Effects of China's Administrative Approval Reforms on Transaction Cost and Economic Growth

China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.

Judicial Administration Reform Promotes Human Rights——An interview with Zhang Sujun,Vice-Minister of Justice

Following is a transcript of an interview given to Human Rights by Zhang Sujun, China＇s Vice-Minister of Justice, on how the on-going judicial administration reform promotes the protection of human rights in the country.

Effect of Digitalization on Serbian Tax Administration Reform

This article introduces the digitalization trends in the Republic of Serbia and its impact on transformation processes within Serbian Tax Administration,with short overview of a case study—unified collection.

Climate change, migration, and regional administrative reform： A case study of Xinjiang in the middle Qing Dynasty(1760–1884)

Based on historical records of extreme climate events and population densities in Gansu and Shaanxi, and information on climate change, populations, new cultivated cropland, and administrative system reform in Xinjiang, this study explores the interaction between climate change, migration, and regional administrative reform in the middle Qing Dynasty. The results showed that the surge in population migration from Gansu and Shaanxi to Xinjiang during 1760–1820 was caused by extreme climate events(droughts and floods) and population pressure in Gansu and Shaanxi. During 1760–1880, the climate in Xinjiang was unusually cold and humid, which was highly conducive to abundant regional water resources. This provided favorable conditions for farmland irrigation and further promoted agricultural cultivation, population growth, and town development within this region. Additionally,the interactions between climate change and the above-mentioned social factors, which acted as driving forces, spurred the reform in the administrative system of Xinjiang whereby the military administration system was transformed to a province administration system. Through this reform, the Qing government managed to restore peace and stability in Xinjiang. This study contributes to a better understanding of climate-related population migration and enhances our knowledge of the impact-response chain between climate change, ancient social developments, and political coping strategies, especially in regional administrative reform.

A Jurisprudential Analysis of Authorization for Experimental Administrative Reform

As a new form of authorization with independent legal status, the authorization of experimental administrative reform falls between legislative and administrative authorization. Decisions on authorization of experimental administrative reform have two aspects, viz., 'the temporary adjustment or temporary suspension of the application of certain provisions of a law' and 'authorizing a given experimenting body to implement this decision.' In essence, the former is the organic combination of two elements: suspending the implementation of a law and formulating a new experimental law;it does not belong under amendment of the law. The latter, on the other hand, is a special legislative authorization similar to administrative franchise. As a method of exercising public power, authorization for experimental administrative reform should follow the procedural requirements laid down in the Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Certain Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Advancing the Law-based Governance of China;further, it may not overstep the bounds of the forms of expression or substantive contents determined by the principles of the modern rule of law.

Project Matching and Overcapacity in China

Based on the features of China's project investment,we consider the formation of production capacity as a matching behavior between local governments and investment enterprises.Using the search and matching model,we illustrate that the excess capacity in China mainly results from the asymmetry between the gains from and contribution to the project matching:The capacity will be excessive when the proportion of local governments' return exceeds its contribution to the project,and the more unbalanced the return-contribution relationship,the more severe the overcapacity.Meanwhile,we test this theoretical prediction based on a quasi-natural experiment:the reform of administrative approval system.The empirical results show that the reduction of the local governments' return-contribution ratio will significantly raise the capacity utilization rate and mitigate the overcapacity.Industry-specific regression results further indicate that governments' return-contribution asymmetry is more prominent in industries dominated by state-owned enterprises,high-monopoly industries,heavy industries,and industries with serious overcapacity.This paper offers a novel mechanism of overcapacity,a theoretical criterion for judging optimal capacity,and some new regulatory tools with the micro foundation.