Obstacles and Countermeasures for Policyoriented Agricultural Insurance Development in the Context of Agricultural Modernization

Agricultural insurance is a key impetus for agricultural modernization. How- ever, there are some problems on the aspect, including deficiency of law supports and top system design, less recognition on insurance of farmers and low effective demands of agricultural insurance market, huge agricultural risks and insufficient supply from agricultural insurance market, and shortage of reinsurance support and disaster risk desertification, hardly to deal with heavy disasters. Therefore, some countermeasures were proposed, including to formulate agricultural insurance laws and establish specific agricultural insurance management institutions, to reinforce promotion and improve premium subsidy system in order to increase market de- mands, to increase tax preference and operating costs, improve insurance services and enhance effective supply in market and to construct a risk diversification system of agricultural heavy disaster.

Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on vegetable production and countermeasures from an agricultural insurance perspective

In the face of the corona virus disease 2019(COVID-19)pandemic,it is essential to stabilize the security of urban“shopping baskets”.Through a survey and interviews with 46 agricultural cooperatives in Shanghai,this paper analyzes the impact of the pandemic on vegetable production and offers suggestions on agricultural insurance.The research results show that:(1)the pandemic has impacted almost all stages of the vegetable supply chain but has had a greater impact on the sales stage;(2)the market risks of vegetable production have increased significantly,and the gap between the field price and the market price has widened.The sales price difference between traditional channels and e-commerce is notable;(3)farmers’incomes have generally declined due to the COVID-19 pandemic,and traditional small-scale farmers have suffered more losses;and(4)agricultural insurance plays an important role in stabilizing the supply of vegetables to the city.To minimize the impact of the pandemic on vegetable production and to stabilize both urban“shopping baskets”and farmers’incomes,it is necessary to further improve agricultural insurance,especially to provide insurance against market risks.

Review of Agricultural Insurance Development in the New Period in China

Agricultural insurance is a great support for agricultural modernization in the new period. It plays a role of " stabilizer" in consecutive increase of yield and constant increase of farmers' income. This paper elaborated current situation of agricultural insurance development in China in the new period,analyzed existing problems,and came up with pertinent recommendations.

Bootstrap Simulation Study on Cooperation between Agricultural Insurance and Agricultural Credit

The economic compensation function of agricultural insurance can reduce the credit default risk of farmers. Therefore,the cooperative development of agricultural insurance and agricultural credit is an inevitable trend for the development of rural financial services. In this paper,the annual time series data of agricultural insurance and agricultural credit in 1994-2013 were used to carry out bootstrap simulation based Granger causality test and make the impulse response analysis. Results indicate that based on the Granger causality test of the whole samples( 1994-2013),there is no Granger causality relationship between agricultural insurance and agricultural credit; based on the test of sub-samples( 2002-2013),there is a two-way Granger causality relationship between agricultural insurance and agricultural credit,the rapid development of agricultural insurance brings about structural changes in agricultural credit; agricultural credit has a positive effect on agricultural insurance,and agricultural insurance has a greater effect on agricultural credit. Finally,it came up with policy recommendations for the cooperative development of agricultural insurance and agricultural credit.

Theory and Model of Agricultural Insurance Subsidy

The issue of agricultural insurance subsidy is discussed in this paper aiming to make it provided more rationally and sci- entifically. It is started with the connection between agricultural insurance and financial subsidy. It is really necessary and crucial to implement the financial insurance due to the bad operational performance, especially in the developing countries. But the sub- sidy should be provided more rationally because financial subsidy has lots of negative effects. A model in competitive insurance markets developed by Ahsan et al (1982) and a farmers' decision model are developed to solve the optimal subsidized rate. Finally, the equation is got to calculate it. But a quantitative subsidized rate is not made here because the calculation should be under some restricted conditions, which are always absent in the devel- oping countries. So the government should provide some subsidy for the ex ante research and preparation to get the scientific prob- ability and premium rate.

Reasons and Improving Strategies of Slow Development of Agricultural Insurance System in China

In order to establish modern agriculture and reduce harmful effects of natural disasters to agriculture, developing agricultural insurance and improving agricultural management system are essential. This paper firstly elaborated the feasibility and importance of improving agricultural economy, and analyzed some reasons which restricted China agricultural insurance developing speed, and then gave some improving suggestions in the end.

The Application and Modification of Delegation-Agent Model in Agricultural Insurance

The delegation-agent models in agricultural insurance are established both under the circumstances of information symmetry and information asymmetry.Insurers choose effort level-a* according to the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ11[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ11c'(a*)u(s(π)) at the present stage when the information is symmetric.While the information is asymmetric,the first order optimal condition changed into v'(π-s(π))u'(s(π))=λ21+μ21(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a)).In other words,the higher the output,the more and more income of insured.The paper also modifies the models,when the information is symmetric,the insurers determine the effort level of insured-a* based on the first order optimal condition of ∫{v(π-s(π))+λ12[u(s(π))]fa(π,a*)}dπ=λ12h'(a*)u(s(π));to the contrary,the first order optimal condition would change into v'(π*-s(π*))u'(s(π*))=λ22+μ22(1-fa(π,a)f(π,a))-λh(a)f(π,a)-μh'(a)f(π,a).The results show that the insured and the insurers would both benefit from the insurance when the effort cost function related to the expectation of the insured(agricultural producers).If the insured manage the objects of insurance more seriously,the rate of disasters would be lowered.Therefore,the insurance claimed against the insured would be lessened,and the benefits of the insurers would be increased at last.

Researches on Agricultural Cooperative Economic Organization Promoting Agricultural Insurance Development

The advantages of cooperative economic organization being the effective carrier of agricultural insurance development are analyzed. Firstly, cooperative economic organization promotes scale management and solves the problem of decentralized operation of small households. Secondly, cooperative economic organization can settle the problem of peasants' low systematization. Thirdly, cooperative economic organization can largely reduce the costs of agricultural insurance operation. Fourthly, cooperative organization decreases moral risks as well as adverse selection to some extent. Lastly, cooperative organization, to a certain degree, reduces the risks of agricultural production and increases the insurability of agricultural risks. Meanwhile, limitations of agricultural cooperative economic organization being the carrier of agricultural insurance operation are pointed out. Firstly, cooperative economic organization has limited coverage and small size of organization, which is harmful to the diversification of agricultural risks. Secondly, cooperative economic organization lacks capital funds and its development is not standard, which is not perfect for the function exertion as a carrier. Lastly, members of professional cooperative organization have low cultural qualities, which restrict the implementation of agricultural insurance. The modes of farmers' cooperative economic organization promoting agricultural insurance development are proposed, including mode of agricultural insurance cooperative ( mutual corporation), mode of "leading enterprises (companies) + professional cooperative organization (planting majors) + insurance" and mode of professional cooperatives serving as agricultural insurance agent. Last of all, the promoting role of agricultural insurance in agricultural cooperative economic organization is briefly illustrated.

Application of Security Index in Evaluation of Agricultural Insurance Security Level

At present,there is still no unified standard for evaluation of agricultural insurance security level,especially in the quantitative evaluation. In order to explore a scientific and reasonable evaluation method for agricultural insurance security level,this paper analyzed the current situation of evaluation methods of social insurance,endowment insurance and medical insurance,as well as the application of security index. It is expected to provide a certain reference for evaluation of agricultural insurance security level by the agricultural insurance security index.

Optimization of Structure of Agricultural Insurance Subsidies:A Multi-task Principal Agent Model

Optimizing the structure of agricultural insurance subsidies is of great significance to increasing the supply of agricultural insurance and strengthening the effects of agricultural insurance policies.This paper optimized the structure of agricultural insurance subsidies.It decomposed insurance activities into three parts:underwriting,claim settlement,and agricultural services.Next,it incorporated adverse selection risks,moral hazards,agricultural production and operation risks,insurance company's behavioral decisions and its risk attitudes into the multi-task principal agent analysis framework.Finally,it discussed how the government designs a subsidy mechanism and adjusts the subsidy structure to increase the insurance supply.

Promoting Agricultural Insurance

The weather calamity in south China has pushed the country to extend insurance coverage to

Feasibility Analysis of Agricultural Product Price Index Insurance Based on Pilot Cases

Agricultural product price index insurance is a kind of index insurance. It avoids defects of traditional agricultural insurance,such as moral hazards,adverse selection,and high management cost. On the basis of studying agricultural product price index insurance of all areas of China,this paper analyzed characteristics of agricultural product price index insurance from object selection,product object,premium design,and policy support,and discussed feasibility of extending agricultural product price index insurance in an all-round way.

Scheme of Weather-Based Indemnity Indices for Insuring Against Freeze Damage to Citrus Orchards in Zhejiang,China

We design a weather-based indemnity index for the insurance against freeze damage to citrus orchards so as to provide technological support for the development of policy-based agriculture. The indices are prepared by separating a relative meteorological yield from the yield that is dependent on tree age, high-yield and low-yield years, and environmental factors, and then using a risk assessment scheme to determine the percentage yield reduction due to the meteorological hazard. We thus develop a set of indices associated with cold temperature damage with which to construct more severe weather indices in conjunction with the yield percentage decrease. We then combine the insured regional citrus yield index with the insured meteorological counterpart to obtain a weather-based indemnity index for the varying degree of freeze damage to crops. When the freeze damage index （FDI） is greater than -7.0℃ for the coastal belt of Zhejiang Province, China, or greater than -9.0℃ for other regions of Zhejiang, weather-based indemnity index （WBII） is zero, meaning there is no compensation; when the FDI is from -7.0 to -7.9℃ for the coastal belt or from -9.0 to -9.9℃ for other regions, the WBII is 1 with 50% compensation; when the FDI is from -8.0 to -8.9℃ for the coastal belt or from -10.0 to -10.9℃ for other regions, the WBII is 2 with 70% compensation; and when the FDI is less than -9.0℃ for the coastal belt or less than -11.0℃ for other regions, the WBII is 3 with 90% compensation. The weather indemnity indices of insured orchards are developed in the interest of owners, thereby eliminating adverse selection and moral hazard issues and providing timely recompense from the insurer, and resolving the problem of high indemnity cost in agricultural insurance.

Price transmission in hog and feed markets of China

There is an increasing demand for feed as the industrialization of hog production in China. Land scarcity limits China＇s ability to continue increasing its hog production without feed imports, particularly soybean, and the feed markets are increasingly integrated into the global market. This study performs an analysis of price transmission between the hog price in China and feed prices, specifically domestic maize price and international soybean price, from January 2000 to April 2014. We identified a long-term stable equilibrium relationship between the three markets. However, further analyses show that there is no significant Granger causality between hog and feed market, and the long-run equilibrium partially results from Granger causality between the international soybean market and domestic maize market. This suggests that the domestic hog market has been distorted by different policies. The results also indicate that the efficiency of price transmission is very low and it takes about 11 months to correct one-half of any long-run disequilibrium for the hog market in China. Therefore, to stabilize hog price in China, only market intervention to regulate the maize and soybean markets would be insufficient and comprehensive measures need to be taken into account such as hog production modernization, agricultural insurance, epidemic surveillance etc.

Agricultural Risk Modeling Challenges in China:Probabilistic Modeling of Rice Losses in Hunan Province

This article summarizes a joint research projec undertaken under the Risk Management Solutions, Inc(RMS) banner to investigate some of the possible approaches for agricultural risk modeling in China. Two modeling approaches were investigated—the simulated weather crop index and the burn yield analysis approach. The study was limited to Hunan Province and a single crop—rice. Both modeling approaches were dealt with probabilistically and were able to produce probabilistic risk metrics. Illustrative model outputs are also presented. The article discusses the robustness of the modeling approaches and their dependence on the availability, access to, and quality of weather and yield data. We offer our perspective on the requirements for models and platforms for agricultural risk quantification in China in order to respond to the needs of all stakeholders in agricultural risk transfer.

Rainfall-Related Weather Indices for Three Main Crops in China

Rainfall-relatedhazards—deficitrainand excessive rain—inevitably stress crop production,and weather index insurance is one possible financial tool to mitigate such agro-metrological losses.In this study,we investigated where two rainfall-related weather indices—anomaly-based index(AI)and humidity-based index(HI)—could be best used for three main crops(rice,wheat,and maize)in China’s main agricultural zones.A county is defined as an“insurable county”if the correlation between a weather index and yield loss was significant.Among maize-cropping counties,both weather indices identified more insurable counties for deficit rain than for excessive rain(AI:172 vs 63;HI:182 vs 68);moreover,AI identified lower basis risk for deficit rain in most agricultural zones while HI for excessive rain.For rice,the number of AIinsurable counties was higher than the number of HI-insurable counties for deficit rain(274 vs 164),but lower for excessive rain(199 vs 272);basis risks calculated by two weather indices showed obvious difference only in Zone I.Finally,more wheat-insurable counties(AI:196 vs 71;HI:73 vs 59)and smaller basis risk indicate that both weather indices performed better for excessive rain in wheatplanting counties.In addition,most insurable counties showed independent yield loss,but did not necessarily result in effective risk pooling.This study is a primary evaluation of rainfall-related weather indices for the three main crops in China,which will be significantly helpful to the agricultural insurance market and governments’policy making.