Voluntary Disclosure and the Type of Product Market Competition： Capacity vs. Price

This paper investigates empirically the effect of different types of product market competition on levels of voluntary disclosure of proprietary information in financial markets. The author proposes that there are two types of strategic interaction settings relevant to disclosure： capacity competition and price competition. Capacity competition drives firms to disclose more information to attain financial market valuation-related benefits, while price competition drives them to disclose less to protect long-term product market advantages. The author finds that the type of product market competition affects the level of voluntary disclosure over and above the finn＇s external financing needs documented in the previous literature. That is, firms engaged in capacity competition disclose relatively more information than those in price competition. Further analysis shows that capacity competition firms disclose more information than no-strategic-interaction benchmark firms but that price competition firms do not disclose less information than the benchmark firms.

The extent of voluntary disclosure in an emerging capital market： The case of Jordan

This study evaluates the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of non-financial companies listed at the Amman Stock Exchange （ASE） for the year 2006. The study adopts the disclosure index suggested by Haddad, AI-Shattarat ＆ Nobanee （2009） and evaluates the voluntary disclosure for the Jordanian companies for the year 2006 at three levels： the first provides a description and analysis of the overall voluntary disclosure; the second covers the extent to which each individual item of information is disclosed; the third covers the type of information （e.g., financial information, historical information, management discussion）. The results of the study reveal that there was a considerable variation in the disclosure of the index items and also among the listed companies. On average, a company disclosed about 28.95% of the items applicable to it, and only six out of the 53 companies received disclosure scores greater than 50%. It was also found that 50 items out of 62 items included in the index had a disclosure below 50%, and 10 items had disclosure of less than 10%. With respect to the evaluation of different types of information, the analyses indicated that the category of the background information, the category of financial ratios and the category of management discussions were better disclosed in corporate annual reports than the other types of information.

Voluntary disclosure behavior and strategy in Chinese listed companies

Due to the information asymmetry on the securities market, Chinese listed companies have incentives to disclose voluntarily. Mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure are both included in an effective information disclosure system. Mandatory disclosure is the basic demand of the market, and voluntary disclosure is the extended demand of the market, because of its informative complement to the timing, content and depth of disclosure. With the weakening of seller＇s market characteristic in China, the voluntary disclosure behavior in the listed companies has been greatly encouraged. This paper provides a statistical description of the status quo of the voluntary disclosure behavior in Chinese listed companies, and claims that the voluntary disclosure strategy guided by the investor relations management should be included in the corporate strategies.

The effect of earnings forecast precision on firm value and insider trading under voluntary disclosure in Taiwan

Taiwan changed its earnings forecast policy from mandatory to voluntary disclosure in 2005. In this study, the inferences of voluntary earnings forecast are examined based on forecasts issued by listed firms. This study suspects that insiders have a temptation to strategically manipulate financial forecast information to influence markets and thus receive extra rents. Under the new earnings forecast disclosure policy, the number of disclosing firm decreases but the precision of earnings forecast increases. The empirical result from dynamic panel data evidences the forecast error of voluntary disclosure may negatively impact firm values. Furthermore, there is a positive relationship between insiders＇ trading profit and manipulation of earnings forecasts. As volatility in insider manipulation increases, it is difficult for the investors to predict the real intention of insiders, and insiders may achieve greater benefits from trading. This study also observes that many listed companies hold investor conferences to provide earnings guidance in Taiwan. The reason may be that investor conference is more flexible and has less forecast error cost than the formal financial forecast. This study provides important insights into earnings forecast policy in emerging markets. The competent authority should improve corporate governance and develop monitoring functions to abate forecast manipulation.

The Influence of Market and Company Characteristics on Voluntary Disclosure

In this paper, the determinants of the voluntary disclosure level of firms have been investigated during a period of deep financial crisis. Two disclosure indexes used as dependent variables are proposed： a global index based on both quantitative and qualitative disclosure and a solely quantitative voluntary index. Firstly, the explanatory variables have been selected taking into account the main contributions of international literature. In addition, some specific variables have been introduced in order to take into account the peculiarities of Italian market system and the ongoing financial crisis. A positive relationship has been found among the global voluntary disclosure （GVD） and the number of employees, the dividend policy, and the presence of independent directors on the board. On the contrary, a negative correlation with respect to the percentage of the firm＇s outstanding shares held by directors （not independent） exists. With reference to the quantitative voluntary disclosure （QVD） index, there is a positive correlation with the number of employees, the dividend policy, the market floating, and the incidence of intangible assets. Moreover, such （quantitative） a disclosure is different depending on the industrial membership sector.

Factors Influencing the Voluntary Disclosure of Vietnamese Listed Companies

This paper aims to investigate the factors affecting the extent of voluntary disclosure by examining the annual reports of 205 industrial and manufacturing companies listing on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange （HSX） and Hanoi Stock Exchange （HNX） for the year of 2012. Those factors include company size, profitability, leverage, state ownership, managerial ownership, and foreign ownership, board independence, role duality, and type of external auditors. Evidence from this study suggests two main findings： （1） Companies with high foreign ownership have a high level of voluntary disclosure; （2） The company size is an important factor related to the increased level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Vietnamese listed companies. However, no significant associations are found between profitability, leverage, state ownership, managerial ownership, board independence, role duality, and type of external auditors as hypothesized in this study.

The Impact of Financial Distress Status and Corporate Governance Structures on the Level of Voluntary Disclosure Within Annual Reports of Firms （Case Study of Non-financial Firms in Indonesia Over the Period of 2009-2011）

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of financial distress status and corporate governance structures on the level of voluntary disclosure. We apply six independent variables, including the firm＇s financial distress status and five components of corporate governance structures, such as board independence, audit committee independence, institutional ownership, board meeting frequency, and audit committee meeting frequency. This research is carried out by examining the annual reports of 114 non-financial firms listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange over the period of 2009-2011. To test hypotheses, we undergo two different analyses, including independent samples t-test and Multiple Linear Regression. We find that： （1） The audit committee independence and the audit committee meeting frequency have significant positive impacts on the level of voluntary disclosure; （2） The financial distress status is negatively related to the level of disclosure at various levels of significance; and （3） All the independent variables are simultaneously related to voluntary disclosure.

Information Voluntary Disclosure Made by China＇s Listed Companies： the Status Quo and Its Countermeasure

Voluntary disclosure is one of the major sign of the mature security market. Chinese securities market is in her young age. The quality and way of information disclosure in listed companies is one of major concern for the market. With the development and expansion of the market, the voluntary disclosure has been drawn a great attention by investors. However, in China, the information disclosure is mainly mandatory and only very a few companies are willing to disclose voluntarily. In general, the information voluntary disclosure in China is lacking. This paper discusses the current status, possibility, and problems for the voluntary disclosure based on data from the annual reports prepared by listed companies. Recommendation for the future improvement and fulfillment of the voluntary disclosure are out forward accordingly.

Board independence, internal information environment and voluntary disclosure of auditors' reports on internal controls

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers,independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor managers,and only under these conditions can increasing their proportion on the board effectively reduce agency problems, such as driving managers to disclose information to investors. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms that voluntarily disclose their auditors' reports on internal controls from 2007 to 2009, this study explores how the information acquisition costs of independent directors affect their monitoring effectiveness by investigating the disclosure decisions of their internal control audits. We find that when the information asymmetry between insiders and outside directors is low and the proportion of independent directors on a board is high, a firm is more likely to voluntarily disclose its internal control audit report.

Determinants and features of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market

This paper offers in-depth analysis of the determinants and features of voluntary disclosure based on information in the annual reports of 1066 Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. This extensive sample represents about 80% of all public companies in China. Our findings suggest that voluntary disclosure in China is positively related to firm size,leverage, assets-in-place, and return on equity and is negatively related to auditor type and the level of maturity or sophistication of the intermediary and legal environments. We also find some evidence to suggest a quadratic convex association between state ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, our analysis provides no evidence that extensive disclosure benefits public companies in China in the form of a lower cost of equity.

Investigating Voluntary Risk Disclosure： The Case of Jordanian Banks

The aim of the study is to investigate whether banks in Jordan are compliant with the International Financial Reporting Standards （IFRS） 7 requirement for mandatory disclosure and to find out the extent to which the banks provide voluntary risk disclosures. To achieve the objectives of the study, we collected data from all 15 banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange for the year ending December 2013. The findings of the study suggest that there is strong compliance with respect to mandatory risk disclosure, as required by IFRS. However, the results generally signal a need for further improvement in the voluntary risk disclosure area, since most of the banks do not provide adequate information that can be of use to stakeholders. We also suggest future avenues of research into the topic to determine progress.

Voluntary disclosure of internal control and auditor＇s attestation： evidence from China

We examine what determines a firm＇s decision to disclose a self-assessment report on its internal control （IC） system and to further attain an auditor＇s attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2006-2010. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that the likelihood of having voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment with an auditor＇s attestation is positively related to future equity refinancing, mutuM-fund shareholding, and whether the firm is controlled by the government, especially the central government. Our study also takes the identification problem into consideration, as our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies. Our study not only makes an incremental contribution to the literature, but also has practical implications, especially for regulators and investors in China.

Assessing Disclosure Quality： A Methodological Issue

The voluntary disclosure studies conducted until today, in social accounting and related fields, use different approaches to evaluate the so-called ＂disclosure quality＂. Disclosure quality is not so easy to measure, and it is derived from the application of different methodologies. In particular, the methodologies to assess the level of disclosure could be classified as subjective or objective. To the first category belong all the ＂tools＂ that are used directly without relying on the analysis of the original source of the information studies （Imhoff, 1992; Coleman ＆ Eccles, 1997; Welker, 1995）. The objective measurements used to assess the disclosure quality are, instead, based on the direct study of the original information source in order to obtain the information required （Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1985; Botosan, 1997; Lang ＆ Lundholm, 2000）. The aim of the paper is to give scholars and researchers a brief framework to understand the different methodologies used in accounting literature to assess the disclosure quality, providing examples of the application of the same in different research contexts.

The web-based financial reporting adopted by the listed companies in the Athens Stock Exchange

Web-based corporate reporting is the provision of financial information through the Internet. Other companies prefer to disclose their financial information in order to satisfy their investors and to attract new ones while others prefer to provide as less information as possible. The purpose of this paper is twofold： first it provides a critical examination of the main reporting criteria followed by the Greek listed companies, in order to point out how many of these companies present these criteria. Second, it considers how the industry sector of the listed companies or their capitalization category is related with their disclosure degree of financial reporting.

A countermeasure designed to restrain self-serving behavior and strategic rating disclosure of credit rating agencies

This study examines an incentive of the credit rating agency(CRA)to exert effort to observe projects’signals and strategically disclose ratings when the upfront fee and performance-based fee scheme are imposed.Under the upfront fee scheme,the CRA obtains an upfront fee in exchange for its services but gains a performance-based fee only if its ratings accurately foresee the rated project’s outcome.In the setting,an issuer solicits a rating from the CRA,whose conduct of inflating and deflating ratings is considered.In addition,the CRA can endogenously exert effort to observe a project’s signal,which specifies the signal accuracy and how much operating costs the CRA incurs.After receiving the observed signal,the CRA can strategically decide to announce a rating corresponding to or contradicting the observed signal.The findings reveal that the performance-based fee scheme incentivizes the CRA to exert greater effort and truthfully disclose a more accurate rating.

Intangibles and management earnings forecasts

We investigate how the accounting treatment of intangible assets on managers’likelihood of issuing voluntary earnings guidance(MEF).We find that unrecognized intangibles(immediately expensed)are negatively associated with MEF issuance,while recognized intangibles(capitalized)show a positive association.These findings hold across various factors such as analysts’coverage,industry type and for a subsample that excludes software firms permitted to capitalize software development costs under SFAS No.86.In additional,we investigate the cross-sectional determinants of MEF issuance based on the characteristics of firm intangibility.We find a significant increase in the likelihood of MEF issuance for higher unrecognized intangibles with greater earnings uncertainty.This suggests that managers may prioritize delivering valuerelevant information to market participants to alleviate uncertainty.

Product market competition and the disclosure of supply chain information

We investigate how product market competition affects corporate voluntary disclosure decisions,specifically regarding supply-chain information.Our results,based on a sample of manufacturing companies listed in China from 2010 to 2016,show that companies in more competitive industries disclose less customer/supplier information.The main results stand through several robustness tests.Further analyses show that the negative relationship between product market competitiveness and supply-chain information disclosure is stronger when the disclosure contains more incremental information and when competitors are more capable of gaining competitive advantage using the disclosed information.Our study contributes to the understanding of both the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure decisions and the regulation of information disclosure to build a transparent capital market.

The spillover effect of disclosure rules and materiality thresholds:Evidence from profit warnings issued in Hong Kong market

Dual-listed firms simultaneously follow the relevant rules in their home country and in their cross-listed country.In contrast,other firms only listed in the cross-listed country are only subject to the local regulations.Previous literature has found evidence that cross-listing can improve firms' information transparency because of more stringent listing rules in the cross-listed country.The existing research,however,has not paid enough attention to the potential influence of dual-listed firms and their home country institutional factors(e.g.unique disclosure policies) on other firms only listed in the cross-listed country(i.e.spillover effect).In the Hong Kong market,Chinese dual-listed firms are under the mandatory profit warning regulation of China's Mainland,but other firms listed only in Hong Kong only need to follow the voluntary disclosure rule of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.Such a setting provides us with the opportunity to investigate a spillover effect,i.e.whether these Chinese dual-listed firms influence their peers only listed in Hong Kong to release profit warnings.We find that firms only listed in Hong Kong are more likely to issue profit warnings if their Chinese dual-listed peers have also issued warnings.We further find that this spillover effect increases with the market capitalization of Chinese duallisted firms and increases with the market share of these firms before they dominate the industry.Lastly,due to an underlying duty to disclose material information in Hong Kong,the spillover effect is weaker for firms with large earnings surprises.

A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007.