Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information...Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.展开更多
On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and pro...On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and product nature, find different bargaining power and product nature important role for channel structure, and also present equilibrium result. Furthermore, the academic proof for channel structure choice is presented.展开更多
From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is...From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is discussed and the equilibrium result is found. Also the theoretical evidences for competing channel structure choice are given.展开更多
碳达峰碳中和的背景下、主动配电网(active distribution network,ADN)下多主体间能源共享有助于消纳弃风弃光。但随着各微网内风机光伏容量日益增加,每日微网净负荷峰谷趋势变化明显。传统分时电价逐渐很难发挥对微网的削峰填谷作用。...碳达峰碳中和的背景下、主动配电网(active distribution network,ADN)下多主体间能源共享有助于消纳弃风弃光。但随着各微网内风机光伏容量日益增加,每日微网净负荷峰谷趋势变化明显。传统分时电价逐渐很难发挥对微网的削峰填谷作用。提出考虑主动配电网下多主体能源共享调度策略,以主动配电网向下级微网的售电收益减去向主网购电成本所得净收益最大为目标函数,充分考虑下级多微网在电网议价下以微网自身运行成本最低为目标的调度自主性,运用卡罗需-库恩-塔克(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker,KKT)条件将下级多主体电能共享联盟运行成本最低的目标转化为上级目标的约束条件。引入KKT乘子,同时运用大M法对非线性约束进行线性化处理,提高模型求解速度。在MATLAB的Gurobi环境下,对连续的上下层耦合变量乘积进行离散化处理。最后,在IEEE33节点的主动配电网算例中验证所提模型的有效性。展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60972059)Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (PAPD)+3 种基金Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (Nos. 2010QNA27 and 2011QNB26)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 20100481185)the Ph. D. Programs Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Nos. 20090095120013 and 20110095120006)Talent Introduction Program, and Young Teacher Sailing Program of China University of Mining and Technology
文摘Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.
文摘On the problem of competing channel structure, we present asymmetry competing channel structure models under bargaining power, analyze the evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power and product nature, find different bargaining power and product nature important role for channel structure, and also present equilibrium result. Furthermore, the academic proof for channel structure choice is presented.
文摘From the bargaining process, competing channel structure models are presented. The evolving process of channel structure under different bargaining power is analyzed The important role of different bargaining power is discussed and the equilibrium result is found. Also the theoretical evidences for competing channel structure choice are given.
文摘碳达峰碳中和的背景下、主动配电网(active distribution network,ADN)下多主体间能源共享有助于消纳弃风弃光。但随着各微网内风机光伏容量日益增加,每日微网净负荷峰谷趋势变化明显。传统分时电价逐渐很难发挥对微网的削峰填谷作用。提出考虑主动配电网下多主体能源共享调度策略,以主动配电网向下级微网的售电收益减去向主网购电成本所得净收益最大为目标函数,充分考虑下级多微网在电网议价下以微网自身运行成本最低为目标的调度自主性,运用卡罗需-库恩-塔克(Karush-Kuhn-Tucker,KKT)条件将下级多主体电能共享联盟运行成本最低的目标转化为上级目标的约束条件。引入KKT乘子,同时运用大M法对非线性约束进行线性化处理,提高模型求解速度。在MATLAB的Gurobi环境下,对连续的上下层耦合变量乘积进行离散化处理。最后,在IEEE33节点的主动配电网算例中验证所提模型的有效性。
