Considering participators' risk bias,which is measured by the method of value at risk,the risk constraints in a two-echelon supply chain coordination under buy-back contract is equal to giving the order of an uppe...Considering participators' risk bias,which is measured by the method of value at risk,the risk constraints in a two-echelon supply chain coordination under buy-back contract is equal to giving the order of an upper bound.With a risk-averse dominant enterprise(M)and a risk-neutral non-dominant one(R),the coordination which optimizes the supply chain under the risk constraints is achieved by a penalty mechanism L to reduce R's order.With risk-neutral M and risk-averse R,M can motivate R to increase his order by providing a risk subsidy K,and two cases are discussed.If the risk constraints of R cannot satisfy M's participation constraint to offer K,M will prefer to accept R's order to obtain a sub-optimization solution of the supply chain.Or else,with M's K,R's optimal order just coordinates the supply chain,which is equal to the case without risk bias,and in this situation R's risk bias only affects the profit distribution between the participators.展开更多
Along with the rapid development of economics and enhancement of industrialization, the power demand keeps rising and frequently creates mismatch between demand and supply in electricity.This provides miscellaneous en...Along with the rapid development of economics and enhancement of industrialization, the power demand keeps rising and frequently creates mismatch between demand and supply in electricity.This provides miscellaneous energy buy-back programs with great opportunities. Such programs, when activated, offer certain amount of financial compensations to participants for reducing their energy consumption during peak time. They aim at encouraging participants to shift their electricity usage from peak to non-peak time, and thereby release the demand pressure during peak time. This paper considers a periodic-review joint pricing and inventory decision model under an energy buy-back program over finite planning horizons, in which the compensation levels, setup cost and additive random demand function are incorporated. The objective is to maximize a manufacturer's expected total profit.By using Veinott's conditions, it is shown that the manufacturer's optimal decision is a state dependent(s, S, P) policy under a peak market condition, or partly an(s, S, A, P) policy under the normal market condition.展开更多
Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no desig...Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no design capability） or an ODM （having design capability）. Regarding OEM, the fashion brand designs the products, outsources the manufacturing function, and has the option of outsourcing procurement function. Regarding ODM, the fashion brand buys unlabeled products from the ODM, which is charge of designing and manufacturing. In this case, buy-back contract is widely adopted so as to share the risk of demand uncertainty between the ODM and the fashion brand. We solve the wholesale pricing problems via sequential/simultaneous optimization, and derive the buy-back price via generalize Nash bargaining. We find that, fashion brand prefers contracting with an ODM when its bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is larger than a threshold, although the fashion brand＇s order size under ODM is always larger than that under OEM. Interestingly, we find that the buy-back price is decreasing in the fashion brand＇s bargaining power. We further analyze the supply chain sustainability in both ODM and OEM scenarios, fmding that the supply chain might achieve both environmental sustainability and economic sustainability in OEM scenario when the fashion brand＇s bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is small.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70671025)the National Key Technology R&D Program of China during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period(No.2006BAH02A06)
文摘Considering participators' risk bias,which is measured by the method of value at risk,the risk constraints in a two-echelon supply chain coordination under buy-back contract is equal to giving the order of an upper bound.With a risk-averse dominant enterprise(M)and a risk-neutral non-dominant one(R),the coordination which optimizes the supply chain under the risk constraints is achieved by a penalty mechanism L to reduce R's order.With risk-neutral M and risk-averse R,M can motivate R to increase his order by providing a risk subsidy K,and two cases are discussed.If the risk constraints of R cannot satisfy M's participation constraint to offer K,M will prefer to accept R's order to obtain a sub-optimization solution of the supply chain.Or else,with M's K,R's optimal order just coordinates the supply chain,which is equal to the case without risk bias,and in this situation R's risk bias only affects the profit distribution between the participators.
基金partially supported by Young Faculty Research Fund of Beijing Foreign Studies University(2015JT005)YETP(YETP0851)+3 种基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(71371032)Key Project of Beijing Foreign Studies University Research Programs(2011XG003)the Humanities and Social Science Research Project of Ministry of Education(13YJA630125)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities
文摘Along with the rapid development of economics and enhancement of industrialization, the power demand keeps rising and frequently creates mismatch between demand and supply in electricity.This provides miscellaneous energy buy-back programs with great opportunities. Such programs, when activated, offer certain amount of financial compensations to participants for reducing their energy consumption during peak time. They aim at encouraging participants to shift their electricity usage from peak to non-peak time, and thereby release the demand pressure during peak time. This paper considers a periodic-review joint pricing and inventory decision model under an energy buy-back program over finite planning horizons, in which the compensation levels, setup cost and additive random demand function are incorporated. The objective is to maximize a manufacturer's expected total profit.By using Veinott's conditions, it is shown that the manufacturer's optimal decision is a state dependent(s, S, P) policy under a peak market condition, or partly an(s, S, A, P) policy under the normal market condition.
文摘Consider a fashion supply chain comprising a supplier, a contract manufacturer and a fashion brand, we examine the fashion brand＇s profit performances when the contract manufacturer is either an OEM （having no design capability） or an ODM （having design capability）. Regarding OEM, the fashion brand designs the products, outsources the manufacturing function, and has the option of outsourcing procurement function. Regarding ODM, the fashion brand buys unlabeled products from the ODM, which is charge of designing and manufacturing. In this case, buy-back contract is widely adopted so as to share the risk of demand uncertainty between the ODM and the fashion brand. We solve the wholesale pricing problems via sequential/simultaneous optimization, and derive the buy-back price via generalize Nash bargaining. We find that, fashion brand prefers contracting with an ODM when its bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is larger than a threshold, although the fashion brand＇s order size under ODM is always larger than that under OEM. Interestingly, we find that the buy-back price is decreasing in the fashion brand＇s bargaining power. We further analyze the supply chain sustainability in both ODM and OEM scenarios, fmding that the supply chain might achieve both environmental sustainability and economic sustainability in OEM scenario when the fashion brand＇s bargaining power in buy-back negotiation is small.
