The Creation of a Tourism Village Governance Model: Study in Sleman Regency, Special Region of Yogyakarta

This study discusses the creation of a tourism village governance model by conducting a study in Sleman Regency,Special Region of Yogyakarta.The main problem of the study is:How governance models are in accordance with the cultural,community,and geographical characteristics of rural tourism village in Sleman Regency?The purpose of this research:to create a model of tourism governance in a fair,transparent,and accountable manner while continuing to pay attention to sustainability in a professional manner and to be able to preserve local culture by adapting to the development of contemporary tourism.The research method is using a qualitative approach.The result of the study explains that the tourism village in Sleman Regency is divided into two schemes,namely bottom up from the community and top down from the initiation of the government(cq.Department of Tourism).A healthy tourism village governance model involves stakeholders and shareholders equally.Then,it is necessary to determine the Board of Director(BOD)and agents from the shareholders and stakeholders.Then Board Police Manual(BPM)is made,so that there is no hidden information and hidden action between BOD and agent.In conclusion:(1)The tourism village governance model created is expected to be able to bring justice to the shareholders and stakeholders fairly,because it is carried out based on BPM and GCG guidelines so that it still pays attention to sustainability in a professional manner.(2)The creation of the tourism village governance model is able to preserve local culture by adapting the current tourism development,as in the governance structure illustrated in Figure 1.

Researching the Impact of the Quality of Village Governance on Farmers’Well-Being:From the Perspectives of Income and Occupational Differentiation

The goal of village governance is to improve the well-being of farmers,so this study aims to measure the impact the quality of village governance on the well-being of farmers.It also examines the heterogeneity of this impact across different farmer groups from the perspectives of income levels and occupational differentiation.To this end,this study developed an indicator system based on survey data collected from 1,442 farmers in the Sichuan,Shaanxi,and Gansu provinces,as well as the Ningxia Hui autonomous region.Multiple linear regression models were then used to analyze this data,and the findings revealed that improvements in the quality of village governance significantly increased the well-being of farmers.Specifically,primary-level empowerment and capacity building were shown to contribute the most to the enhancement of the farmers’well-being,followed by social inclusion,and social cohesion was found to have only a minimal effect.In terms of income levels,improving the quality of village governance benefited middle-income farmers the most,followed by low-income farmers,and it had the least effect on high-income farmers.In terms of occupations,full-time farmers gained the most from improvements in the quality of village governance,followed by off-farm farmers,with part-time farmers benefiting the least.Based on these findings,this study suggests that policymakers should improve the quality of village governance to enhance the well-being of farmers,focusing on the impact that level of income and occupational differentiation have on village governance.

Village Elections,Accountability and Income Distribution in Rural China

China has experimented with village elections for nearly 20 years. Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of 8 Chinese provinces for the period 1986-2002, this paper studies how the introduction of elections affects village governance and income distribution in Chinese villages. The econometric analysis finds the following outcomes. First, village elections have increased the share of public expenditure and reduced the share of administrative expenditure in the village budget, so the accountability of the elected village committee has been enhanced. Second, elections have not led to more income redistribution; instead, they have reduced the progressiveness of income redistribution. Third, elections have reduced income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient in villages. The reduction is equivalent to 5.7 percent of the sample average, or 32 percent of the growth of the Gini coefficient in the period of 1987-2002. Because village elections have not led to more income redistribution, this positive effect must have come from more public investment, which benefits the poor more than wealthier people. The general conclusion that we draw from our results is that, despite institutional constraints, village elections have improved village governance and the life of villagers.