Reverse auctions have been widely adopted for purchasing goods and services. This paper considers a novel winner determination problem in a multiple-object reverse auction in which the buyer involves loss-averse behav...Reverse auctions have been widely adopted for purchasing goods and services. This paper considers a novel winner determination problem in a multiple-object reverse auction in which the buyer involves loss-averse behavior due to uncertain attributes. A corresponding winner determination model based on cumulative prospect theory is proposed. Due to the NP-hard characteristic, a loaded route strategy is proposed to ensure the feasibility of the model. Then, an improved ant colony algorithm that consists of a dynamic transition strategy and a Max-Min pheromone strategy is designed. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm. We find that under the loaded route strategy, the improved ant colony algorithm performs better than the basic ant colony algorithm. In addition, the proposed model can effectively characterize the buyer's loss-averse behavior.展开更多
A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procur...A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.展开更多
With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that t...With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that the service quality is highly related to the privacy level of the data.In this paper,we investigate the problem of privacy-aware service subscription in people-centric sensing.An efficient resource allocation framework using a combinatorial auction(CA)model is provided.Specifically,the resource allocation problem that maximizes the social welfare in view of varying requirements of multiple users is formulated,and it is solved by a proposed computationally tractable solution algorithm.Furthermore,the prices of allocated resources that winners need to pay are figured out by a designed scheme.Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.展开更多
To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method ...To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.展开更多
基金sponsored by the Distinguished Young Scholars Award of NSFC Grant #71325002the Major International Joint Research Project of NSFC Grant #71620107003+2 种基金the Foundation for Innovative Research Groups of NSFC Grant #61621004111 Project Grant #B16009the Fundamental Research Funds for State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process Industries Grant #2013ZCX11
文摘Reverse auctions have been widely adopted for purchasing goods and services. This paper considers a novel winner determination problem in a multiple-object reverse auction in which the buyer involves loss-averse behavior due to uncertain attributes. A corresponding winner determination model based on cumulative prospect theory is proposed. Due to the NP-hard characteristic, a loaded route strategy is proposed to ensure the feasibility of the model. Then, an improved ant colony algorithm that consists of a dynamic transition strategy and a Max-Min pheromone strategy is designed. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and algorithm. We find that under the loaded route strategy, the improved ant colony algorithm performs better than the basic ant colony algorithm. In addition, the proposed model can effectively characterize the buyer's loss-averse behavior.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(7127105171371002+1 种基金71471032)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,NEU,China(N140607001)
文摘A method for solving the winner determination problem （WDP） in multi-attribute procurement auctions is proposed, based on technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Firstly, on the background of procurements in China, a multi-attribute pro- curement auction mechanism is presented, where technical and business experts participate in the bid evaluation. Then, the concept of TOPSIS is used to determine the positive and negative ideal points of the WDP according to bid prices, the technical and business experts＇ evaluation information. Further, the closeness coefficient of each bidder （candidate supplier） is obtained by calculating the distances to the positive and negative ideal points. Thus, the winning supplier can be determined according to the closeness coefficients. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.
基金This work was partially supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61801167Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China under Grant No.BK20160874.
文摘With the emergence of ambient sensing technologies which combine mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things,large amount of people-centric data can be obtained and utilized to build people-centric services.Note that the service quality is highly related to the privacy level of the data.In this paper,we investigate the problem of privacy-aware service subscription in people-centric sensing.An efficient resource allocation framework using a combinatorial auction(CA)model is provided.Specifically,the resource allocation problem that maximizes the social welfare in view of varying requirements of multiple users is formulated,and it is solved by a proposed computationally tractable solution algorithm.Furthermore,the prices of allocated resources that winners need to pay are figured out by a designed scheme.Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
基金supported by the Foundation for the Author of National Excellent Doctoral Dissertation of China under Grant No. 200159National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 70571014
文摘To eliminate computational problems involved in evaluating multi-attribute bids with differentmeasures,this article first normalizes each individual component of a bid,and then makes use ofthe weighted product method to present a new scoring function that converts each bid into a score.Twokinds of multi-attribute auction models are introduced in terms of scoring rules and bidding objectivefunctions.Equilibrium bidding strategies,procurer's revenue comparisons and optimal auction designare characterized in these two models.Finally,this article discusses some improvement of robustnessof our models,with respect to the assumptions.
