By using the data collected from the years 2006 to 2012 of16 listed banks as samples,an empirical test was set up to analyze the impacts of corporate governance and government regulation towards bank stability. The re...By using the data collected from the years 2006 to 2012 of16 listed banks as samples,an empirical test was set up to analyze the impacts of corporate governance and government regulation towards bank stability. The results show that the nature and percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder,as well as the top10 shareholders, have no significant impact on bank stability.Supervision of board of directors increases bank stability, while independent directors could not play the role of supervision. Higher executive compensation increases bank stability,while shareholding of executives does not show much incentive function. Franchise value has self-regulatory effects. Capital regulation also improves bank stability. Implicit insurance covers the entire banking system.Improving corporate governance and government regulation to increase bank stability are put forward.展开更多
In today＇s globalized world, regulatory issues are heatedly debated, and experts can be divided into two groups based on their attitudes towards these issues. In the first group, representatives are in favor of stric...In today＇s globalized world, regulatory issues are heatedly debated, and experts can be divided into two groups based on their attitudes towards these issues. In the first group, representatives are in favor of stricter regulation, and representatives of the second group are in favor of removing legislative barriers in the markets of financial services. An important objective of the European Commission in recent years is to integrate the individual segments of the financial services into a whole so as to ensure the proper functioning of the whole to satisfy all the member states. The aim of this paper is to show the complexity of the regulatory environment, to point out the large number of institutions that cooperate in the creation of legislative measures, and also to highlight the different approaches to regulation in individual member countries and these issues do not ease the situation.展开更多
Climate change which is mainly caused by carbon emissions is a global problem affecting the economic development and well-being of human society.Low-carbon agriculture is of particular significance in slowing down glo...Climate change which is mainly caused by carbon emissions is a global problem affecting the economic development and well-being of human society.Low-carbon agriculture is of particular significance in slowing down global warming and reaching the goal of“carbon peak and carbon neutrality”.Therefore,taking straw incorporation as an example,this paper aims to investigate the impact of risk preferences on farmers’low-carbon agricultural technology(LCAT)adoption.Based on a two-phase micro-survey data of 1038 rice farmers in Jiangsu,Jiangxi,and Hunan provinces,this paper uses experimental economics methods to measure farmers’risk aversion and loss aversion to obtain the real risk preferences information of the farmers.We also explore the data to examine the actual LCAT adoption behavior of farmers.The results revealed that both risk aversion and loss aversion significantly inhibit farmers’LCAT adoption:more risk-averse or more loss-averse farmers are less likely to adopt LCAT.It is further found that crop insurance,farm scale and governmental regulations can alleviate the negative impact of risk aversion and loss aversion on farmers’LCAT adoption.Therefore,we propose that local governments need to promote low-carbon agricultural development by propagating the benefits of LCAT,extending crop insurance,promoting appropriate scale operations,and strengthening governmental regulations to promote farmers’LCAT adoption.展开更多
基金Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Youth Fund Project,China(No.12YJC630157)Shanghai University of Engineering Science,China(No.2012pg33)
文摘By using the data collected from the years 2006 to 2012 of16 listed banks as samples,an empirical test was set up to analyze the impacts of corporate governance and government regulation towards bank stability. The results show that the nature and percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder,as well as the top10 shareholders, have no significant impact on bank stability.Supervision of board of directors increases bank stability, while independent directors could not play the role of supervision. Higher executive compensation increases bank stability,while shareholding of executives does not show much incentive function. Franchise value has self-regulatory effects. Capital regulation also improves bank stability. Implicit insurance covers the entire banking system.Improving corporate governance and government regulation to increase bank stability are put forward.
文摘In today＇s globalized world, regulatory issues are heatedly debated, and experts can be divided into two groups based on their attitudes towards these issues. In the first group, representatives are in favor of stricter regulation, and representatives of the second group are in favor of removing legislative barriers in the markets of financial services. An important objective of the European Commission in recent years is to integrate the individual segments of the financial services into a whole so as to ensure the proper functioning of the whole to satisfy all the member states. The aim of this paper is to show the complexity of the regulatory environment, to point out the large number of institutions that cooperate in the creation of legislative measures, and also to highlight the different approaches to regulation in individual member countries and these issues do not ease the situation.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72103115)the Humanities and Social Science Research General Project of the Ministry of Education of China(21XJC790008)+1 种基金the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(2020T130393)the Social Science Foundation of Shaanxi Province,China(2021D028)。
文摘Climate change which is mainly caused by carbon emissions is a global problem affecting the economic development and well-being of human society.Low-carbon agriculture is of particular significance in slowing down global warming and reaching the goal of“carbon peak and carbon neutrality”.Therefore,taking straw incorporation as an example,this paper aims to investigate the impact of risk preferences on farmers’low-carbon agricultural technology(LCAT)adoption.Based on a two-phase micro-survey data of 1038 rice farmers in Jiangsu,Jiangxi,and Hunan provinces,this paper uses experimental economics methods to measure farmers’risk aversion and loss aversion to obtain the real risk preferences information of the farmers.We also explore the data to examine the actual LCAT adoption behavior of farmers.The results revealed that both risk aversion and loss aversion significantly inhibit farmers’LCAT adoption:more risk-averse or more loss-averse farmers are less likely to adopt LCAT.It is further found that crop insurance,farm scale and governmental regulations can alleviate the negative impact of risk aversion and loss aversion on farmers’LCAT adoption.Therefore,we propose that local governments need to promote low-carbon agricultural development by propagating the benefits of LCAT,extending crop insurance,promoting appropriate scale operations,and strengthening governmental regulations to promote farmers’LCAT adoption.
