The Impact of Bank-Specific and Macroeconomic Factors on Non-performing Loans in Sri Lankan Commercial Banks

The main purpose of this study is to ascertain the effect of bank-specific and macroeconomic factors on non-performing loans in systemically and non-systemically important commercial banks in Sri Lanka over 10 year’s period from 2004 to 2013.Also,the study examines the impact of civil war that prevailed in the country for 30 years on the ex-post credit risk of the banking sector.The study employed panel data methodology to investigate the effect of bank-specific and macroeconomic factors on non-performing loans.Panel unit root test has been undertaken in order to test the stationary of the variables.Hausman test and Wald coefficient restriction test were used to select the appropriate model out of pooled,random,and fixed effect.A dummy variable panel regression model adopted to study the war effect,considering 2009 as the structural year.Findings revealed that return on assets as a proxy for bank efficiency has a significant negative influence,while non-interest income as a proxy for income diversity is positively correlated with non-performing loans of systemically important banks.Both real gross domestic products and lending rates were highly significant in both bank types.On contrary with literature,growth in bank branches is negatively correlated.Public banks do not account for higher level of non-performing loans compared to their private counterpart.Finally,it was identified that civil war had an effect on the level of non-performing loans in commercial banks.The research would have benefited if the analysis is carried out among classified types of loans offered by commercial banks.Future researchers should involve in identifying the most significant contributing loan type to the non-performing loans and its determinants.This study is one of the few studies which have investigated the causes of non-performing loans in the commercial banking industry in Sri Lanka.The analysis of civil war and its impact on non-performing loans is the first study of that nature to be conducted in the context.

Loan Strategies to Small and Medium Size Enterprises:An Analysis of Determining Factors of“Subsidiary Banks”in the Cameroonian Context

This paper proposes to present an overview of determining factors of the granting of loan to Small and Medium Size Enterprises(SMSE)by the subsidiaries of multinational banks in Cameroon.The analysis of the data collected following interviews with banking employees conducted in accordance with the method of thematic content analysis reveals that two categories of factors play a major role in the decision of the banker:parameters relating to the characteristics of the SMSE applying for a loan and elements specific to the context of study.The combination of these factors contributes to the reinforcement of the already transactional attitude of these subsidiary banks in the area of experimentation of the study.

A Knowledge-based System for the Analysis of the Ability of Paying back Loans

This paper describes the development of a knowledgebased system (KBS) for determining whether or not, and under what conditions, a bank Ioan officer should grant a business loan to a company. The prototype system developed focuses on what is bank loans risks management, how to prevent risk by the analysis of the ability of paying back loans. The paper makes the structural analysis involved in the system's decision situation, the structured situation diagram or model, dependency diagram and the document needed by the KBS prototype system thus are developed. Through testing the samples from loan business, the quality for the analysis of the ability of paying back loans can be effectively evaluated by the KBS prototype system.

Designing of Commercial Bank Loans Risk Early Warning System Based on BP Neural Networks

According to the index early warning method, a commercial bank loans risk early warning system based on BP neural networks is proposed. The warning signal is mainly involved with the financial situation signal of loaning corporation. Except the structure description of the system structure the demonstration of attemptive designing is also elaborated.

Loan growth and bank solvency:evidence from the Pakistani banking sector

Background:The dramatic loan growth and changes in the Pakistani banking system in mid-2000s have led to significant research attention on borrowers and lenders.This expansion and diversification in financial sector was driven by structural reforms,political stability and significant economic growth.Against this background,this study investigates the loan growth and risk-taking behavior of the banks during the expansionary periods of lending.Method:This study used dynamic two-step system generalized method of moment’s estimation technique,based on data taken from 32 banks in Pakistan over 2006-2014.Result:Loan growth has a significant effect on bank-specific and macroeconomicspecific variables.Loan growth in the previous year raises non-performing loans and decreases the solvency of banks with a time lag of many years.The driving force behind this phenomenon is weak prudential regulation among competitors,the asymmetric information of the borrowers,and,most importantly,that banks underestimate the risk of lending during credit booms.Conclusion:More regulatory measures are required to ensure a strong financial system when the volume of non-performing loan grows significantly.An increase in the capital requirement policy for rapidly growing banks is also needed because the problem of abnormal loan growth cannot be detected at the current time.At the same time,strong supervision is necessary to avoid the adverse consequences of borrower selection.

Intelligent Decision Support System for Bank Loans Risk Classification

Intelligent Decision Support System (IISS) for Bank Loans Risk Classification (BLRC), based on the way of integration Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Expert System (ES), is proposed. According to the feature of BLRC, the key financial and non-financial factors are analyzed. Meanwhile, ES and Model Base (MB) which contain ANN are designed . The general framework,interaction and integration of the system are given. In addition, how the system realizes BLRC is elucidated in detail.

Bank loan information and information asymmetry in the stock market:evidence from China

In this study,we use bank loan information to construct proxies for corporate transparency and examine whether these measures reflect information asymmetry in the stock market.Our analysis is based on a novel dataset of stock transactions and bank loans of all publicly listed firms on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,covering January 2008 to June 2013.We find that firms with outstanding loans have a lower level of information asymmetry in the stock market,whereas firms with defaulted loans have a higher level of asymmetry.Further evidence demonstrates that the effect of loan default on information asymmetry in the stock market is more pronounced when these loans are borrowed from joint-equity commercial banks or multiple banks and when the default occurs under inactive market conditions.Our results remain robust to a series of endogeneity and sensitivity tests and provide suggestive evidence of a close connection between the credit loan and stock markets.

A Tentative Analysis of the Use of Potential by Commercial Bank in Controlling Credit Scale

This article brings forward the conception of potential and filed potential in bank's competition under the inspiration of law of electric current in electrodynamics. It discusses the impact of potential shifting on commercial bank's credit scale and builds up a model for commercial bank to control the scale by credit pricing and risk policy in a dynamic way, and also gives some advice to domestic commercial bank for improving loan business, aiming to settle down the existing credit management problems.

Proper Financial System for the Socialist Market Economy——Vice-Governor Zhou Zhenqin of the People's Bank of China on China's Financial System at an international meeting

In the year 1994, China’s new policies and measures for taxation, finance, invcstment and foreign system reform came into being respectively and enjoyed steady progress. At an international meeting not long ago, Vice-Governor Zhou Zhenqin of the People’s Bank of China talked about the targets, measures and headway for China’s financial system reform to domestic and forcign people from economic circles who attended the meeting. When talking about the financial reform carried out this year, he focused on the introduction of the following

The Import & Export Bank of China——An interview with Tong Zhiguang, Chairman of the Board

Since the founding of the Import and Export Bank of China, one of the few policy banks in China and the first of its kind to support the import and export trade, on July 1, 1994, it has aroused great attention in financial, economic and trade fields at home and abroad. The bank was co-established by the Bank of China, the Ministry of Foreign Trade

Central bank digital currency,loan supply,and bank failure risk:a microeconomic approach

Central bank digital currencies(CBDCs),which are legal tenders in digital form,are expected to reduce currency issuance and circulation costs and broaden the scope of monetary policy.In addition,these currencies may also reduce consumers’need for conventional demand deposits,which,in turn,increases banks’loan provision costs because deposits require higher rates of return.We use a microeconomic banking model to investigate the effects of introducing an economy-wide,account-type CBDC on a bank’s loan supply and its failure risk.Given that a CBDC is expected to lower the cost of liquidity circulation and become a strong substitute for demand deposits,both the loan supply and the bank failure risk increase.These increases are countered by subsequent increases in the rates of return on term deposits and loans,which,in turn,reduce the loan supply and thus bank failure risk.These offsetting forces lead to no significant change in banking,as long as the rate of return on loans is below a certain threshold.However,once the rate is above the threshold,bank failure risk increases,thereby undermining banking stability.The problem is more pronounced when the degree of pass-through of funding costs to the loan rate is high and the profitability of a successful project is low.Our results imply that central banks wishing to introduce an economy-wide,account-type CBDC should first monitor yields on bank loans and consider policy measures that induce banks to maintain adequate liquidity reserve levels.

Determining pledged loan-to-value ratio:an option pricing perspective

Background:We investigated the determination of the pledged loan-to-value ratio in an optionpricing environment and mainly articulated the theoretical framework and analytical method.Methods:The basic idea is that the present value of the pledged loan payoff is equal to a put option’s value.While the interest rate is fixed and the loan is without coupon,we analyzed the pledged loan-to-value ratioin the option pricing perspective and got it that the pledged loan-to-value ratio is decided by term,excessreturn,and the value volatility of the pledge.Next,we extended the same work to coupon loan and portfoliopledge circumstances.For zero coupon and fixed interest rate circumstances,we performed a numericalanalysis.Results:Our results indicate the following:the pledged loan-to-value ratio is a convex decreasing function ofthe term;and the pledged loan-to-value ratio is a concave decreasing function of the value volatility of the pledge;and the pledged loan-to-value ratio is a concave increasing function of the risk premium.For floating interest rate circumstances,we should specify the function form between the loan interest and the risk-free rate.Conclusions:The scientific measurement of the pledged loan-to-value ratio means that simple rules of thumb or the VaR method may lead to mispricing,which could create the possibility of arbitrage.In this way,a new direction for trading derivative products of pledges will be provided.