Pressured by a slowdown in exports, cost increases and dwindling returns to manufacturing investments, China's manufacturing capital has begun to shift to the real-estate and stock markets. As a matter of fact, th...Pressured by a slowdown in exports, cost increases and dwindling returns to manufacturing investments, China's manufacturing capital has begun to shift to the real-estate and stock markets. As a matter of fact, the stock market had already felt a shock a couple of years ago when top domestic manufacturers like Midea, Gree, TCL and LMZ started to invest their idle capital in the real-estate and stock markets. Investments of manufacturing capital in both the real estate and stock markets have increased fluid capital and pushed up the value of both markets. Booms in both markets have in turn guaranteed investment returns of manufacturing capital, which further increased the stock market valuations of manufacturing capital. Such a cycle has created interest chains between listed manufacturers, the stock market and the real-estate market. Along with the ups and downs of the stock and real-estate markets, manufacturing capital now faces a dilemma: to escape or to persist? Where should it escape? When can the markets be profitable again? Just like the classic Shakespearean question: to be or not to be, that is the question.展开更多
Recently, the China Securities Regulatory Commission conducted a survey on rural residents’ demand for investment through securities companies. Items covered by the survey are the depth of the farmers’
Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that...Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said ‘‘no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.展开更多
文摘Pressured by a slowdown in exports, cost increases and dwindling returns to manufacturing investments, China's manufacturing capital has begun to shift to the real-estate and stock markets. As a matter of fact, the stock market had already felt a shock a couple of years ago when top domestic manufacturers like Midea, Gree, TCL and LMZ started to invest their idle capital in the real-estate and stock markets. Investments of manufacturing capital in both the real estate and stock markets have increased fluid capital and pushed up the value of both markets. Booms in both markets have in turn guaranteed investment returns of manufacturing capital, which further increased the stock market valuations of manufacturing capital. Such a cycle has created interest chains between listed manufacturers, the stock market and the real-estate market. Along with the ups and downs of the stock and real-estate markets, manufacturing capital now faces a dilemma: to escape or to persist? Where should it escape? When can the markets be profitable again? Just like the classic Shakespearean question: to be or not to be, that is the question.
文摘Recently, the China Securities Regulatory Commission conducted a survey on rural residents’ demand for investment through securities companies. Items covered by the survey are the depth of the farmers’
基金financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Projects 71,372,206 and 71,672,152)the support of the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University(NCET-13–0963)
文摘Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said ‘‘no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.
