Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning： Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

This paper discusses a neglected theme in Wittgenstein＇s writings on meaning and psychology from the early 1930s until 1949. Throughout this period Wittgenstein deals with aspects of meaning of words and pictures that cannot be accounted for in dispositional terms but have to be related to experience and perception. Wittgenstein＇s reading of William James, I argue, has sharpened his eye for the many pitfalls in coming to terms with this experiential notion of meaning. James＇s treatment of experiences of meaning succumbs to the temptation to postulate ~~meaning-bodies,＂ bearers of meaning apart from the way and context in which we use the particular words. I argue that the conflation of what Wittgenstein calls the transitive and intransitive use of words is at the root of postulating meaning-bodies. I also argue that contemporary treatments of experiences of meaning are similarly vulnerable to James＇s confusion.

Natural Realism or Transactionalism： On the Relationships between Putnam and Two Pragmatists, James and Dewey

The relationships between Hilary Putnam and the pragmatists （especially William James and John Dewey） are obvious but subtle. To shed some light on this issue, the author will explore a key issue that not only stands as Putnam＇s main inheritance from the pragmatists, but that also illuminates the relationships between them more clearly than any other issues. This key issue is the understanding of perception and the philosophical position that arises from this understanding. The author argues that in adopting Dewey＇s transactionalism （or interactionalism）, Putnam advances from James＇ insight to Dewey＇s, a shift that is particularly manifest in Putnam＇s attempt to add another layer of meaning to what he refers to as the second naivete that he detects and appreciates in James＇ natural realism.

＂Bodyheartminding＂ （Xin ,心）： Reconceiving the Inner Self and the Outer World in the Language of Holographic Focus and Field

In this essay, inspired by the somatic turn in philosophy initiated by Richard Shusterman, I want to invoke the language of classical Confucian philosophy to think through the best efforts of William James and John Dewey to escape the mind-body and nature-nurture dualisms--that is, to offer an alternative vocabulary that might lend further clarity to the revolutionary insights of James and Dewey by appealing to the processual categories of Chinese cosmology. What I will try to do first is to refocus the pragmatist＇s explanation of the relationship between mind and body through the lens of a process Confucian cosmology. And then, to make the case for James and Dewey, I will return to the radical, imagistic language they invoke to try and make the argument that this processual, holistic understanding of ＂vital bodyminding＂ is in fact what they were trying to say all along.

A Process Interpretation of Daoist Thought

Despite the fact that the Dao De Jing 道德经 is one of the most frequently translated texts in history, most of these translations share certain unexamined and problematic assumptions which often make it seem as though the text is irrational, incoherent, and full of non sequiturs. Frequently, these assumptions involve the imposition of historically anachronous, linguistically unsound, and philosophically problematic categories and attitudes onto the text. One of the main causes of the problem is the persistent tendency on the part of most translators to read the first line of the text as referring to or implying the existence of some kind of ＂eternal Dao.＂ These are what I term ＂ontological＂ readings, as opposed to the ＂process＂ reading I will be articulating here.

Conjunctions and/or Disjunctions： Radical Empiricism in the History of Philosophy

William James challenged the traditions of British Empiricism （Hume） on one hand and German Idealism （Kant and Hegel） on the other. James＇ ＂Radical Empiricism＂ is a via media （＂middle road＂） between these divergent positions. His central points of contention are the ontological status of relationships and the correct analysis of experience. British Empiricism leaves us with a world of separate, particular facts, based on atomic sense impressions. Idealists, on the other hand, claim that all worldly phenomena are conjoined by one rational principle. According to James＇ account, neither side recognizes that both conjunctive and disjunctive relations are integral to experience. Furthermore, James＇ critique proved to influence A. N. Whitehead＇s philosophy of experience and orientation toward Hume and Kant. This essay situates James＇ philosophy in this polemical and historical context.

Cognitive Dissonance and ＂The Will to Believe＂

That we shape our beliefs to align with our actions should be of interest within philosophy of religion and philosophy generally. Cognitive dissonance, a psychological state in which an individual＇s beliefs and actions do not conform with each other, presents just such a situation. The idea that cognitive dissonance, by strict evidentialist standards, compromises our epistemic integrity since cognitive dissonance causes us to hold beliefs for which we do not have evidence, recalls the exchange between William Clifford and William James in which they discuss evidentialism, the idea that we should hold no beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In this paper I draw upon extant published research concerning cognitive dissonance theory and religion. I also survey the Clifford-James debate, applying considerations from their exchange to cognitive dissonance and （religious） belief. I conclude by showing how cognitive dissonance can have ambiguous results as concerns the justification of beliefs and that philosophy could benefit from attending to factors impacting empirical aspects of belief formation such as cognitive dissonance.