for supply chain coordination. The example shows the effectiveness of the provided supply chain coordination.