The adoption of new technologies often represents a crucial component of firms＇ investment decisions. This paper studies a dynamic duopoly model in which two firms compete in adoption of current technology with a fur...The adoption of new technologies often represents a crucial component of firms＇ investment decisions. This paper studies a dynamic duopoly model in which two firms compete in adoption of current technology with a further new technology anticipated. Here it is assumed that the operating costs are not zero which has more explanatory power of the real world. There exist three kinds of equilibria that may occur in adoption of current technology, which mainly depends on the level of operating costs and the first-move advantage. It shows that the faster technological substitution or innovation encourages the leader to invest earlier while induces the follower to invest later. Furthermore,like the investment costs,with the increase of operating costs the follower tends to invest later while the leader tends to invest earlier ,the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of operating costs than that of investment costs.展开更多
It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national ...It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national innovation policy system to coordinate these incentives in order to promote economic transition and upgrade through corporate innovation. Innovation policies are determined by a country's technology level. The premise for most advanced economies to follow market-based incentives is a foundation of early-stage non-market policies, as their governments frequently resorted to non-market means such as state-owned enterprises in the early stage of development. This paper also concludes that technological uncertainty can well describe the technological characteristics of industries. For industries with less technological uncertainty, non-market means are more likely to succeed. Lastly, this paper employs the dimensions of both technology level and industrial technology characteristics for a quantitative analysis on the scope of industries to which the two incentive mechanisms are applicable, divides them into quadrants in order to discuss the boundary between market-based and non-market incentives, and explore ways to achieve effective interplay between government and market.展开更多
This paper studies a general dynamic duopoly in which two firms compete in the adoption of current technology with a further new technology anticipated. Three kinds of equilibria may occur in technology adoption, name...This paper studies a general dynamic duopoly in which two firms compete in the adoption of current technology with a further new technology anticipated. Three kinds of equilibria may occur in technology adoption, namely the preemptive, sequential, and simultaneous equilibrium, depending on the level of operating costs and the first-move advantage. It shows that the faster technological innovation encourages the leader to invest earlier, while induces the follower to invest later. Furthermore, like the investment costs, with the increase of the operating costs, the follower tends to invest later, while the leader tends to invest earlier. However, the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of the operating costs than that of the investment costs.展开更多
文摘The adoption of new technologies often represents a crucial component of firms＇ investment decisions. This paper studies a dynamic duopoly model in which two firms compete in adoption of current technology with a further new technology anticipated. Here it is assumed that the operating costs are not zero which has more explanatory power of the real world. There exist three kinds of equilibria that may occur in adoption of current technology, which mainly depends on the level of operating costs and the first-move advantage. It shows that the faster technological substitution or innovation encourages the leader to invest earlier while induces the follower to invest later. Furthermore,like the investment costs,with the increase of operating costs the follower tends to invest later while the leader tends to invest earlier ,the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of operating costs than that of investment costs.
基金sponsored by the Key Project of National Social Sciences Foundation “Study on the Interplay Between Industrial Upgrade and the Pathway of Environmental Regulation” (Grant No. 14AJY015)the Key Project of National Soft Science Research Program “Study on the Disruptive Technology Innovation Mechanism and Its Impact on Industrial Development” (Grant No. 2013GXS6B213)
文摘It is the view of this paper that both market and non-market mechanisms can stimulate corporate innovation and have their respective areas of application. As a major developing country, China should create a national innovation policy system to coordinate these incentives in order to promote economic transition and upgrade through corporate innovation. Innovation policies are determined by a country's technology level. The premise for most advanced economies to follow market-based incentives is a foundation of early-stage non-market policies, as their governments frequently resorted to non-market means such as state-owned enterprises in the early stage of development. This paper also concludes that technological uncertainty can well describe the technological characteristics of industries. For industries with less technological uncertainty, non-market means are more likely to succeed. Lastly, this paper employs the dimensions of both technology level and industrial technology characteristics for a quantitative analysis on the scope of industries to which the two incentive mechanisms are applicable, divides them into quadrants in order to discuss the boundary between market-based and non-market incentives, and explore ways to achieve effective interplay between government and market.
基金The work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.70301003.
文摘This paper studies a general dynamic duopoly in which two firms compete in the adoption of current technology with a further new technology anticipated. Three kinds of equilibria may occur in technology adoption, namely the preemptive, sequential, and simultaneous equilibrium, depending on the level of operating costs and the first-move advantage. It shows that the faster technological innovation encourages the leader to invest earlier, while induces the follower to invest later. Furthermore, like the investment costs, with the increase of the operating costs, the follower tends to invest later, while the leader tends to invest earlier. However, the investment thresholds are more sensitive to the change of the operating costs than that of the investment costs.
