In this article I will confront Antonio Damasio＇s theory （exposed in his last book Self Comes to Mind） with the criticism it received from Ned Block. The latter holds that Damasio does not distinguish the concepts ...In this article I will confront Antonio Damasio＇s theory （exposed in his last book Self Comes to Mind） with the criticism it received from Ned Block. The latter holds that Damasio does not distinguish the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness and this has two kinds of consequences. One is that it cannot satisfactorily explain certain mental states （dreams, vegetative states）; the other is that it has harmful consequences for animal ethics. I maintain that to compare the two theories we can only rely on our pre-theoretical intuition of consciousness. Thus, I argue that Dam^tsio＇s theory combines more with our intuitions. One of the reasons is that the cases that Block describes as phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness （and without self-consciousness） are best explained as being cases of mind without consciousness. Dam^sio＇s theory can also explain those referred cases which are theoretically problematic. Moreover, Dam^isio has a threshold model （an expression by Barry Dainton）, which is something that Block seems to ignore. This model fits well with the intuitions and neurological knowledge that we normally have on animal consciousness. Dam^isio＇s core self and his theory of emotions and feelings allow us to understand why we feel compassion for animals. Therefore, we are able to develop an animal ethics, which does not mean that we are required to do so. So even though Damasio does not solve the mystery of consciousness, he should not be the subject of Block＇s criticism.展开更多
文摘In this article I will confront Antonio Damasio＇s theory （exposed in his last book Self Comes to Mind） with the criticism it received from Ned Block. The latter holds that Damasio does not distinguish the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness and this has two kinds of consequences. One is that it cannot satisfactorily explain certain mental states （dreams, vegetative states）; the other is that it has harmful consequences for animal ethics. I maintain that to compare the two theories we can only rely on our pre-theoretical intuition of consciousness. Thus, I argue that Dam^tsio＇s theory combines more with our intuitions. One of the reasons is that the cases that Block describes as phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness （and without self-consciousness） are best explained as being cases of mind without consciousness. Dam^sio＇s theory can also explain those referred cases which are theoretically problematic. Moreover, Dam^isio has a threshold model （an expression by Barry Dainton）, which is something that Block seems to ignore. This model fits well with the intuitions and neurological knowledge that we normally have on animal consciousness. Dam^isio＇s core self and his theory of emotions and feelings allow us to understand why we feel compassion for animals. Therefore, we are able to develop an animal ethics, which does not mean that we are required to do so. So even though Damasio does not solve the mystery of consciousness, he should not be the subject of Block＇s criticism.
