Do anti-corruption campaigns affect IPO underpricing?Evidence from a central discipline inspection of the CSRC in China

The system of central discipline inspections has become a key anti-corruption governance tool in China since 2013.This paper investigates the impact of a central discipline inspection of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC)on initial public offering(IPO)underpricing.We find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period exhibit greater IPO underpricing than those listed outside the inspection period.The reason is the increased focus of the CSRC on maintaining capital market stability,which makes it more inclined to approve IPO firms with lower issue prices during the inspection period compared with other periods.We also find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period have better short-term market performance but poorer long-term returns than those listed outside the inspection period.Moreover,the effect of the anti-corruption inspection on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises,firms with low-quality auditors and firms located in regions with high corruption.Overall,our paper enriches the literature on IPO underpricing and the economic consequences of the central discipline inspection system.

Anti-corruption, government subsidies, and investment efficiency

The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enter- prises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that govern- ment subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the govern- ment has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized stateowned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency.We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between governmentand enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.

Are foreign monks better at chanting? The effect of ‘airborne’ SDICs on anti-corruption

The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.

Anti-corruption, marketisation and firm behaviours: evidence from firm innovation in China

China has launched an anti-corruption campaign since theEighteenth CPC National Congress, which has exerted widespreadinfluences on Chinese politics and economy. This paper examinesthe effect of the anti-corruption initiative on firm behaviours fromthe perspective of research and development (R&D) investments. Itshows that pursuing political connections and improving innovation are two mutually exclusive alternatives for firm growth inChina. The anti-corruption campaign raises the cost of seeking forpolitical bond and strengthens the incentive for firm innovation.After anti-corruption policies and regulations were issued, R&Dexpenditure in politically connected firms increases significantly;the anti-corruption initiative has positive effects on firm innovation.Further research shows that the effects vary with different types offirms. For state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the anti-corruptioninitiative only increases the R&D investments of firms with seniorexecutives who used to serve in the government;while for nonstate-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), this campaign has all-aroundpositive effects on their R&D investments. In the meantime, a heterogeneity at the provincial level is observed: R&D investments offirms with political connections increase more significantly in provinces with more intense anti-corruption efforts. Finally, marketisation also has a role to play. For regions with a more developedmarket economy, anti-corruption increases the innovation of firmswith political connections;whereas in regions with a less developed market economy, this effect is insignificant. This paper provides evidence for the opinion that anti-corruption is favourable toeconomic growth in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, ituses data obtained from the anti-corruption policy experimentsince the Eighteenth CPC National Congress and the difference-indifferences (DID) method to further test the hypotheses.

The Anti-corruption Discourse of China: Cracking down on "Tigers"

Fighting corruption has been a signature theme in the governance of China since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(CCCPC)in 2012.Among the extensive attention from academic and policy discourse to this unprecedented anti-corruption elfort in CPC's history,there are studies that take the one-sided view that the effort under way is not anti-corruption in its strict sense as it relies on the Party mechanism rather than the legal system,scripted,and calculated for the narrow self-interest of factional power enhancement.Reviewing contemporary fundamental anti-corruption discourses,anchored in critical discourse analysis,and assisted by 134 circulars of intra-Party disciplinary punishments of corrupt high-ranking officials(“tigers”,dalaohu),this interdisciplinary study reveals that,by contrast,China adopts an integrated approach to corruption,which incorporates republican and liberal-rationalist beliefs and values.Specifically,it is characterized by CCCPC as leadership,the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as political agency,both following a mentality of the rule of law,and by the coordination between intra-Party disciplinary rules and state laws.This approach is appropriate because it conceptualizes corruption by targeting the main feature of the corruption-related problem.This study contributes from a discoursal perspective to the understanding of China's anti-corruption in the Xi Jinping Era.

The Analysis of China’s Integrity Situation Based on Big Data

In order to study deeply the prominent problems faced by China’s clean government work,and put forward effective coping strategies,this article analyzes the network information of anti-corruption related news events,which is based on big data technology.In this study,we take the news report from the website of the Communist Party of China(CPC)Central Commission for Discipline Inspection(CCDI)as the source of data.Firstly,the obtained text data is converted to word segmentation and stop words under preprocessing,and then the pre-processed data is improved by vectorization and text clustering,finally,after text clustering,the key words of clean government work is derived from visualization analysis.According to the results of this study,it shows that China’s clean government work should focus on‘the four forms of decadence’issue,and related departments must strictly crack down five categories of phenomena,such as“illegal payment of subsidies or benefits,illegal delivery of gifts and cash gift,illegal use of official vehicles,banquets using public funds,extravagant wedding ceremonies and funeral”.The results of this study are consistent with the official data released by the CCDI’s website,which also suggests that the method is feasible and effective.

Should 'Anti-Corruption' Accounts Be Abolished?

The "account against corruption" originated in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. At the beginning of 2000, after Xu Yunhong, former Secretary of the Ningbo Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, and some other top officials were arrested on corruption charges, the municipal government set up

The politics of anti-corruption reforms and reversals in Uganda’s changing political terrain

The article discusses the increasing levels of public sector corruption despite the NRM government’s pursuing of accountability reforms and anti-corruption policy strategies.It asserts that having an impressive legal and institutional framework in place to enhance accountability and control corrupt tendencies may not be enough if political factors are ignored.In the absence of exemplary political leadership and support to institutions that enforce compliance,fighting corruption will remain a far cry.The article further argues that in circumstances where the political terrain ascribes to patron-client and neo-patrimonial instruments to consolidate and retain power,curbing public sector corruption will be elusive.The article insists that fighting public sector corruption largely depends on political commitment and less on the semblance of laws,institutions and technocrats.

关于防腐倡廉的社会文化基础（英文）

The fight against corruption is the foundation of a permanent topic of statehood is not a slight relaxation of the basic work of building a socialist harmonious society is the essential part. Social development is multifaceted, spiritual civilization and political civilization, civilization or system is one of the important aspects of the fight against corruption and both are closely related. "People are going to a little spirit." With lofty lofty ideals and beliefs, will working hard. Effectively preventing corruption is an inevitable requirement of anti-corruption construction depth development. Major cases and typical cases continue to be exposed and dealt with, demonstrates our continued efforts to increase the party's anti-corruption. We must also realize, to carry out anti-corruption work, increase the intensity of only handling the investigation and punish corrupt elements were not enough, you must firmly establish the concept of focusing on prevention, increasing efforts to prevent corruption from the source.

The impact of anti-corruption measures and risk effects on equity incentives and financial misreporting in China

This study examines the effects of anti-corruption and equity incentive risk on financial misreporting in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership structure and governance regime.Using a sample comprising 2,708 cases of financial restatement over the 2007-2017 period.Our key findings suggest that managers’shareholdings are significantly and positively associated with their firms’financial misreporting,and certain equity risk factors dramatically alter Chinese corporate governance.Furthermore,managers’motivation to misreport is significantly more pronounced in non-state owned enterprises(nonSOEs),suggesting that equity incentive risk effects mitigate the"absence of ownership"problem believed to affect SOEs.Managers in highly competitive industries and firms with low institutional ownership are found to be highly motivated to misreport performance.

Disciplinarian Heads Anti-Corruption Bureau

China has recently ramped up its anti-corruption efforts by establishing the National Corruption Prevention Bureau(NCPB).Appointed to lead the bureau,which falls under the Chinese Central Government。

Legal-Ease EU Anti-Corruption Measures for European Businesses in China

Currently, the European Union (EU) has few provisions in place to deal with the risks to EU business, relating to corruption, in developing countries like China. In this respect, the EU lags well behind the United States. According to our recent research, plans to rectify this are in the pipeline. When these plans will emerge, however, is an open question. Existing provisions and policy In 1995, EU ministers adopted the Convention on

Are Numeric Targets Suitable for Anti-corruption Work?

A new accountability system was recently adopted by the Henan Provincial Higher People’s Procuratorate to enable local anticorruption agencies to deal with a greater number of corruption cases more effectively. Under the system, heads of the least effective bureaus

Corruption,state capture,and the effectiveness of anticorruption agency in post-communist Ethiopia

In 2001,Ethiopia established a centralised anti-corruption agency(ACA),the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission(FEACC),purportedly to be used for curbing the rampant corruption.By the government’s repeated admissions,corruption continues to engulf the country,indicating the failure of the FEACC to curb corruption.Various researchers attribute the FEACC’s failures to curb corruption to a host of reasons.This article follows a different route to show why the FEACC was doomed to fail from the outset.We show that the war against corruption in Ethiopia collapsed mainly because of mischaracterisation of the nature of corruption in the country and how the FEACC was established–a conventional anti-corruption agency for a nonconventional problem of corruption.We deploy some testable hypotheses to explore the scenarios under which an anticorruption agency would be effective.Drawing from the corruption literature of post-communist countries,the article shows that corrupt Ethiopian practices can easily be subsumed under an extreme version of the highest form of corruption known as state capture.The article then moves onto unpacking the systemic and predatory nature of the Ethiopian corruption conundrum and how the FEACC approached in tackling it.Doing so allows us to illustrate the endogenous nature of the country’s corruption patterns and why a traditional ACA is incapable of tackling a state-driven patronage.It also lays out the flawed structures and practices of the FEACC showing why,under a state-crafted corruption conundrum,the FEACC was doomed to fail from the start.The article concludes by illustrating the detrimental effects of using the agency as a political weapon to neutralise the ruling party’s political opponents as well as the failure of the war against corruption.It calls for a different approach in combating the Ethiopian systemic corruption,a governance regime change being one of them.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO TACKLING CORRUPTION： WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN＇T？

A well-developed set of international anti-corruption tools now exists. These range from broad conventions to focused initiatives in specific policy areas. This article argues that international agreements work best when they are focused and they speak to the common interests of the parties involved. Solutions need to be creative, they need to bring in a broad coalition of stakeholders and they need to be focused on specific problems. International agreements need to help states with good quality institutions of governance focus on developing transparency initiatives, accountability drives and nuanced efforts to tackle particular national variants of ＂legal corruption.＂ In countries with patchy institutions of governance the scope for international influence is broader, while in states with serious governance challenges the best international anti-corruption efforts will often have surprisingly little to do with corruption at all. In a state where the rule of law is patchy or non-existent then anti-corruption laws （or indeed laws more generally） mean very little. The challenge here is to improve the basic tools of governance in the knowledge that only then can the issue of corruption be brought on to the agenda.

DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTED BY ICSID TRIBUNALS IN DECIDING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORRUPTION CASES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The issue of corruption has attracted increasing attention in the study and practice of international investment law during recent years.After taking prudent consideration of the corruption defense invoked by the host states in some international investment arbitration cases involved with corruption,International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID)tribunals accordingly determined the final awards.However,some parts of the arbitral jurisprudence aroused strong criticism,especially with regard to the ICSID tribunals’reasoning that arbitrators have no jurisdiction over corruption-tainted international investments.The ICSID tribunals are legitimately supposed to exercise their jurisdiction and are lawfully obliged to probe into the nature of corrupt activities.The tribunals are strongly expected to adopt a balanced approach in deciding the merits and fairly weighing the obligations,rights,and interests of both disputing parties.It is preferable to strengthen the collaborative interaction between ICSID proceedings and domestic anti-corruption enforcement mechanisms when it comes to combating corrupt international investment activities.Existing international treaties(or specific treaty provisions)on combating corruption in international business transactions and calling for international cooperation,alongside domestic anti-corruption enforcement legislation,have actually laid solid legal foundations for the establishment of such an anti-corruption coordinative mechanism between ICSID and domestic corruption regulatory authorities on the global level.