Phenomenal Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Animal Suffering

In this article I will confront Antonio Damasio＇s theory （exposed in his last book Self Comes to Mind） with the criticism it received from Ned Block. The latter holds that Damasio does not distinguish the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness and this has two kinds of consequences. One is that it cannot satisfactorily explain certain mental states （dreams, vegetative states）; the other is that it has harmful consequences for animal ethics. I maintain that to compare the two theories we can only rely on our pre-theoretical intuition of consciousness. Thus, I argue that Dam^tsio＇s theory combines more with our intuitions. One of the reasons is that the cases that Block describes as phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness （and without self-consciousness） are best explained as being cases of mind without consciousness. Dam^sio＇s theory can also explain those referred cases which are theoretically problematic. Moreover, Dam^isio has a threshold model （an expression by Barry Dainton）, which is something that Block seems to ignore. This model fits well with the intuitions and neurological knowledge that we normally have on animal consciousness. Dam^isio＇s core self and his theory of emotions and feelings allow us to understand why we feel compassion for animals. Therefore, we are able to develop an animal ethics, which does not mean that we are required to do so. So even though Damasio does not solve the mystery of consciousness, he should not be the subject of Block＇s criticism.

Application of the genome editing tool CRISPR/Cas9 in non-human primates

In the past three years, RNA-guided Cas9 nuclease from the microbial clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats （CRISPR） adaptive immune system has been used to facilitate efficient genome editing in many model and non-model animals. However, its application in nonhuman primates is still at the early stage, though in view of the similarities in anatomy, physiology, behavior and genetics, closely related nonhuman primates serve as optimal models for human biology and disease studies. In this review, we summarize the current proceedings of gene editing using CRISPR/Cas9 in nonhuman primates.

On The Supposed Importance of Intrinsic Value in Animal and Environmental Ethics

The idea of intrinsic value is pervasive in environmental ethics and animal ethics.In fact,the view that certain non-human animals and the environment have intrinsic value is the basis of many ethicists’claim that we are morally obligated to treat these non-human animals and the environment well.In this paper,I argue that these ethicists often conflate intrinsic and final value.If something is finally valuable,then it is valuable for its own sake or in its own right either in virtue of its internal or external properties.To be intrinsically valuable is just to be finally valuable in virtue of one’s internal or intrinsic properties.Given this understanding of intrinsic value,many animal and environmental ethicists end up committing themselves to the view that the source of the moral status of certain non-human animals and the environment is some set of their respective internal or intrinsic properties.However,I argue that the value that they are often concerned with is based on non-human animals’and the environment’s external or extrinsic properties(sentience,rareness,uniqueness,diversity,etc.).This means that these ethicists need only defend the claim that certain non-human animals and the environment are extrinsically finally valuable as opposed to intrinsically valuable.