用Copula函数刻画公司股价与核心一级资本比率(core tier 1 ratio,CTR)的相关性,然后通过模拟股价和CTR,建立了或有可转换债券(Co Co)以及带期权条款的或有可转换债券(Co Co Co)的定价模型.并将模型应用于塞浦路斯银行发行的CECS(conver...用Copula函数刻画公司股价与核心一级资本比率(core tier 1 ratio,CTR)的相关性,然后通过模拟股价和CTR,建立了或有可转换债券(Co Co)以及带期权条款的或有可转换债券(Co Co Co)的定价模型.并将模型应用于塞浦路斯银行发行的CECS(convertible enhanced capital securities)债券,发现用Copula刻画股价与CTR相关性的定价结果与债券实际价格的差异优于假设两者独立时的结果.最后结合国际上已发行的Co Co和Co Co Co债券的相关条款以及我国银监会对于减记债的基本要求,以交通银行为例设计了中国版的Co Co债券和Co Co Co债券,并依据所给模型对它们进行了数值计算.展开更多
We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to con...We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to conduct seasoned equity offerings than non-state firms. Further, non-state firms exhibit greater sensitivities of subsequent investment and stock performance to regulatory decisions on stock issuances than state firms. Our work suggests that state control of capital access distorts resource allocation and impedes the growth of non-state firms. We also provide robust evidence that financial constraints cause underinvestment.展开更多
文摘用Copula函数刻画公司股价与核心一级资本比率(core tier 1 ratio,CTR)的相关性,然后通过模拟股价和CTR,建立了或有可转换债券(Co Co)以及带期权条款的或有可转换债券(Co Co Co)的定价模型.并将模型应用于塞浦路斯银行发行的CECS(convertible enhanced capital securities)债券,发现用Copula刻画股价与CTR相关性的定价结果与债券实际价格的差异优于假设两者独立时的结果.最后结合国际上已发行的Co Co和Co Co Co债券的相关条款以及我国银监会对于减记债的基本要求,以交通银行为例设计了中国版的Co Co债券和Co Co Co债券,并依据所给模型对它们进行了数值计算.
基金the City University of Hong Kong (Grant No. 7200080)
文摘We study the effect of state control on capital allocation and investment in China, where the government screens prospective stock issuers. We find that state firms are more likely to obtain government approval to conduct seasoned equity offerings than non-state firms. Further, non-state firms exhibit greater sensitivities of subsequent investment and stock performance to regulatory decisions on stock issuances than state firms. Our work suggests that state control of capital access distorts resource allocation and impedes the growth of non-state firms. We also provide robust evidence that financial constraints cause underinvestment.
