Chinas economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question: Is it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth? Based...Chinas economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question: Is it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth? Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel Chinas economic growth; Chinas gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSMfor the treatment of the endogeneity problem-all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.展开更多
From June to July of 2017, the approval rates of the Abe administration fell sharply, in stark contrast to the long-term stability since2012. The stability of Abe's approval rates originated from the people's ...From June to July of 2017, the approval rates of the Abe administration fell sharply, in stark contrast to the long-term stability since2012. The stability of Abe's approval rates originated from the people's negative support for him and their opposition to the Security Laws and other important events as well as the scandals under his administration. The opposition and negative support originated from the people's "acquired helplessness","Abenomics", the sharp drop in the opportunity costs of voting and other conditions. The sudden fall of Abe's approval rates was not due to the change in the aforementioned conditions, rather because of the collapse of his image including personality owing to Abe's perceived arrogance and his estrangement with the people. In the context of the temporary stabilization of approval rates, Abe dissolved the House of Representatives ahead of schedule and held a general election, taking full advantage of the internal strife between the opposition parties, to achieve his goal of ruling until the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. His victory in the recent election does not accurately demonstrate that Abe is completely immune to negative impact, thus he will to use the Korean Peninsula crisis and other issues to demonstrate his ability of safeguarding Japan's security, seek reconstruction of his image, and further enhance his approval rate to stabilize his administration.展开更多
Five Features of China’s Reform on Administrative System China started with the great historic process of Reform and Open-up more than 30 years ago.Since them,reform on China’s administrative system has been under w...Five Features of China’s Reform on Administrative System China started with the great historic process of Reform and Open-up more than 30 years ago.Since them,reform on China’s administrative system has been under way.To sum up the course of 30 odd years,the features of China’s reform on administrative system are as follows.First,as China’s reform made its first breakthrough in rural areas,展开更多
Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offeri...Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offering(IPO)preference based on the entropy balancing method,and findings are as follows.First,an IPO ownership preference exists under approval system.That is,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)are more likely than private enterprises to obtain IPO approval.However,RSR significantly changes this preference,especially for non-politically connected private enterprises.Second,the post-IPO market performance of SOEs is inferior to that of private enterprises under approval system,thus excluding the view that approval is prioritized for SOEs because of superior performance.Third,compared with SOEs,private enterprises are more likely to switch the issuance system from approval system to registration system;this change makes it easier for them to obtain IPO approval,indicating that private enterprise owners perceive the registration channel to be fairer.Fourth,the effect of RSR on IPO ownership preference mainly occurs in companies in three major urban agglomerations in China—the Pearl River Delta,the Yangtze River Delta,and the Beijing–Tian jin–Hebei region—and in technology-intensive industries.Collectively,our findings reveal that RSR cultivates a fairer IPO approval process.展开更多
文摘Chinas economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question: Is it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth? Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel Chinas economic growth; Chinas gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSMfor the treatment of the endogeneity problem-all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.
文摘From June to July of 2017, the approval rates of the Abe administration fell sharply, in stark contrast to the long-term stability since2012. The stability of Abe's approval rates originated from the people's negative support for him and their opposition to the Security Laws and other important events as well as the scandals under his administration. The opposition and negative support originated from the people's "acquired helplessness","Abenomics", the sharp drop in the opportunity costs of voting and other conditions. The sudden fall of Abe's approval rates was not due to the change in the aforementioned conditions, rather because of the collapse of his image including personality owing to Abe's perceived arrogance and his estrangement with the people. In the context of the temporary stabilization of approval rates, Abe dissolved the House of Representatives ahead of schedule and held a general election, taking full advantage of the internal strife between the opposition parties, to achieve his goal of ruling until the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. His victory in the recent election does not accurately demonstrate that Abe is completely immune to negative impact, thus he will to use the Korean Peninsula crisis and other issues to demonstrate his ability of safeguarding Japan's security, seek reconstruction of his image, and further enhance his approval rate to stabilize his administration.
文摘Five Features of China’s Reform on Administrative System China started with the great historic process of Reform and Open-up more than 30 years ago.Since them,reform on China’s administrative system has been under way.To sum up the course of 30 odd years,the features of China’s reform on administrative system are as follows.First,as China’s reform made its first breakthrough in rural areas,
基金support from the Natural Science Foundation of China(72062012)the Natural Science Foundation of Hainan Province(722RC636)+2 种基金Hainan Province Doctoral Students Innovative Scientific Research Project(Qhyb2022-25)Key Research Project on Higher Education and Teaching Reform in Hainan Province(Hnjg2023ZD-2)Key Subject of Education and Teaching Reform in Hainan University(hdyj2303).
文摘Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offering(IPO)preference based on the entropy balancing method,and findings are as follows.First,an IPO ownership preference exists under approval system.That is,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)are more likely than private enterprises to obtain IPO approval.However,RSR significantly changes this preference,especially for non-politically connected private enterprises.Second,the post-IPO market performance of SOEs is inferior to that of private enterprises under approval system,thus excluding the view that approval is prioritized for SOEs because of superior performance.Third,compared with SOEs,private enterprises are more likely to switch the issuance system from approval system to registration system;this change makes it easier for them to obtain IPO approval,indicating that private enterprise owners perceive the registration channel to be fairer.Fourth,the effect of RSR on IPO ownership preference mainly occurs in companies in three major urban agglomerations in China—the Pearl River Delta,the Yangtze River Delta,and the Beijing–Tian jin–Hebei region—and in technology-intensive industries.Collectively,our findings reveal that RSR cultivates a fairer IPO approval process.
