Stochastic evolutionary public goods game with first and second order costly punishments in finite populations

We study the stochastic evolutionary public goods game with punishment in a finite size population. Two kinds of costly punishments are considered, i.e., first-order punishment in which only the defectors are punished, and second-order punishment in which both the defectors and the cooperators who do not punish the defective behaviors are punished. We focus on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system. In the population, the evolutionary process of strategies is described as a finite state Markov process. The evolutionary equilibrium of the system and its stochastic stability are analyzed by the limit distribution of the Markov process. By numerical experiments, our findings are as follows.（i） The first-order costly punishment can change the evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium of the public goods game, and it can promote cooperation only when both the intensity of punishment and the return on investment parameters are large enough.（ii）Under the first-order punishment, the further imposition of the second-order punishment cannot change the evolutionary dynamics of the system dramatically, but can only change the probability of the system to select the equilibrium points in the ＂C＋P＂ states, which refer to the co-existence states of cooperation and punishment. The second-order punishment has limited roles in promoting cooperation, except for some critical combinations of parameters.（iii） When the system chooses＂C＋P＂ states with probability one, the increase of the punishment probability under second-order punishment will further increase the proportion of the ＂P＂ strategy in the ＂C＋P＂ states.

生态补偿视角下流域跨界水污染协同治理机制设计及演化博弈分析

针对流域相邻两地区和流域管理机构三方博弈主体,引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制,构建流域跨界水污染三方演化博弈理论模型。通过稳定性分析得出流域跨界水污染协同治理理想状态的稳定条件,并结合新安江流域生态补偿试点案例进行仿真分析。结果表明:(1)引入双向生态补偿-奖惩机制可有效推动新安江流域相邻两地采取达标排放行为,促使系统达到(1, 1, 0)稳定状态;(2)动态奖惩机制组合使用有助于系统演化,从博弈主体初始意愿、实施效能和支持倾向等角度综合考虑,动态奖励-静态惩罚策略监管效果最优,动态奖励-动态惩罚策略次之;(3)流域跨界水污染协同治理的实现策略与相邻两地达标排放的治理成本与收益、双向生态补偿金额度、流域管理机构发放生态补偿奖励金额、积极监管成本和收益等因素密切相关。

前景理论视角下废旧动力电池回收监管演化博弈分析

废旧动力电池具有较强的负外部性,违背了新能源汽车设计的初衷。为促进废旧动力电池有效回收,将前景理论与演化博弈论耦合,综合考虑政府、企业(汽车生产)和公众之间的利益,促使政府和公众对企业进行共同监督,构建三方博弈模型。针对初始意愿、罚款组成、风险态度系数和损失规避系数的不同情况,进行模拟数值仿真,并结合现实中废旧动力电池的认识度、奖惩机制和盈利信心进行分析。研究表明:提高公众或政府的初始监督意愿,可以促进企业回收废旧动力电池;当企业的回收策略为亏损时,提高企业对公众的补偿金额、降低企业的风险态度系数和损失规避系数,可以促进企业积极回收;在废旧动力电池回收过程中,共同监督的效果优于单独监督。

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。

政府不同奖惩措施下消费者参与快递包装回收行为演化研究

面对不断增加的快递包装废弃物和较低的消费者对快递包装回收的参与度,为提高消费者参与快递包装回收积极性,本文分别在政府静态及动态奖惩措施下构建政府监管部门与消费者间的演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方的稳定策略,探究政府的不同政策措施对消费者参与快递包装回收行为的影响机理,并进行仿真分析。研究表明:政府静态奖惩措施下,系统没有均衡稳定点,双方均无稳定策略;动态奖惩措施能够有效促进对消费者参与快递包装回收行为,双方均达到了演化稳定状态;动态奖励静态惩罚措施对消费者回收行为起到了最佳奖励效果;消费者参与快递包装回收行为的概率与政府的惩罚力度成正比,与奖励上限值、政府监管成本和参与回收付出成本成反比。研究结果对政府制定合理的政策措施提供参考。

可持续公共采购中寻租监管的动态演化稳定性控制

可持续公共采购的腐败风险在近年来受到学术界的高度关注,本文旨在借助演化博弈和系统动力学探究可持续公共采购中三方主体(政府监管部门、采购人员和供应商)寻租与监管的动态演化博弈过程,并引入动态奖励-惩罚机制对模型进行改进,以寻求稳定控制的最优演化策略。研究结果表明:(1)政府监管成本、采购人员心理期望、寻租收益空间以及奖惩额度是影响三方演化博弈的关键因素。降低监管成本,提高采购人员心理预期,扩大招标范围有助于降低寻租风险。(2)通过引入奖励-惩罚机制对模型进行稳定性控制,在同时考虑寻租概率和腐败程度的动态机制下,“政府不监管、采购人员不寻租和供应商提供可持续产品”的策略组合是最终得到的演化稳定策略,这一结论与初始模型推导的结果相印证。以该策略为基础,进而对可持续公共采购部门的采购决策、程序和监管机制的优化提出政策建议。

不同奖惩机制下智慧城市信息安全服务质量监管的演化博弈分析

智慧城市建设背景下各类组织的信息安全服务需求逐步提升。为提升政府应对智慧城市信息安全服务质量问题的监管效用,构建了由政府和智慧城市信息安全服务提供方组成的演化博弈模型。我们考虑了用户参与,并探讨了不同奖惩机制下的博弈演化策略。最后,借助Matlab2021b分析了最优机制下关键参数上限值提高对博弈主体策略选择概率的影响。分析结果表明:静态奖惩机制下的系统不存在稳定点,动态奖励与静态惩罚、动态奖励与动态惩罚、静态奖励与动态惩罚的系统存在稳定点,且动态奖励与静态惩罚相较于其他机制为更优机制。通过调控奖励上限值、惩罚上限值和用户反馈概率,从政府和用户两个角度提出了针对性的策略建议。

基于演化博弈的PPP项目绩效奖惩补偿机制研究

目前,大多数公私合营(Pubilc-Private Partnership,PPP)的补偿机制仅仅考虑了如何激励社会资本,但忽略了补偿方案带给政府部门的财政压力。通过考虑政府和社会资本之间的动态博弈,结合奖惩措施,构建一个演化博弈模型,并引入系统动力学进行了模拟。基于模型求解,计算绩效目标和差异函数下奖惩系数的取值,研究显示政府应该增加奖惩系数的值或改变补偿策略,以鼓励私营部门采用高努力策略:当社会资本努力策略下,其产出的社会效益大于政府最低补偿水平减经济效益产出时,政府部门应采用单一奖惩系数策略,否则采用差异奖惩系数策略,从而实现在提高绩效的同时,减轻自身财政压力。研究拓展了PPP补偿的研究视角,提出在激励私营部门积极改进绩效的基础上,采用不同补偿策略来降低补偿金额的思路,有利于缓解政府财政压力。

静态和分级惩罚机制下短视频平台监管策略的演化博弈研究

为了破解短视频市场的监管困局,构建行而有效的短视频平台监管机制,基于演化博弈理论,分别构建了政府静态惩罚机制和分级惩罚机制下短视频平台和用户的演化博弈模型,分析了双方行为决策的动态演化路径和相互作用机理。研究表明:静态惩罚机制下,当政府惩罚力度或平台声誉损失逐渐增加时,短视频平台倾向于选择“严格监管”策略,但随着监管成本与流失用户成本的增加,短视频平台继而转向选择“消极监管”策略。用户的策略选择取决于平台惩罚和政府惩罚,当且仅当平台惩罚与政府惩罚均较大时,用户才会选择“合规”策略。分级惩罚机制下,增大一级惩罚与二级惩罚的力度,也将使平台选择“严格监管”策略。分级惩罚机制下短视频平台严格监管的概率随着用户合规概率的升高而降低,而静态惩罚机制与之相反。更为重要的是,相比于静态惩罚机制,分级惩罚机制下短视频平台总是会选择“严格监管”策略。

奖惩机制下微信虚假健康信息治理的三方演化博弈分析

微信是健康信息传播的重要社交媒体平台,也是虚假健康信息滋生和传播的沃土。在考虑用户、微信平台和政府在虚假健康信息治理中发挥不同作用的同时,引入奖惩机制,通过构建三方演化博弈模型探讨奖惩机制下治理微信虚假健康信息的最优策略和有效机制。在检验系统稳定性的基础上,运用MATLAB R2018b进行仿真实验。研究发现,合理的奖惩强度和奖惩系数、提高用户健康素养以及控制成本是影响各方主体进行有效策略选择的关键因素。据此提出虚假健康信息治理的政策建议,以营造清朗的健康信息传播网络空间。

奖惩视域下区块链政务数据共享演化博弈研究

区块链的政务数据共享可在确保数据安全的前提下打通各部门间数据壁垒,对进一步提升政府治理能力和公共服务水平具有重要意义。为探究奖惩视域下多方利益主体在政务数据共享中的行为倾向,本文首先构建了政府部门、区块链服务商和第三方监管机构的演化博弈模型,其次通过模型稳定性分析探究了三方演化博弈的均衡条件,接着借助MATLAB对演化博弈结果进行仿真分析与验证,最后为推动区块链政务数据共享提出有针对性的建议。研究发现,政府部门、区块链服务商和第三方监管机构是区块链政务数据共享中不可或缺的重要参与者。其中,第三方监管机构对于促进区块链政务数据共享具有重要意义。合理的奖惩机制是区块链政务数据共享中的关键一环,适当的惩罚能够促使区块链服务商提供更安全的服务;适当的奖励可以激励监管机构严格监管区块链服务商的运营环境。本文为进一步推动区块链政务数据共享提供了具体可操作的建议。

基于斯塔克尔伯格博弈的绿色供应链诚信策略演化博弈及仿真分析

加快企业绿色转型对我国实现双碳目标具有重要意义。为解决绿色供应链发展过程中出现的非法排放、虚假宣传、监管不力等问题,运用Stackelberg博弈、演化博弈和系统动力学模型,探寻绿色供应链参与主体的决策演化和系统稳定策略,以及各要素对绿色供应链系统演化的影响。研究表明:价格敏感系数与绿色营销敏感系数对主体决策演化的影响取决于两者之间的比例;制造商的诚实决策选择与其偷排程度有关,偷排程度较低的制造商倾向于诚实行为;高监督成本和高物质奖励都会导致政府监督的积极性降低;采用动态惩罚措施能够有效抑制系统的波动状态,并让制造商诚实概率和政府监督概率维持在合理水平。

Study of the impacts of upstream natural gas market reform in China on infrastructure deployment and social welfare using an SVM-based rolling horizon stochastic game analysis

Natural gas is expected to play a much more important role in China in future decades, and market reform is crucial for its rapid market penetration. At present, the main gas fields, pipelines and liquefied natural gas(LNG) infrastructure are mainly monopolized by large state-owned companies, and one of the important market reform policies is to open up LNG import rights to smaller private companies and traders. Therefore, in the present study, a game theoretical model is proposed to analyze and compare the impacts of different market structures on infrastructure deployment and social welfare. Moreover, a support vector machine-based rolling horizon stochastic method is adopted in the model to simulate real LNG price fluctuations. Four market reform scenarios are proposed considering different policies such as business separation, third-party access(TPA) and their combinations. The results indicate that, with third-party access(TPA)entrance into the LNG market, the construction of LNG infrastructure will be promoted and more gas will be provided at lower prices, and thus the total social welfare will be improved greatly.

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies:cooperators,defectors,punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered.By adopting approximate best response dynamics,we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in[Nature(London) 425(2003) 390],but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation.Compared with previous results of infinite populations,which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain cooperation.In addition,we characterize that loner’s payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner’s payoff.It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner’s payoff will influence the cooperation.Finally,we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Insensitivity to Unethical Behavior in Dictator Game When Indirectly Intermediated-Implications of Indirect Blindness for Safety Management

The aim of this study was to demonstrate that indirect mediation in behaviors leads to insensitivity to unethical behavior through a dictator game and to give some implications for safety management. The indirect involvement in the unethical behavior such as the violation of regulation is believed to lessen the responsibility and the criticism from others for the unethical behavior as compared to the direct involvement in it. The instruction condition for the evaluator of behavior in a dictator game was taken up as an experimental variable. Instruction condition 1 was to pay attention to the behavior of only a dictator. In instruction condition 2, the participant (evaluator) was required to review all players’ behavior and evaluate a dictator. It has been investigated whether allowing indirect actions (mediations) leads to reduced punishment as a function of the instruction condition. While the punishment to the indirectness did not get smaller for instruction condition 2, the punishment to the indirectness tended to get smaller only for instruction condition 1.

Behaviours of Multi-Stakeholders under China’s Renewable Portfolio Standards:A Game Theory-Based Analysis

China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.

奖惩组合政策下企业策略性环境治理演化博弈

为了制定合理的奖惩政策抑制企业策略性环境治理行为,基于动机—行为—绩效分析框架,构建地方政府与企业的演化博弈模型,探讨政府奖惩组合政策对企业策略性环境治理行为演化的影响,分析不同奖惩组合政策下系统实现演化稳定状态的条件,以及最优奖惩组合政策下各参数变化对企业实施前瞻性环境治理概率的影响.研究表明:当政府实施静态惩罚和静态补贴组合政策时,系统无法渐进稳定于中心点;当实施动态惩罚和静态补贴、静态惩罚和动态补贴、动态惩罚和动态补贴3种组合政策时,系统存在演化稳定策略.当企业因前瞻性环境治理获得的声誉收益小于某阈值时,动态惩罚和静态补贴为最优奖惩政策;当声誉收益大于该阈值时,动态惩罚和动态补贴为最优奖惩政策.地方政府对企业前瞻性环境治理行为的补贴金额过高,补贴激励效应会扭曲,补贴效应出现反转.

认罪认罚量刑建议精准化的检视与改良

认罪认罚从宽制度是建立在协商性司法理论基础之上的。量刑建议的提出需要协商,因而控辩审各方会产生博弈关系。运用行为经济学的“展望理论”对认罪认罚案件量刑建议的提出和采纳进行博弈分析,发现法检博弈使得认罪认罚案件的程序和结果受到超出案件本身事实认定和法律适用的控制,与认罪认罚从宽制度所追求的价值有所偏离。为了最大限度地避免法检博弈给办案质量带来的负面影响,应当弱化量刑建议的司法效力,检视检察机关不合理的业绩考评激励方式,构建法官参与量刑协商的常态化机制,使得法院对认罪认罚案件量刑的关注点回归到案件本身的事实认定与法律适用上。

动态溢出奖惩机制下有限空间作业人员不安全行为博弈研究

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