Nowadays,more and more transactions or interactions like online dating and shopping are completed on two-sided platforms involving two groups of agents.On these two-sided platforms,there often exist cross-network effe...Nowadays,more and more transactions or interactions like online dating and shopping are completed on two-sided platforms involving two groups of agents.On these two-sided platforms,there often exist cross-network effects,i.e., the benefits that agents at one side receive are positively related to the number of agents at the other side,and vice versa.This paper considers such two-sided platforms,where the platforms offer a certain service to attract agents of both sides to join the platforms,and then charge agents who join the platforms a lump-sum fee to gain the profit.We present service and pricing strategies for both monopolistic and duopolistic platforms,respectively.We also investigate the impact of platforms'life cycle on their service and pricing strategies.Some managerial implications are shown.展开更多
In this paper,we investigate two competing pay-tv platforms or free-to-air media platforms that consist of two groups of agents:viewers and advertisers.The pay-tv platforms can receive revenues from charging viewers p...In this paper,we investigate two competing pay-tv platforms or free-to-air media platforms that consist of two groups of agents:viewers and advertisers.The pay-tv platforms can receive revenues from charging viewers pay-per-view prices and advertising,while the free-to-air platforms can only obtain all incomes from advertising.We discuss and compare advertising intensities and program content provisions of the two competing media platforms.Our findings show that if the extent to which viewers dislike advertising(the nuisance for advertising)is more massive than the marginal benefit that advertisers receive from an additional viewer,the pay-tv stations tend to maximally differentiate their program content and charge the viewers higher pay-per-view prices.If the nuisance approaches to the marginal benefit,however,both stations should offer similar program content,and charge the viewers lower prices under certain conditions.Particularly,if both platforms provide duplicated content,they should subsidize the viewers.In contrast,we show that the free-to-air media platforms never duplicate program content with a positive nuisance for advertising,and tend to offer maximal differentiated content if the nuisance is sufficiently large.Moreover,we reveal that if the viewers greatly dislike advertising(care less about advertising),the advertising volume of the pay-tv platforms is lower(higher)than that of the free-to-air platforms.Finally,we extend our base model to the case in which a pay-tv platform competes against a free-to-air station,and numerically show that the profit of the pay-tv platform may be larger or smaller than that of the free-to-air station.展开更多
This paper examines the impact of piracy on access pricing strategy of an operating system platform.We study the behavior of users and developers due to an increase in software protection when positive network externa...This paper examines the impact of piracy on access pricing strategy of an operating system platform.We study the behavior of users and developers due to an increase in software protection when positive network externalities matter.We show that when piracy cost increases,access demands to the platform vary in the same direction and the magnitude of this variation depends on both the marginal network benefit that a developer derives and a certain threshold of piracy cost.Taking into account the behavior of these two sides when piracy matters,the monopoly platform changes its pricing strategy.We show that,it tends to reduce or to increase access fees.Finally,we show that under certain conditions,the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy can be reversed.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under grant NOs.G71520107001,G7187010221 and G11771149.
文摘Nowadays,more and more transactions or interactions like online dating and shopping are completed on two-sided platforms involving two groups of agents.On these two-sided platforms,there often exist cross-network effects,i.e., the benefits that agents at one side receive are positively related to the number of agents at the other side,and vice versa.This paper considers such two-sided platforms,where the platforms offer a certain service to attract agents of both sides to join the platforms,and then charge agents who join the platforms a lump-sum fee to gain the profit.We present service and pricing strategies for both monopolistic and duopolistic platforms,respectively.We also investigate the impact of platforms'life cycle on their service and pricing strategies.Some managerial implications are shown.
基金The authors thank the editor(s)and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions,which are very helpful to improve the quality of the paper.Rui Houis the corresponding author.This paper has been supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.G71571052 and G71520107001and Guangdong Natural Science Foundation under Grant No.2016A030313691and Guangdong Planning Project of Philosophy and Social Science under Grant No.GD19YGL05.
文摘In this paper,we investigate two competing pay-tv platforms or free-to-air media platforms that consist of two groups of agents:viewers and advertisers.The pay-tv platforms can receive revenues from charging viewers pay-per-view prices and advertising,while the free-to-air platforms can only obtain all incomes from advertising.We discuss and compare advertising intensities and program content provisions of the two competing media platforms.Our findings show that if the extent to which viewers dislike advertising(the nuisance for advertising)is more massive than the marginal benefit that advertisers receive from an additional viewer,the pay-tv stations tend to maximally differentiate their program content and charge the viewers higher pay-per-view prices.If the nuisance approaches to the marginal benefit,however,both stations should offer similar program content,and charge the viewers lower prices under certain conditions.Particularly,if both platforms provide duplicated content,they should subsidize the viewers.In contrast,we show that the free-to-air media platforms never duplicate program content with a positive nuisance for advertising,and tend to offer maximal differentiated content if the nuisance is sufficiently large.Moreover,we reveal that if the viewers greatly dislike advertising(care less about advertising),the advertising volume of the pay-tv platforms is lower(higher)than that of the free-to-air platforms.Finally,we extend our base model to the case in which a pay-tv platform competes against a free-to-air station,and numerically show that the profit of the pay-tv platform may be larger or smaller than that of the free-to-air station.
文摘This paper examines the impact of piracy on access pricing strategy of an operating system platform.We study the behavior of users and developers due to an increase in software protection when positive network externalities matter.We show that when piracy cost increases,access demands to the platform vary in the same direction and the magnitude of this variation depends on both the marginal network benefit that a developer derives and a certain threshold of piracy cost.Taking into account the behavior of these two sides when piracy matters,the monopoly platform changes its pricing strategy.We show that,it tends to reduce or to increase access fees.Finally,we show that under certain conditions,the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy can be reversed.
